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Executive Summary 
Rwanda has embraced a pluralistic 
political system defined by Dialogue and 
Consensus approach in order to tackle 
issues of national and local interest. This 
commitment is clearly set out in article 
9 of the Constitution which commits 
the Government of Rwanda to promote 
and reinforce a number of fundamental 
principles among which the principle 
of “constant quest of solutions 
through Dialogue and Consensus”. The 
Senate  has been assigned the role of 
ensuring that the principle is being 
implemented nationwide (article 87 
of the Constitution). The importance 
attached to the principle of Dialogue 
and Consensus is materialized by the 
number of policies and mechanisms in 
place to promote and sustain it.   
It is in line with article 9 of the 
Constitution that the Senate has carried 
out a study designed to find out how 
Rwandans understand the principle of 
Dialogue and Consensus, and whether 
tools put in place to promote and create 
an enabling environment for Dialogue 
and Consensus Frameworks are 
achieving their objectives. The research 
on Dialogue and Consensus focused on 
mechanisms such as Gacaca, Abunzi, 
Umuganda, Community Development 
Committees, National Women Council, 
National Youth Council, Itorero, Girinka, 
Ubudehe, Community Juries, and 
advisory councils. In addition the study 
captured views on the trust in various 
institutions at national and local level 
as well as trust in family members and 
friends. To better inform this study, both 
quantitative and qualitative methods 
were used in order to identify the extent 
to which and for whom the mechanisms 
for Dialogue and Consensus are working 
and how they might be improved.
Results from the household survey 
suggest that there is a relatively high 
level of community engagement, with 
84 per cent of respondents to the survey 
having participated in community 
meetings on at least several occasions 
over the previous year and 76 per cent 
having worked with others to develop 
a programme. The correlation between 
people who frequently participate 
in community meetings and those 
involved in working together with other 
members of the community to develop 
a programme is high (0.69). In contrast, 
the level of engagement in civil society 
organizations is much lower with little 
evidence of multiple memberships; 37 
per cent of respondents are members 
of one or more, but most belong just 
to one. The mean for the index of 
density of participation in civil society 
organization is 2.1 on a scale of 13 
points. Furthermore, those aged 51 
years and over are significantly more 
likely to participate in dense networks 
than the younger age groups but less 
likely than those in mid-life (M 2.0).
There is also a high level of knowledge 
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of the mechanisms that operate at a 
local level, but a much lower level of 
knowledge about those at a national 
level. Only 11 per cent of respondents 
had heard of all the mechanisms. 
Findings suggest that 95 per cent of 
respondents had some engagement 
with at least one mechanism and 
participated because they thought the 
activity was important.    
However, frequent and multiple 
engagements with mechanisms is 
lower (the mean of index of density of 
engagement is 7.9 on a scale of 16 point 
or 4.9 on a 10 points scale).  
The levels of high satisfaction with a 
mechanism (8 out of 10 or higher by 
those that gave a rating) ranged from 83 
per cent for Umuganda to 51 per cent for 
the National Dialogue Summit. Ingando, 
Gacaca, Girinka and Itorero are the 
mechanisms considered by respondents 
to be the major contributors to Dialogue 
and Consensus with respectively 77.6%, 
75.4%, 72.7% and 70% being satisfied, 
while Ubudehe (30.6%), Community 
Development Committees (30%) and 
National Youth Council (38.4%) are thought 
by respondents to contribute the least to 
Dialogue and Consensus. 
To the question on what the community 
could do if there were problems with 
leaders, the most frequent response 
was “to discuss it”. The responsibility 
for the success or failure of mechanisms 
was rarely attributed to the community, 
and the main responsibility for solving 
problems was seen to lay with leaders 
Members of the community were 
confident in their ability to work 
together on community projects (87%), 
but less confidence in their ability to do 
so without conflict (51%) or that they 
could actually work together to solve 
a problem (51%). The level of altruism 
is low (with a mean of 4.3 on a 10 
point scale) and most people are said 
to be motivated by self-interest (73%) 
although 70 per cent of respondents 
thought that people could be relied on 
to fulfil their obligations.
With regard to trust, the findings shown 
that trust in politicians and the forces of 
law and order are high, with more than 
80 per cent of respondents saying that 
they trust them. The President (99%) 
and the army (96%) have the highest 
levels while political parties are the 
least trusted institutions with 61.3%. At 
a local level, the trust is high for district 
mayors (84.4%) whilst members of the 
cell council (79%) are the least trusted. 
There was relatively high levels of trust 
in family members (74.4%), friends 
(78.7%) and neighbours (85%). The 
level of trust in other people in general 
was relatively high with a mean of 7.1 
on a 10 point scale. There is a significant 
difference in generalized trust across 
the Provinces.
Findings from FGDs support, to some 
extent, the quantitative findings. There 
is evidence of the existence of thick 
networks of social engagement. There 
is a greater awareness of mechanisms 
that operate at the local level and 
less awareness of those that operate 
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at district and national levels. Also in 
most of FGDs the participants said 
that leaders informed them about 
policies and initiatives during meeting 
held after Umuganda. High levels of 
engagement with some mechanism 
of Dialogue and Consensus were said 
mainly to be motivated by the fear of 
being fined. What did come across in 
the FGDs was significant involvement 
in dispute resolution at a local level. 
FGDs participants told us that citizens 
at local level have learnt how to 
resolve disputes themselves and if 
they could not then neighbours in the 
village discussed the issues and made 
recommendations. Disputes were less 
frequently being referred to village 
leaders and especially to the cell and 
Abunzi than in the past.
As suggested by both the qualitative 
and quantitative findings, mechanisms 
for Dialogue and Consensus have 
helped local communities to solve 
problems for themselves to some 
extent. The mechanisms for Dialogue 
and Consensus are making a direct 
and indirect contribution to the 
increase in social cohesion. They 
make a direct contribution by building 
trust through participation in solving 
community problems thereby building 
a common understanding of what is 
in the interest of the community.  In 
many communities there seems to 
be a strong collective commitment to 
these mechanisms (Umuganda, Abunzi, 
Community Juries, etc.) and recognition 
of what they achieve for the whole 
community. Mechanisms such as 
Umuganda, the Abunzi, Community 
juries and Girinka were seen to bring 
benefits to the community, not only 
through the building of infrastructure 
including schools, roads and houses for 
the extremely poor and the elderly, but 
also through providing effective means 
for resolving disputes especially those 
involving land. 
Indirectly, the increase in social 
capital itself provides an important 
context for economic activities which 
enable individuals to improve their 
economic situation and contribute 
more generally to economic growth. 
The main motivation for participating 
in community work was commitment 
to improving their community. In some 
cases the community work undertaken 
during Umuganda was seen as 
benefitting the whole community 
and in other cases the vulnerable and 
very deprived. This is what enables 
the building of social cohesion by the 
development of an understanding of the 
collective interests of the community.
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Introduction	 	 	
to	the	Report	
Following the devastating Genocide 
against the Tutsi in 1994, Rwanda has 
deliberately set out to build a society 
that is socially cohesive and makes the 
good life possible for all (Musoni 2007). 
It has aimed not just to overcome 
sectarian divides but for economic, 
political and social transformation. 
It is widely acknowledged as one of 
the success stories in post-conflict 
reconstruction and development. Just 
20 years after the Genocide against 
Tutsi which destroyed the country, 
it has a stable Government and a 
growing economy, poverty is declining, 
economic transformation is beginning 
and the country is on track to achieve 
most of the MDGs. Good governance 
has been at the heart of the country’s 
development strategy and central to 
this has been accountability and citizen 
participation. Frameworks have been 
put in place for all layers of society to 
contribute to the development process 
through civic engagement utilising 
mechanisms of Dialogue and Consensus. 
The aim has been to recreate a sense of 
national identity and loyalty through an 
emphasis on one language, one culture, 
one history and one people. 
Rwanda has deliberately set out to 
build social cohesion, a prerequisite for 
a society to survive and progress and an 
essential strategy for reducing the risk 
of future cataclysmic breakdown. Social 
cohesion is strongest when a majority 
of members of society consider 
themselves to be stakeholders. Beyond 
enabling people to work together and 
live in peace and harmony, it provides 
an essential basis for economic 
development and the context in 
which individuals can convert their 
capabilities into functioning (e.g. Sen 
1999). Conflict destroys the very social 
fabric of a society as well human capital 
and physical infrastructure. Building a 
post-conflict state means moving from 
chaos, insecurity and instability to 
the establishment of order, regulated 
institutions and improved human 
welfare. In addition to infrastructure 
development, rebuilding the economy 
and investment in human capital, 
there is a need to develop a new ‘social 
contract’. Building social cohesion by 
establishing shared norms and values 
and a common understanding of the 
rules governing political and social 
life is central to this. It is important 
for legitimating political authority, 
encouraging participation in decision 
making at all levels, contributing to the 
reform of institutions and the shaping of 
the development and implementation 
of social and economic policies. Trust 
in Government, trust in the rule of law, 
trust in institutions, trust in civil society, 
trust in family, friends and neighbours 
and generalised trust in others is 
essential if life is to go on as normal. 
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Trust underpins our ability to interact 
with others on a daily basis without 
having to constantly worry about the 
outcomes of our interactions.
The research on which this report is 
based set out to determine the extent 
to which the mechanisms put in place to 
recreate social cohesion are doing so and 
the extent to which Rwanda is making 
life good. It does so by considering the 
ways and extent to which adults are 
participating in the mechanisms and 
how they are contributing to the growth 
of generalised trust which provides the 
basis for social cohesion at community 
and national levels. 1 It aims to inform 
policy debates and to provide policy-
makers with solutions to real-world 
policy challenges. 
1.2. The	Impact	of	the	
Genocide	
The Genocide against the Tutsi in 
1994 destroyed not only the physical 
infrastructure but the very social 
fabric of the society. It constituted 
a totally systemic breakdown; not 
only through the destruction of the 
physical infrastructure, the economy, 
human capital and the institutions 
of governance, but the very fabric of 
society itself, the norms and values 
1  Community in this report generally means the 
Umuganda or village, a settlement of between about 
100 and 150 households which forms the lowest unit 
of administration under the decentralisation policy. In 
remote rural areas the households may be scattered 
over a wide area with each living in its own plot of 
land.  In total about 37 per cent of the population live 
in isolated rural dwellings (NISR 2012a).
that provide the very basis for a shared 
social life. It divided the population 
and undermined interpersonal and 
communal trust and destroyed the 
norms and values that underlie 
cooperation and collective action for 
the common good and increased the 
likelihood of communal strife.
Although the extent of the destruction 
of human life, the displacement of 
the population and the impact on 
the physical and mental health of 
those who survived is not known with 
certainty, estimates suggest that at 
least 12 per cent of the seven million 
population perished2, approximately 
two million Rwandans sought refuge in 
neighbouring countries and beyond and 
120,000 people (mainly men) were held 
in prison (Nadjaldongar 2008; Shway 
2011; http://survivors-fund.org.uk/
resources/rwanda-history/statistics/).
1.3. Recovery:	Nineteen	Years	
after	the	Genocide	
Rwanda has made a recovery that can 
be seen as little short of miraculous as 
it strives to become a middle income, 
private sector led economy by 2020 
(Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Planning 2000).  The country’s 
development strategy incorporates the 
MDGs, promotes pro-poor economic 
growth, economic transformation and 
good governance (Ministry of Finance 
and Economic Planning 2007, EDPR2 
2  A 2008 report by AERG estimates the number 
as nearer two million http://allafrica.com/sto-
ries/200810040044.html
32
2012).  It aims to create an inclusive, 
cohesive society with a responsive 
decentralised Government fighting 
corruption and creating a legal and 
regulatory framework to support 
private-sector development. There has 
been a sustained economic growth 
(Figure 1) and poverty reduction. 
Rwanda is on track to achieve most of 
the MDGs (Table 1; Abbott and Rwirahira 
2013). There has been a growth in 
non-farm employment, in agricultural 
productivity, in Government revenues 
and investment in the private sector. 
Figure	1:	GDP	per	Capita	PPP	US$1993-2012
635.5
342.3
567
700.1
1097.5
1251.1
1405.1
1993 1995 2000 2005 2010 2012 2013
(Source: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/rwanda/gdp-per-capita-ppp)
Table	1:	Key	Indicators	of	Development	
Indicator 1990	or	
nearest 
2000 2005	 Most	
Recent 
Poverty % 47.5 58.9 57 44.9
Extreme Poverty % 34 41.6 35.8 24.1
% Workers Non-Farm na 11.4 21.5 29.8
Government Revenues RFW Billions na 122 180 515
ODA RFW Billions na 206 344 635
Net Primary School Attendance 62.5 72.6 86.6 91.7
Maternal Mortality Rate 1300 1071 750 476
Under-5 Mortality Rate 150 196 152 76
%Improved Sanitation 37 50.4 58.5 74.5
% Clean Water 66 70.1 70.3 74.2
(Source: Abbott and Rwirahira 2012)
The 2003 Constitution incorporates 
a Bill of Rights and provides for a 
tripartite system of Government 
with legal separation between the 
executive, a bicameral parliament 
and the judiciary. Central to good 
governance are the National Dialogue 
Summit, the Decentralisation Policy, 
mechanisms for social inclusion and 
Dialogue and Consensus, with many 
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of the latter involving the adaptation 
of traditional governance instruments. 
The principle of subsidiarity underpins 
the decentralisation policy, which 
is designed to ensure transparency 
and accountability for local service 
delivery through citizen participation 
in planning.  Local Government is 
held accountable through the Imihigo 
performance contracts, which are 
agreed between the districts and the 
President with the districts being held 
accountable for their performance at 
an annual public event chaired by the 
President.
In 2011 the Rwanda Governance 
Board was established to promote 
decentralisation, and principles and 
practices of good governance in public 
institutions as well as to conduct 
research to promote accountability, 
transparency and integrity in public 
affairs (Law N° 41/2011 of 30/09/2011). 
The locally developed Rwanda 
Governance Score Card (Figure 2) 
shows very high scores for Safety and 
Security, Investing in People, Business 
Promotion and Private Sector Advocacy 
and Control of Corruption Transparency 
and Accountability. Participation and 
Inclusiveness and Political Rights and 
Civil Liberties scored above 70 per cent, 
and Rule of Law and Quality of Service 
Delivery scored about 36 per cent, but 
had some poor performing sub-sectors. 
There are also concerns about lack of 
equality before the law, the poor not 
having access to justice, poor citizen 
participation, and ignorance of citizens’ 
rights, poor service delivery and people 
sticking to the ‘official’ line. 
Figure	2:	Rwanda	Governance	Scorecard	2010
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The progress Rwanda has made in 
achieving good governance is generally 
confirmed by international indicators, 
where it scores well apart from on 
democracy and civil liberties. On the 
World Bank Governance indicators, 
for example, Rwanda’s scores have 
increased with the notable exception 
of Voice and Accountability, where 
there has been little progress (Figure3). 
The low score on the latter is seen 
as problematic in allowing genuine 
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participation in the political process 
by citizens. Potentially however some 
of the mechanisms for Dialogue and 
Consensus provide the space for 
ordinary Rwandans to have their voice 
heard and hold to account local and 
national politicians. 
Figure	3:	Scores	on	World	Bank	Governance	Indicators	2000	and	2011
Source: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_chart.asp last accessed 07/04/2013
However, Rwanda faces severe 
challenges in building a stable, inclusive 
and cohesive society. It is highly 
dependent on official development aid 
being the fifth most dependent country 
in the world (Thomas 2011). Economic 
inequalities remain high with a Gini 
coefficient of 49 in 2010/11. Economic 
transformation is fragile and (re)building 
human capital is a long term project 
(Abbott and Rwirahira 2013; Abbott 
2013).  There is low unemployment 
but high underemployment, around 73 
per cent of the working population are 
employed mainly in agriculture, 62.5 
per cent have more than one job and 85 
per cent cultivate their own farm (NISRb 
2012). High fertility rates are driving 
population growth, which is running at 
2.4 per cent a year (NISR 2013). This is 
exerting pressure on the land with 70 
per cent of the land surface already 
being farmed, and most households 
dependent upon subsistence farming 
own less than 0.5 hectares (Ministry 
of Agriculture and Animal Resources 
2009b). Infant and under-five and 
maternal mortality rates remain high 
despite good progress and there is 
low life expectancy at birth (NISR 
2011). Human capital is low with only 
38 per cent of 16-64 year olds having 
completed primary school, 4.6 per cent 
of 20-64 year olds senior secondary 
school and 2.6 per cent of 25-64 year 
olds higher education. 
Challenges to implementation of 
the governance policy include the 
capacity of districts to deliver, lack of 
civil society participation, corruption 
(especially in local Government) and 
gender inequality (Anastasia 2010). The 
mapping of Civil Society Organisations 
(CSOs) in 2011 highlighted the need for 
enhanced dialogue between CSOs, the 
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Government and other stakeholders. 
The districts are more accountable to 
central Government than they are to 
their electorate (Abbott and Rwirahira 
2012). Some commentators have 
suggested that decentralisation in fact 
makes central power more effective 
(Purdekova 2011) although others argue 
that local participation has played an 
important role in reconciliation (Clarke 
2010). 
Analysis of the African Values Survey 
for 2007 and 2012 suggests that life 
is improving in Rwanda as judged by 
ordinary Rwandans. In 2012 adults 
generally felt that they have a moderate 
level of control over their own lives with 
a mean of 6. 9 on a ten point scale going 
from no control to high control, up from 
a mean of 6.5 in 2007. Although they 
remain relatively dissatisfied with their 
lives in general, M 6.5, this represents a 
significant increase from 2007 when the 
mean was 5.0.  However, over 90 per 
cent of adults remained very worried 
about the possibility of a civil war in 
Rwanda, a war involving the country, not 
being able to provide a good education 
for their children and unemployment 
(Figure 4). The proportion fearing a 
civil war is especially worrying and 
questions the extent that Dialogue 
and Consensus is working in building 
a cohesive society.  It suggests that an 
overwhelming majority of Rwandans 
think that there are cleavages between 
groups that could lead to violent 
conflict. Nevertheless, 90 per cent 
feel securer in their neighbourhood, 
and the crime rate is perceived to be 
relatively low. 
Figure	4:	Adults	Worried	about	Conflict,	Education	of	Children	and	Employment	
(Source: African Values Survey 2012, authors’ own calculation)
The findings from the AVS show that 
ordinary Rwandans’ priorities are for 
economic growth, a stable economy 
and maintaining law and order. They 
are less concerned about having more 
of a say about how things are done 
at the community or national level, 
protecting freedom of speech or 
making cities more beautiful. Seventy 
five per cent see economic growth as 
a priority and 74 per cent maintaining 
a stable economy, while 87 per cent of 
respondents think that maintaining law 
and order should have a high priority 
(Table 2).
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Table	2:	Priorities	for	Government	%	of	Respondents
Aim First	Choice	 Second	Choice	 Total 
Aims of Country
High Economic Growth 69.1 6.3 75.4
Strong Defence Force 15.2 24.5 39.7
People Having More Say 12.0 39.7 51.7
Making Cities/Countryside More Beau-
tiful
3.7 29.5 33.2
Most Important to Respondent
Maintaining Order in Country 73.9 12.6 86.5
Giving People More Say in Important 
Government Decisions 
14.4 20.3 34.7
Fighting Inflation 10.5 54.3 64.8
Protecting Freedom of Speech 1.2 12.8 14.0
Other Government Priorities
A Stable Economy 66.9 16.6 73.5
Less Impersonal and More Humane 
Society
20.8   9.5 30.3
Society in which Ideas Count More 
than Money
5.8 32.3 38.1
Fighting Crime 6.5 41.6 47.1
(Source: African Values Survey 2012, authors’ own calculations)
Although there has been no previous 
comprehensive research specifically 
examining the role that the mechanisms 
for Dialogue and Consensus are playing 
in building social cohesion there have 
been a number of surveys that provide 
some information on the extent to 
which Rwanda is becoming a more 
cohesive society. The AVS, for example, 
found strong evidence of national pride 
and identity. 93 per cent of Rwandan 
adults are very proud or proud of their 
citizenship, 79.7 per cent strongly agree 
or agree that they see themselves as part 
of the nation and 88.9 per cent strongly 
agree or agree that they see themselves 
as part of their local community (AVS 
2012, authors’ analysis). However 
this represents a slight decline in the 
proportion saying they are proud of 
their citizenship, a 10 percentage point 
decline in identifying with the local 
community and a 20 percentage point 
decline in those seeing themselves as 
part of the nation compared to 2007. 
Furthermore only 59 per cent said that 
they would be willing to fight for their 
country in 2012 a decline from 95 per 
cent in 2007.  
Research by the National Unity and 
Reconciliation Council (2008; 2010) 
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suggests that there has been an 
increase in social cohesion and inter-
ethnic relations since 1994, with 92 per 
cent of respondents thinking that there 
has been an increase in social cohesion, 
and 80 per cent an improvement in 
inter-ethnic relations and levels of 
trust between communities (National 
Unity and Reconciliation Council 2010). 
Research by Interpeace (2011) found 
that 53 per cent of the population 
thought that there are generally good 
relationships between all Rwandans. 
However, at a local level, 53 per cent think 
that ethnicity is a problem in Rwanda, 
with 31 per cent saying that there are 
poor relations between Hutu and Tutsi, 
and about 20 per cent between Twa 
and the rest of the population.  Similarly 
the National Unity and Reconciliation 
Council (2010) found that just over 30 
per cent of adult Rwandans think that 
ethnic discrimination takes place and 
that Rwandans still judge each other on 
the basis of ethnic stereotypes.  
Furthermore 82 per cent of genocide 
survivors and 54 per cent of ex-prisoners 
say they felt threatened during Gacaca 
(National Unity and Reconciliation 
Council 2008), and 40 per cent believing 
that there are still people in Rwanda 
that would perpetrate acts of the past 
(National Unity and Reconciliation 
Council 2010). 
However, economic cleavages between 
the better off and the poor are seem to 
be as problematic with 30 per cent of 
adult Rwandans seeing this gap as the 
main source of division in society. 
Active involvement in decision making 
and Government-led frameworks, 
political parties, and civil society 
organisations is relatively low. In 2008 
only 47 per cent of citizens had recently 
attended a community meeting and half 
thought that people have to be forced 
to attend. There is also reluctance 
to participate in activities clearly 
associated with resolving disputes 
(National Unity and Reconciliation 
Council 2010). Furthermore nearly half 
of adults (44.5%) do not think that they 
have sufficient space and opportunity 
to influence decisions that affect their 
lives  (National Unity and Reconciliation 
Commission 2008) and only 36 per cent 
rated the degree of freedom and choice 
they have over their lives as eight or 
higher out of 10 (AVS 2012).
Levels of trust in family are high but 
trust in other people in general low 
and actually declined between 2008 
and 2012 from 25.8 per cent to 16.6 
per cent according to the AVS on a 
dichotomous question asking if you can 
trust other people or you cannot be too 
careful (authors’ calculation). However, 
on a scale of 10 going from most people 
take advantage of you to people try to 
be fair the mean was 6.2, suggesting a 
somewhat greater trust in other people 
than on the dichotomous question. 
According to the Women’s Economic 
Empowerment Survey the average 
level of trust for women in 2011 was 
4.7. Other research on specific groups 
of adults has also found relatively low 
levels of general trust, for example on a 
10 point scale the mean  for operators of 
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household enterprises was five (Abbott 
2011) and for Historically Marginalised 
People 6.3 (Abbott 2012). While just 
over a third (35.3%) of Rwandans 
think that the main reason for bad 
relationships between Hutu and Tutsi 
are levels of trust (Interpeace 2011).
Political culture, political institutions 
and leadership are generally seen as 
legitimate and effective (National Unity 
and Reconciliation Council 2008, 2010). 
Confidence in Government is moderate 
with 64 per cent of adults having at 
least quite a lot of confidence in the 
national Government and 65 per cent 
in parliament in 2012. However, this 
represents a significant decline from 
2007 (Figure 5). Confidence in the 
police and the courts has also declined 
significantly although it too remains 
moderate at 63 per cent for the police, 
but low at 50 per cent for the courts. 
The same is the case for the churches 
and the press, with only just over 50 
per cent trusting the press at least 
moderately. This lack of confidence in 
the media and churches is a concern 
as these are the organs that should 
provide an independent report on 
what is happening in the country and 
externally.
Figure	5:	Confidence	in	Political	Institutions	in	Rwanda	2007	and	2012	
(Source: AVS 2007, 2012 authors’ own calculation)
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1.4. 	Structure	of	the	Report	
The Report is divided seven into main 
sections following this introduction:
• Section 2 develops the theoretical 
framework  and discusses the 
central role that the mechanisms 
for Dialogue and Consensus play in 
building a sustainable society;
• Section 3 sets out the aims of 
the research, the data collection 
methods and the approach to data 
analysis;
• Section 4 describes the 
demographic and socio-economic 
profile of the sample;
• Section 5 considers the level of 
knowledge that the respondents 
have of the mechanisms, and their 
level of engagement and overall 
satisfaction  with them;
• Section 6 examines in detail 
consensus building in the 
community focusing on Gacaca, 
the Village Council and Umuganda 
and Community Juries , Ubudehe 
and the Abunzi;
• Section 7 discusses the extent 
to which Rwanda is becoming a 
more socially cohesive society and 
citizens are satisfied with their 
lives – that life is becoming good 
for them;
• Section 8 discusses what can be 
concluded from the research and 
the policy recommendations that 
follow.
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2. Re-Building Society:    
Creating Social Quality 
2.1. 	Restoring	Social	Cohesion	
The critical question is; what are the 
triggers that enable an orderly society 
and what policies enable a society 
to build social cohesion and remain 
cohesive. Social cohesion is strongest 
when a majority of members of society 
consider themselves to be stakeholders 
and all groups are benefiting from the 
way society is organised. Building social 
cohesion means: developing social and 
economic policies that are inclusive, 
that ensure that all feel that they have a 
stake in the existing society and a sense 
of belonging and being valued; giving 
people hope for the future as well as 
meeting their present needs; ensuring 
that individuals have the opportunity to 
develop the capabilities to take control 
over their own lives; that they have 
economic and personal  security; and 
that groups and individuals can work 
together to build a better future. 
2.2. Reconstructing	Society:		
	 The	Social	Quality	Model	
The ultimate test of what makes for 
a ‘good’ society is that it provides the 
conditions for the flourishing of all its 
members and it meets their subjective 
expectations. The Social Quality Model 
identifies what is necessary to enable 
the building of a sustainable society. It is 
based upon four dimensions: economic 
security, social cohesion, social 
integration and social empowerment. 
The first two dimensions measure the 
quality of the society at the level of 
system integration (how the structure 
of society coheres), whilst the latter two 
dimensions measure social integration 
in the sense of how individuals 
integrated into the societal structure 
(e.g. Abbott 2007; Abbott and Wallace 
2012a). 
Governments need to develop 
policies to explicitly address all four 
elements. Focusing on the economy 
and on economic growth alone is not 
sufficient. A sustainable society needs 
to be cohesive, inclusive, build the 
capabilities of its members and provide 
economic security. Analytically we 
can separate these four elements but 
they are inextricably interconnected 
with each providing the conditions 
for the others. Just as a watch is not 
reducible to the parts that make it up 
so the building blocks of society create 
a whole that is not reducible to the 
elements that make it up. The rule of 
law is essential to enable the orderly 
conduct of everyday life. This requires 
not only a functioning legal system but 
shared norms and values, the informal 
rules that make everyday interaction 
possible. The foundation of this is 
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trust in the Government, trust in law 
enforcement, trust in the legal system 
and trust in other people. Without this 
the economy cannot function effectively 
and people cannot work together. It 
also means ensuring social inclusion of 
all groups and that they have a shared 
stake in society. Social divisions whether 
they are based on racial/ethnic identity, 
economic divisions, generational 
differences, gender or any other socially 
created difference, provide the basis for 
the growth of conflict and dissention. 
Building social cohesion is essential for 
building a sustainable society as it is the 
basis of social order and provides the 
foundation for economic development 
and growth. Underpinning social 
cohesion is trust, trust provides the 
basis for social interaction and enables 
people to work together to achieve 
common ends. Building social cohesion 
is not just about integrating individuals 
but also groups that may have competing 
or different interests and building trust 
in other people as well as societal 
institutions including Government. In 
turn physical capital, economic capital, 
human capital and social capital which 
are inexorably interconnected provide 
the basis for social cohesion and 
social wellbeing (Coleman 1998; Falk 
and Kilpatrick 1999; Grootaert and 
Van Bastelarer 2002). Social inclusion 
and social empowerment provide the 
basis for agency and social interaction. 
Social inclusion includes the social 
support of friends and neighbours and 
participation in social networks and 
civil society. Performance (participation 
in institutions) develops a shared 
understanding of the expected ways 
of behaving, of values, of interpersonal 
trust and solidarity and engenders 
loyalty.  Empowerment  means that 
people have both the freedom and the 
capabilities to act, enabling them to 
pursue different strategies to improve 
their quality of life (Sen 1999) by acting 
on issues they deem important. It is both 
individual and collective. Thus it is about 
both building capabilities (education 
and training, physical and mental 
health) and providing the conditions 
for people to be able to exercise their 
capabilities. Education, for example, 
builds capability for employment, but 
for people to be able to exercise their 
employability capabilities employment 
opportunities have to be available. This 
is dependent on economic policies.
The model has to be seen wholistically 
and is not reducible to it parts. It 
provides the space within which 
individuals and society as a whole can 
flourish and grow and become more 
productive for the benefit of all.  It  is 
interactive and dynamic with each 
element providing the conditions for 
the other elements and each in turn 
dependent on the other.  It provides 
for a society that makes life good and 
thus the ultimate test of the quality of a 
society is how satisfied people are with 
their lives.
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Figure	6:	Social	Quality	Model
Systems,
Organisations,
Institutions
Global	Processes
Communities.	
Groups,	Individuals
Economic Security
Material security
Employment security
Housing security
Health security
Social	Cohesion
Trust
Solidarity
Violent crime
Economic inequalities
Citizenship
Social Inclusion
Close knit relationships with 
family and friends 
Identification with 
community
Political inclusion
Social inclusion
Social and Cultural 
empowerment
Political empowerment
Economic empowerment
Socio-psychological 
empowerment
Information empowerment
Biographical	Processes
If we cvonsider the development 
agenda in Rwanda, both in terms of 
what it is trying to achieve, Vision 
2020, and the legal and policies 
framework that is being developed 
and implemented, we can see how it is 
working to build a sustainable society, 
one that aims to build social cohesion 
(Figure 7). It also enables us to see 
how the different elements of policy 
interact and are mutually dependent. 
If we consider the overarching aims of 
economic policy we can see that it is 
concerned with economic growth and 
transformation while at the same time 
ensuring that the weak and vulnerable 
are included through, for example, the 
Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme and 
agricultural policies are designed to 
increase the productivity of subsistence 
farmers. Thus it is concerned with social 
cohesion as well as economic growth. 
The agricultural policy also includes 
empowerment through the work of 
the agricultural extension workers 
who build the capacity of farmers to 
increase the productivity of their land 
and market surplus produce. The latter 
includes supporting farmers to form 
cooperatives which increase social 
inclusion. A key element of the policy of 
financial inclusion is the development 
of the Umurenge SACCOs, which are 
run as cooperatives at district level 
and therefore play a role in promoting 
social inclusion.  Policies for social 
inclusion are designed to promote civic 
engagement at different levels, vertical 
as well as horizontal, which in turn 
builds solidarity and social cohesion. 
The various councils, for example, 
have inclusive membership at village 
level with elected representatives at 
each successive level. These and other 
participatory groups are used as a tool 
for Dialogue and Consensus which 
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is designed to build social cohesion. 
Participation in civic activities as well 
as informal groups builds social capital 
which in turn builds trust. Societies that 
are rich in social capital bring greater 
economic returns to individuals as well 
as the society as a whole. Participation 
in civic organisations builds members’ 
capabilities and thus empowers them. 
In turn empowerment (education and 
training) builds peoples’ capabilities 
to actively participate in civic 
organisations. Empowerment increases 
peoples’ ability to make a livelihood and 
also to make decisions more broadly. 
Policies designed specifically to build 
social cohesion at national level increase 
trust and solidarity, thus facilitating 
cooperation and participation in social 
capital networks and increasing social 
inclusion. This in turn reinforces social 
cohesion.  More inclusive societies are 
more cohesive they are. This means that 
economic policies that are designed to 
reduce economic inequalities and social 
inclusion policies that encourage the 
build vertical and horizontal networks 
across social and economic divides are 
especially important in building social 
cohesion.
Figure	7:	Building	Social	Quality	in	Rwanda:	Examples	of	the	Policy	Framework
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2.3. Social	Cohesion’s	
Contribution	to	Sustainable	
Development	
Socially cohesive societies generally 
provide a higher quality of life for 
their citizens, are more inclusive and 
have higher economic growth (e.g. 
Portes and Landolt 2000; Wilkinson 
and Pickett 2010). A divided society 
by contrast is made up of competing 
groups that have strong identity with 
and loyalty to their own group but are 
in competition and even conflict with 
each other. Social polarisation and 
formal institutional rules that constrain 
arbitrary Government action are critical 
for the development of cooperative 
norms and trust (Portes and Landolt 
2000).
Social cohesion is the bonds or social 
networks that unite people together 
across a nation state and plays a central 
role in sustainability. It is built through 
people working together for common 
purpose within and across communities 
and differently located social and 
economic groups. It enables diverse 
groups to work together and to tolerate 
and respect difference.  It is evident by 
both what is present, trust, norms of 
reciprocity, a vibrant civil society and 
institutions of conflict management and, 
what is absent  latent conflict between 
different interest groups whether 
based on economic inequalities, 
racial/ethnic difference, disparities in 
political participation or any other form 
of  polarisation (Scott 2009). It breaks 
down the spatial, social, cultural and 
economic barriers that divide societies 
and builds a shared sense of identity 
and belonging; a shared purpose. 
Investing in building social cohesion is 
thus an investment in preventing future 
social and economic conflict, a strategy 
to avoid the risk of social breakdown. 
However, social cohesion also provides 
the basis for inclusive economic 
development that benefits individuals 
as well as the society as a whole. Trust, 
the basis of social cohesion, facilitates 
cooperation, gives confidence in the 
motivations and actions of others and 
enables the anticipation of positive 
outcomes. It is the foundation on which 
the acceptance of mutual obligations 
and reciprocity are built, enabling self-
interest to be replaced by a commitment 
to promoting collective interests. The 
challenge is to build trust across social, 
economic and geographically located 
groups, enabling the development of 
generalised trust in others as well as 
Government and civic institutions.
Through building social cohesion, 
social capital contributes to sustainable 
economic growth by facilitating 
collective action, and complementing 
economic and human capital. The 
majority of wealth in the world lays in 
intangible capital (human and social); 
the sum of knowledge, skills and know 
how possessed by the population, the 
quality of formal and informal social 
institutions (norms and networks) and 
generalised trust (Knack and Keefer 
1997; World Bank 2006).  Intangible 
wealth, human, institutional and 
social capital contributes between fifty 
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nine and 80 per cent of social welfare 
(Hamilton and Ruta 2006). Investment 
in social capital reduces poverty by 
enabling some groups to exit poverty 
more rapidly (Knack and Keefer 1997; 
Naryan and Pritchett 1997, 1999, 
2002).  Naryan and Prichett showed 
that increased membership of groups 
and associations at village level in 
Tanzania increased household incomes. 
Conversely Easterley and Levine (1997) 
have shown that fractionalization 
impacts negatively on annual per capita 
growth both directly and indirectly. 
However, van Rijin (2012) found that in 
terms of farmers’ willingness to adopt 
innovations, this was associated with 
bridging social capital, ties that go 
beyond the local community and that 
strong ties within a community are a 
barrier to the take up of innovative 
farming practices. Although Rwanda 
had one of the lowest scores for both 
types of social capital, it had the highest 
for uptake of innovations.3
In an analysis of 159 countries, 
‘intangible’ capital (knowledge, skills 
and institutions) was found to be an 
important component of national 
wealth with a one per cent increase in 
the stock of social capital resulting in 
a 1.10 per cent increase in intangible 
capital, a one year increase in school 
years a 0.47 per cent increase and 
remittances a 0.14 increase (Dulal and 
Foa 2011).  The intangible residue of 
GDP in Rwanda is 54 per cent, but the 
3  The data was for a sample of villages in the 
 border region with DRC and Uganda
relative contribution of social and human 
capital differs from the general findings 
with years of schooling contributing 54 
per cent and social capital 45 per cent. 
This is accounted for partly by the high 
investment the Government of Rwanda 
has made in education, but also a very 
low social capital stock even compared 
with other low income countries. An 
increase in social cohesion in Rwanda 
would then yield a large marginal gain 
and contribute to sustained economic 
growth.  
2.4. Building	Social	Cohesion	
In a society that is fragmented, divided 
and made up of competing groups with 
a lack of shared identity between groups 
and a lack of trust in Government, it 
is necessary to build social cohesion. 
There is a need to build trust in 
Government, the institutions of law and 
order, civic society and other people in 
general. Additionally, mechanisms for 
national unity and reconciliation need 
to be put in place to bring that about. 
Whilst a willingness to cooperate, to 
survive and proposer (Stanley 2003) is a 
starting point for social cohesion, there 
needs to be a shared identity (Moody 
and White 2003), or at least tolerance 
and respect for difference. This requires 
building a shared commitment to the 
same values and goals underpinned 
by reciprocity and mutual trust 
which supports cooperation, and 
mutual exchange (Colleta and Cullen 
2000) through social engagement in 
networks and organisations within 
and across communities. Participation 
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in voluntary activity, socialising with 
community groups, active membership 
of community based organisations, 
participation in civic activities and 
participation in Government activities 
facilitate collective action for mutual 
benefit and acts as a form of ‘capital’ by 
facilitating the exchange of goods and 
information and reducing transaction 
costs (Grootaert and van Bastelaer 
2002; Knack 1999). Gibson (2004) 
has suggested four specific elements: 
building inter-group reconciliation and 
trust; political tolerance; support for 
human rights; and respect for political 
institutions. Building social cohesion 
can be seen as a process of building 
cooperation (Kiresberg 2007), solidarity 
(Amstutz 2006) and trust. Putnam 
(1993) showed that the most successful 
regional Governments and economies 
in Italy were those that possessed high 
levels of participation in associational 
life and in which individuals displayed 
high levels of trust in social and political 
institutions.
Colleta and Cullen (2000) argue that 
the challenge in Rwanda was (is) not 
building social capital per se, but 
moving from ‘bad’ to ‘good’ social 
capital, from a society with high social 
capital within groups but low social 
capital between groups which can 
hinder socio-economic development 
and as Rwanda has already witness 
lead to societal breakdown (Colletta 
and Cullen 2000; Knack and Kafer 
1997; Woolcock and Naryan 2000). 
The critical question for Rwanda is: can 
social capital be built and specifically 
can it be built by the Government? Is 
it possible to have policies for building 
social capital in the same way as it 
is possible to build human capital or 
support economic growth? Specifically, 
can community networks be built that 
increase community cooperation and 
build relationships between individuals 
in and across communities?  
Putnam (1993) has argued that it 
takes many centuries to build social 
capital and trust as a prerequisite for 
building social capital, but Coleman 
(1998) argues that the perceived 
benefit of participation is a more 
important in driving participation than 
trust, so it is possible to see trust as 
an outcome rather than a prerequisite 
for social capital formation. Portes and 
Landolt (2000) argue that low social 
polarisation and rules that constrain 
arbitrary Government action are more 
important than membership of civic 
organisations. Giddens (1994) argues 
that Governments can create the 
conditions which enable individuals 
to participate in social groups and 
networks and build social capital. The 
key to Governments creating social 
capital is decentralisation of power 
(Evans 1996; Skocpol 1996; Warner 
et al 1999) and a strong civil society 
that keeps Government responsive 
(Fox 1996; Potapchuck et al 1997). 
Local Government has to move from 
controller, provider and regulator to 
motivator, convenor and facilitator 
(Crocker et al 1998) and help build it at 
community level. Government has to 
put in place: incentives for individuals 
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to participate in groups and social 
networks; it has to mobilise collective 
action at community level; and it has 
to facilitate horizontal ties between 
communities and vertical ties between 
communities and layers of the state 
(Fox 1996).
Dialogue and Consensus is a tool that 
at community level enables all the 
members to participate in decision 
making rather than decisions being 
taken by local leaders or imposed by 
central Government. It encourages 
cooperative interaction to solve 
problems and issues to develop a 
mutually acceptable solution. It is a way 
of dealing with conflict productively 
as it enables people to openly and 
honestly share their views and builds 
recognition of interdependency and 
respect for the views of others (Dean 
1999; Bronkhurst 2005). It is based 
on the principle of ownership of 
the decision by the participants and 
engenders identification with and 
taking on responsibility for others as 
well as building altruism and trust (Allen 
1999).  Its benefits include increasing 
the quality of solutions because they 
are based on a comprehensive analysis 
of the problem which may lead to 
innovative solutions. Furthermore, 
those most familiar with the problem 
will be participating in solving it and it 
will strengthen relationships between 
participants. It also builds capacity 
as participants learn from others and 
deeper and more enduring relationships 
are formed. It creates a solidarity 
grounded in dialogue and performance 
and practical activity. The collective 
identity is sustainable because it is 
created and recreated through activity 
with collective ownership and shared 
power providing the basis for future 
social action based on furthering the 
interests of the group (Allen 1999).
The community driven approach to 
collaborative working brings together 
divided groups/communities to work 
together to solve problems they have 
identified. This process rebuilds social 
capital and trust within and between 
communities and support the building 
of social cohesion (United States 
Institute of Peace) as well as building 
trust in Government (Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs 2008).  It 
involves:
• Community participation includ-
ing women and marginalised and 
previously excluded groups;
• Democratically elected leaders;
• Joint community decision making 
through Dialogue and Consensus;
• Community selection of projects 
and beneficiaries;
• Contribution of labour to develop-
ment projects;
• Community receipt and control 
over money to invest in devel-
opment projects to benefit the 
community with the community 
selecting the beneficiaries;
• Mutuality and reciprocity;
• Accountability and transparency.
Community Driven Development is 
designed to improve social relations 
and social cohesion as well as drive 
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economic development, overcome 
institutional weaknesses and improve 
the physical infrastructure (Table 3). 
Participation means communities 
being empowered so that they are in 
control of the planning process, the 
implementation, the outcomes and the 
evaluation (Hamm 2001). Decisions are 
made by participants through a process 
of Dialogue and Consensus in a situation 
where they are in control, where they 
determine the ground rules and where 
decisions are collectively owned. It 
works to overcome fear of difference, 
reduce prejudice and to create a sense 
of belonging and builds confidence 
through participation (Brune et al 2005; 
Cliffe et al 2003). It increase solidarity 
and build social cohesion by creating a 
sense of identity - people identify with 
others as they interact with them and 
come to feel comfortable with and 
trust them (Bronkhurst 2005; Dean 
1999; Lawrence and Heath 2008). 
Working together creates a sense of 
responsibility for others, of loyalty and 
working for the common good (Allen 
1999) and fosters reconciliation. 
Table	3:	Community	Driven	Development	
Aims Improved	public	
infrastructure	
services	and	more	
private	assets	
Improved	social	
relations	and	
cohesion	
More	effective	
and		responsive	
institutions	
Mechanisms • Better match-
ing of resources  
with needs
• Improved ef-
ficiency 
• Greater par-
ticipation in 
civic life and 
improved rela-
tions
• More accept-
able resource 
distribution
• Mechanisms 
for defusing 
problems 
• Demand for  
more respon-
sive institutions 
• Improved 
citizen-state 
relations
• Common pro-
gramme 
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Those who argue for decentralisation 
(community driven development) 
suggest that it can:
• Facilitate discussion between 
different interest groups on 
local issues and the allocation of 
resources and can formally address 
the local root causes of grievances 
and conflict;
• Can develop  mechanisms 
for collaboration and dispute 
resolution at a local level which can 
help build social cohesion;
• Broadens political participation by 
increasing the layers of Government 
thus reducing the potential for inter 
group grievances; 
• Can build peoples capacity for 
participation in political decision 
making and dispute resolution and 
empower them to become involved 
in promoting the interests of the 
community;
• Political inclusion of all groups 
increasing the legitimacy of the 
state and perceptions of citizenship/
national identity;
• Builds trust as people work 
together at a local level to develop 
joint solutions to problems they 
have identified;
• Can increase the states legitimacy 
as it is seen to work at a local level 
and ensures the rule of law even in 
remote rural areas thus increasing 
national political stability;
• Reduces perceptions of horizontal 
inequalities as groups (economic, 
gender, ethnic, generational) are 
involved in the prioritisation of 
projects and the investment of 
resources;
• Can bring about improvements in 
service delivery thus reducing the 
potential for conflict over scarce 
resources.
On the other hand, those who argue 
that it can increase conflict and reduce 
social cohesion suggest that it can:
• Encourage Government investment 
in community social capital 
development where there are 
not strong horizontal ties in place 
and civil society is weak may well 
end up reinforcing a patron-client 
relationship;
• Result in the dominance of one 
groups at a local level thereby 
increasing the marginalisation and 
exclusion of other groups with 
marginalised groups especially 
vulnerable;
• There is a danger of elite capture 
rather than inclusive participation 
increasing the chance of creating 
inequalities through inequitable 
resource allocation;
• Local leaders can appeal to ethnic 
identity and social polarisation 
become entrenched;
• Inadequate administrative 
resources and finance can result 
in weak and inefficient local 
Government undermining the 
states legitimacy  and increasing 
the potential for conflict as the 
state fails to fulfil its functions;
• Local/national  tensions and conflict 
as well as  interregional ones  can 
develop over the distribution 
of power and the allocation of 
resource;
• An increased number of tiers of 
Government increases the potential 
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for corruption which can lead to 
anger and disillusionment amongst 
the population;
• Decentralisation can increase 
inequalities;
• Local Governments can be more 
vulnerable to exploitation from 
external influences and their 
financial resources are more likely 
to be violently appropriated by 
irregular/armed groups than those 
of central Government are.
However, there has been little research 
and what there is has come up with 
contradictory findings (Green 2006; 
Scott 2009). In practice few studies have 
found evidence of positive outcomes 
from decentralisation and most have 
found negative outcomes in terms of 
building social cohesion. Nevertheless 
Scott (2009) concludes that context 
is important and given the right 
conditions it is possible for there to be 
positive outcomes. Research in Burundi, 
Vervisch (2013), found that attempts to 
engineer social cohesion through top-
down interventions by NGOs providing 
direct livelihood support failed because 
of elite capture. They suggest that 
community based development (CBD) 
programmes that are truly bottom-up 
and provide resources that support the 
community as a whole and provide an 
environment for the building of social 
cohesion within a community are more 
successful.
2.5. The	Rwandan	Policy	
Framework	for	Dialogue	
and Consensus
In the post-genocide period the 
Rwandan Government has promoted 
social cohesion with the emphasis 
being on the state rather than civil 
society, what Green (2009) have called 
a republican social cohesion discourse. 
It has set out to build trust between 
the Government and citizens, between 
communities and between individuals 
by strengthening social linkages within 
communities and between them and 
the state (Musoni 2007). It has, in 
other words, set out to build social 
capital through civic engagement which 
means: 
 --- active involvement of citizens in 
resolving issues of public concern, 
shaping Government policy and 
ensuring that citizens needs are 
central to programmes design and 
service delivery. It means promoting 
the quality of life in a community, 
through both political and non-
political processes (Musoni 2007, p. 
2, emphasis in the original).
The Rwandan policy framework for 
Dialogue and Consensus is part of 
the plethora of initiatives associated 
with building national integration and 
social cohesion using mechanisms 
inspired by Rwandan traditional 
culture but modernized to fit the 
contemporary environment. Building 
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national integration and cohesion is not 
an end in itself, but a process that is 
central to social stability and economic 
development and transformation. 
It is part of Rwanda’s answer to the 
question of what kind of political and 
constitutional arrangements are needed 
to help democracy function in countries 
divided by deep societal cleavage. It 
has avoided the language of power 
sharing and has sought to promote 
a common identity, to put in place 
mechanisms to build a set of shared 
values which emphasises belonging to 
and participating in a national political 
community with Government having a 
supervisory role over institutions of civil 
society. It has stressed the importance 
of communities working together to 
build a better future for themselves in 
partnership with Government. Central 
to this has been the building of the 
common identity; one nation with one 
language, one history and one culture, 
a society where everyone has worked 
together in the past and can do so in 
the future. 
The legal framework for Dialogue 
and Consensus is set out in the 2003 
Constitution (Official Gazette 2003). The 
Constitution sets out the main elements 
of the society that Rwanda intends to 
build in the wake of the Genocide, to 
flourish and avoid conflict in the future, 
explicitly rejecting the majoritarian 
model of political organization or 
power sharing and instead champions 
a pluralistic politics which is ‘voice 
centred’ rather than ‘vote centred’ 
(Musoni 2007). It emphasise the 
importance of building one nation based 
on a common heritage and a shared 
vision of the future as well as socio-
economic development and the rule of 
law. Article 9 in Chapter II: Fundamental 
Principles sets out the framework for 
fighting Genocide ideology, built on 
fundamental principles of equity, the 
rule of law and promoting social welfare 
and social justice. Article 9.6 states that 
as a fundamental principle there will be 
a constant quest for solutions through 
Dialogue and Consensus. Article 46 
states that: 
…every citizen has the duty 
to relate to other persons 
without discrimination and to 
maintain relations conducive 
to safeguarding, promoting 
and reinforcing mutual respect, 
solidarity and tolerance. 
Political parties must reflect the 
unity of the Rwandan people and 
are prohibited from representing any 
sectarian interests that could give 
rise to discrimination (Article 54). 
Article 56 legislates for the Forum 
of Political Parties which facilitates 
consultation between them in working 
for national unity, mediating in conflicts 
arising between political parties and 
supporting the resolution of conflicts 
within political parties. Nominations 
for Senate by the President (Article 85) 
and organs responsible for nominating 
Senators have to take into account 
national unity and in the case of the 
latter the equal representation of 
both sexes (Article 82). Senate has the 
specific function of supervising the 
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implementation of the principles referred 
to in Articles 9 and 54. 
Rwanda has then chosen to adopt 
a ‘third way’ in responding to the 
fundamental question of ‘Who will do 
the governing and to whose interests 
should the Government be responsive 
when the people are in disagreement 
and have divergent preferences?’ It 
has placed limitations on the power 
of the ruling party by requiring it has 
not more than 50 per cent of Cabinet 
seats and that the Prime Minister, the 
President of Senate and the Speaker 
of the House of Representatives are 
from different political parties to the 
President. Pluralistic politics is defined 
by ‘Dialogue and Consensus’ which 
promote reconciliation through:
• Building trust and social cohesion; 
• Preventing/reducing community 
tension; 
• Increasing social capital; 
• Strengthening a shared sense of 
national identity. 
The 2003 Constitution also mandates 
for the establishment of the National 
Commission for Human Rights 
(Article 177), the National Unity and 
Reconciliation Commission (Article 178) 
and the National Commission for the 
Fight against the Genocide (Article 179). 
2.6. Building	Social	Cohesion	
in	Rwanda:	dialogue,	
consensus and Social 
Capital
Rwanda has deliberately set out to 
build social cohesion, recognising it as 
fundamental to creating a sustainable 
society that meets the needs of all 
its members and in which all citizens 
feel they have a stake. Building 
social cohesion through Dialogue 
and Consensus permeates all levels 
of society from the national to the 
smallest administrative unit, the village, 
and includes the private and non-
Governmental sectors as well as the 
Government (Kostner and Kuehnast 
2001; Ministry of Local Government and 
Social Affairs 2002).  By building social 
cohesion through these mechanisms, 
it is anticipated they will build social 
capital, which will in turn drive the 
development of generalised trust 
and social cohesion and encourage 
communities to collectively invest 
in their own future. The role of the 
Government is as a facilitator, investing 
in the development of social and human 
capital, what Giddens has called the 
social investment state (Giddens 1998).
The decentralisation policy is of especial 
importance in citizen involvement in 
the political process and building social 
cohesion. Mechanisms of Dialogue and 
Consensus enable the implementation 
and evaluation of social and economic 
planning at decentralised levels 
(Ministry of Local Government 2007, 
2008, 2011) enabling people at the 
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grass roots to identify their needs 
and work together to meet them with 
the support of elected local leaders 
(Ministry of Local Government and 
Social Affairs 2002; Ministry of Local 
Government 2008, 2011). The main 
strategy used for mobilising local 
communities is the Ubudehe (local 
collective action) approach which is 
implemented at village level and aims 
to build the capacity of the community 
to solve its own problems. Other 
formalised community processes 
use the Ubudehe principles including 
Umuganda (monthly community 
work, Abunzi (disputes mediation), 
community policing, community 
health workers and Community Health 
Insurance (Box 1).
This approach is clearly aligned with what 
the literature tells us works in building 
social capital, trust and social cohesion. 
Relationships and trust are being built 
by a community-based development 
approach at both national and local 
levels. At a national level the 2003 
Constitution was developed through 
a participatory process as was Vision 
2020 and the subsequent development 
strategies. There is the Forum of 
Political Parties and the National 
Dialogue Summit which enables all 
Rwandans the future development of 
the country (Box 1). The participation of 
citizens in the development process has 
vertical as well as horizontal linkages. 
At community level (the Umuganda or 
village) all residents are members of the 
Village Council, the National Women’s 
Council, the National Youth Council and 
the National Council of People Living 
with Disabilities. These councils elect 
representatives to sit on cell councils, 
which in turn elect representatives 
to sit on sector councils which in turn 
elect representatives to sit on District 
Councils. The Women’s National Council 
and National Council of Youth and the 
National Council of Disabled people 
are also organised at national level and 
there are elected representatives of 
women, youth and people living with 
disabilities in Parliament.
Our analysis of the policies and 
mechanisms that have been developed 
to build social cohesion in Rwanda 
suggests that it has been informed by 
arguments as to what does (is likely) 
to work and the measures necessary 
to overcome the potential negative 
outcomes. It is also worth noting that 
Dialogue and Consensus is only one 
of the policies that the Government 
has developed to build social cohesion 
There has been a concerted fight against 
corruption at all levels, political parties 
based on ethnic identity are banned, 
political representation is inclusive and 
participatory, there is one language and 
there has been a planned development 
and strengthening of local Government. 
Government policy is pro-poor and aims 
to reduce inequalities and resources 
have been allocated to reduce regional 
inequalities, for example in the 2012 
Budget the Southern Province was 
selected for additional investment as 
the poorest province. Twelve Year Basic 
Education (12 YBE) is fee-free, and the 
Mutual Health insurance puts access 
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to health care within the reach of all 
Rwandans. Economic and employment 
policies have supported the growth of 
micro, small and medium enterprises 
as well as encouraging investment in 
large ones. The establishment of the 
Umurenge SACCOs has been designed 
to enable the majority of Rwandans 
to have a secure and safe means 
of saving. Agricultural policies have 
been designed to enable subsistence 
farmers to increase the productivity 
of their land and to be able to benefit 
from commercialisation through land 
consolidation and crop specialisation. 
The land tenure regularisation process 
gives people a real feel that they have 
a stake in society by giving them legal 
title to their land.
Nevertheless it is necessary to be 
clear about which mechanisms use 
Dialogue and Consensus as opposed 
to having the potential to contribute 
to reconciliation and/or encourage 
the use of Dialogue and Consensus for 
resolving problems and issues.  Using 
Dialogue and Consensus to resolve 
interpersonal disputes as well as to 
work on community and national issues 
and challenges is important. Dialogue 
and consensus encourages the peaceful 
resolution of interpersonal disputes 
without recourse to the courts or the 
use of violence.  However, as we have 
pointed out, a socially cohesive society 
is more than one in which people are 
able to live together in relative harmony. 
This is not to negate the importance 
of the latter but to ensure that those 
mechanisms that have the potential 
to promote community dialogue 
and problem solving and build social 
cohesion are clearly identified. Using 
this criteria the mechanisms that are in 
place are the National Dialogue Summit, 
Umuganda, the Village Council, the 
Women’s National Council, the National 
Youth Council, Ubudehe and Girinka, to 
the extent that the community work 
together to agree who should receive 
donated cows.  Abunzi and Community 
Juries are more concerned with 
resolving disputes between individuals, 
although the proposed solution is 
reached through a process of Dialogue 
and Consensus.  Ingando and Itorero 
are concerned with educating citizens 
in the history and norms and values of 
Rwandan society as part of the process 
of reconciliation. An important element 
of this is explaining the importance 
of the mechanisms for Dialogue and 
Consensus. 
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Box1:	Mechanisms	for	Dialogue	and	Consensus
GAcAcA – A traditional Rwandan method of conflict resolution that has been adapted to hear Genocide 
crimes. Local people are elected by the community to prosecute cases and the members of the community 
participate in the trials with outcomes being agreed through a process of Dialogue and consensus.
UmUGANDA – Mandatory community service day held from 8.00 a.m. to 11 a.m. on the last Saturday of 
every month with all able bodied citizens aged 18 to 65 years participating. The free labour contributes 
to economic development and participation builds community integration and social capital as the 
community agree projects through Dialogue and consensus. . Following the community work participants 
meet to discuss local issues and raise concerns with community leaders.
UbUDehe –The community working together to solve problems they have identified using Dialogue and 
consensus using Dialogue and consensus. The Ubudehe credit Scheme enables the poor to benefit from 
a community project by signing a contract with the community setting out obligations and commitment 
to pay back. The community monitor the advancing and the repayment of loans
ImIhIGo – a process by which local government articulates its own objectives and is evaluated on its 
performance against agreed targets. The local plan is developed through a consultative process with 
citizen involvement through meetings at village level. The outcomes of the meetings are passed on 
through representative committees at cell and sector levels to the district.
AbUnzI – a system for dispute resolution at community level with the Abunzi mediating on some 
categories of disputes using Dialogue and consensus to reach decisions. The Abunzi provide a framework 
for mandatory mediation prior to filing cases in ordinary courts. each committee is comprised of 12 local 
volunteers who have as a minimum completed primary school (organic Law No 02/2010 of 09/06/2010).
commUNITy JURIeS - community juries bring together citizens and local authorities to solve problems 
and discuss development issues using Dialogue and consensus. They also brings together citizens to 
discuss disputes and resolve them with the assistance of local leaders in order to reduce the numbers 
taken to higher levels of government and the courts (ministerial order No 002/07/01 of 20 the may 
2011).
NATIoNAL WomeN’S coUNcIL – a forum for all women 18 years and over whichmeets at all levels 
villages to national. It enables women to use Dialogue and consensus to agree on progressing local 
issues especially as they relate to women. The National Women’s council is mandated by the 2003 
constitution (Article 187).
NATIoNAL yoUTh coUNcIL - a forum for all youth (15 to 35 years) which meets at all levels villages to 
national. The National youth council is mandated by the 2003 constitution (Article 188).
INGANDo - Unity and reconciliation residential solidarity camps which teach students about Rwandan 
history, norms and values and the importance of Dialogue and consensus.
IToReRo - civic education schools which aim mainly at teaching the national norms and values including 
national unity, social solidarity, patriotism, integrity, bravery and tolerance as well as the importance of 
using Dialogue and consensus..
NATIoNAL DIALoGUe SUmmIT – An annual forum chaired by the President with the cabinet, 
Parliament, representatives of local government at all levels and such others to debate issues relating to 
national unity , the state of the Nation and of local government. The dialogue is broadcast live on TV and 
radio and citizens can ‘phone in with questions and comments. It is mandated by the 2003 constitution 
(Article 168).
FoRUm oF PoLITIcAL PARTIeS – Is a consultative forum to facilitate the political parties working 
together for national unity and to mediate between political parties when they are in conflict and to 
support the resolution of internal conflict in political parties using Dialogue and consensus (Article 56).
2726
2.7. Evaluating	Rwanda’s	
Policies	for	Dialogue	and	
Consensus and Building 
Social	Cohesion		
In this report we are focusing on 
the mechanisms for Dialogue and 
Consensus and the ways in which 
they are enabling ordinary Rwandans 
to work together and thereby build 
a socially cohesive and sustainable 
society. Rwanda has generally been 
seen as making significant progress in 
building a stable, inclusive society but 
a number of concerns have been raised 
by commentators about the governance 
policies and it is important that these 
are acknowledge (see e.g. Melvin 2012; 
Purdekova 2011a, 2011b). Concerns 
that have been raised include:
• Limitation on the power of the 
majority party rather than power 
sharing results in political space 
largely being controlled by the 
ruling party. Rwanda is no longer 
a majoritarian democracy but nor 
is it a consensus democracy in the 
way described by, for example, 
Lijphart (1977, 1999), where power 
is explicitly and proportionally 
shared between political parties 
representing the different interest 
groups. However, voting in elections 
has generally been seen to be 
fair and free and decentralisation 
and Dialogue and Consensus at a 
local level (the main focus of this 
report) are used as a mechanism 
for enabling ordinary Rwandans to 
make their voice heard.4 
4  We do not discuss it in this report, but the annual 
• Across the world different 
approaches have been used to 
manage heavily divided societies. 
One way is a form of consociational 
democracy, as they use in Northern 
Ireland and Burundi, which is where 
you formally recognise competing 
groups but effectively force them 
to share power. Clearly Rwanda has 
chosen not to do this (as discussed 
above, it still bears the scars of a 
power-sharing model that failed), 
and instead is trying to achieve 
political stability by eliminating 
ethnic cleavages. It has sought to 
emphasis inclusive governance as 
an essential condition to overcome 
the legacy of ethnic-based 
discrimination and genocide. The 
potential problem with this is that, 
arguably, it is brushing under the 
carpet real tensions that would 
be better discussed more openly. 
However, there are real downsides 
to the consociational model: in 
Northern Ireland, elites may share 
power but there is little sense of 
integration between Catholics 
and Protestants at a community 
level; and Burundi clearly has real 
problems of its own. 
• It is argued that Gacaca has enabled 
forgiveness and reconciliation to 
take place and for perpetrators 
and survivors to live in harmony. 
Furthermore, the emphasis on 
a shared identity as Rwandans 
negates any attribution of blame 
to those who did not participate in 
the Genocide and encourages all 
Rwandans to work together.
Children’s Summit provides an opportunity for the 
voices of children and young people to be heard  and 
their views to be taken into account in policy making.
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• There is a delicate balance to be 
had between permitting political 
debate and ensuring that ethnic 
divides are not (re)created.
• An environment where NGOs, 
community based organisations and 
the media operate self-censorship 
based on an understanding of what 
is acceptable. However, there is 
little evidence of overt censorship 
and the Government has supported 
the development of an independent 
public policy think tank.
• A climate has been created making 
people very careful about what 
they say to whom, thereby making 
it difficult to make sense of what 
is really going on. However, there 
is little overt suppression and the 
Constitution guarantees freedom 
of expression.
• Some evidence that although 
people say there is reconciliation, 
people actually live parallel lives 
-in other words, there is no mixing 
across divides. However, there 
is evidence of people working 
together across divides across the 
country.
• That the use of mechanisms of 
Dialogue and Consensus results 
in may crimes going unrecorded 
including gender based violence 
against women and girls and 
violence against children in schools 
as well as at home ( Gender 
Monitoring Office 2013). 
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3. Aims and Objectives of the 
Research and Research 
Methods 
education, socio-economic status); 
• To provide evidence-
informed recommendations 
for strengthening the mechanisms 
for Dialogue and Consensus;
• To equip the Senate with a clear 
evidence-base for discharging 
their duties in respect of Article 
87 of the Rwandan Constitution 
(including, if feasible, the 
development of clear indicators 
for assessing the effectiveness 
of Dialogue and Consensus 
frameworks). 
Objectives
• To analytically demonstrate 
how Rwandans comprehend 
the principle of Dialogue and 
Consensus.
• To evaluate the mechanisms for 
Dialogue and Consensus and 
how they have effected local 
communities.
• To critically analyze the response 
of the community to building 
relationships and shared 
understanding between diverse 
groups with using Dialogue and 
Consensus.
• To identify various challenges and 
critical areas of debate and gaps in 
respect of the current operation of 
Dialogue and Consensus.
• To identify and examine 
3.1. Aims	and	Objectives	of	the	
Research
The core objective of this research 
project is to: 
a)  Explore how Rwandan citizens 
understand the principle of Dialogue 
and Consensus
b) To evaluate how well policies 
designed to promote Dialogue and 
Consensus are working in practice: 
that is the extent to which they 
are contributing to the outcomes 
identified above, in particular the 
their impact on social cohesion. 
Aims 
• To identify and describe the 
various frameworks for Dialogue 
and Consensus; 
• To find out whether Rwandan 
citizens at grass root level 
understand, own and feel part 
of the Dialogue and Consensus 
frameworks in place;
• To find out whether these 
frameworks are contributing 
to Rwanda becoming a socially 
cohesive society (i.e. to find out 
which frameworks are considered 
more effective and why);
• To measure, through the 
household survey, the extent 
of social cohesion in Rwanda in 
general and within social segments 
(age, gender, ethnicity, location, 
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discrepancies between the 
expected results and the findings 
as well as discuss long-term 
strategic policies; so that various 
mechanisms of Dialogue and 
Consensus can be enhanced and 
strengthened.
• To propose effective mechanisms 
and tools for a successful Dialogue 
and Consensus experiences as 
well as to promote peace building 
and social cohesion through 
strengthening the role of local 
authorities
3.2. 	Methodology	
The research combined the strengths 
of a large household survey with 
qualitative methods (in depth 
interviews with individuals and FGDs) 
in order to both identify the extent to 
which and for whom the mechanisms 
for Dialogue and Consensus are working 
and how they might be improved. The 
survey provides an important snap-
shot of public opinion allowing us to 
interrogate overall perceptions about 
the meaning and effectiveness of 
Dialogue and Consensus at the local 
and national level, as well as provide 
data on some of the desired outcomes 
of Dialogue and Consensus, for example, 
levels of social cohesion and trust. The 
other significant contribution of the 
survey is that it allowed us to compare 
how attitudes vary by social segments 
(urban-rural, gender, age, ethnicity, 
education level, deprivation etc) across 
Rwanda, using both descriptive statistical 
analysis and multivariate analysis. The 
survey sample was large enough to 
enable us to generalise to the population 
and to carry out an analysis of sub-groups 
of the population, for example young 
women living in rural areas with primary 
education or less, older men living in 
urban areas, in non-farm employment 
with secondary school/higher  education. 
The qualitative work allowed us to probe 
these issues in more detail: in particular 
it enabled us to evaluate the different 
frameworks for promoting Dialogue and 
Consensus in a more meaningful way 
than the survey allows. The qualitative 
research enabled us to provide a greater 
understanding of what is and what is 
not working, what the barriers to the 
mechanisms working are, what facilitates 
them working well and what would 
enable them to function more effectively. 
Retting (2012), for example, based on 
his mixed methods research in Rwanda, 
argues that qualitative work provides a 
different perspective from that gained 
from analysing survey responses. 
3.2.1. Survey
The survey utilised a questionnaire 
administered face-to-face to a 
nationally representative sample of 
the adult population, aged 18 years 
and over, living in the community and 
of Rwandan nationality. A two-stage 
probability sample was used with 
targeted population being all those 18 
years and over with the achieved sample 
being proportionate to the population 
size at District level. Sectors were 
selected using a systematic sampling 
method and sectors were divided into 
urban, semi-urban and rural. 
In each province except Kigali City, eight 
villages were selected in each District 
proportionate to the urban, semi-urban, 
and rural split; and in Kigali ten villages 
were selected in each District.  At 
household level the individual selected 
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for interview was the household 
member aged 18 years or over who had 
most recently celebrated their birthday
Size	and	distribution	of	the	sample
The sample size was determined using 
the formula hereafter:
n=D* z2*(p)*(1 p)
C2
Where:  n = the size minimum of the 
sample
z = a coefficient depending on the 
degree of confidence (=1.96 to the 
threshold of 95%)
p= the proportion of the population 
with the characteristic (indicator) of 
interest. In the absence of real data 
from a recent study on Dialogue and 
Consensus in Rwanda, we preferred to 
assign to this parameter a value of 50% 
which gives the highest sample size for 
this study. 
c = the acceptable margin error (of 2%). 
This means that the estimated values 
are within the range of ± 2% of actual 
value.
D = Design Effect (DEFF) is added to the 
formula to adjust the sample size when 
selecting the sample is done at several 
degrees or levels (here, the sample is 
selected in two steps: first at village 
level, then at households’ level).
n=1.59 *  1.96
2*(0.5)*(1 -0.5)
0.022
n=1.59 *  3.8416*(0.25)
0.0004
n= 1.59*2401≈ 3818
With D = 1.59 we have a sample size 
of 3818 households adjusted to 3840, 
with 20 households to be interviewed 
in each selected village in Kigali City and 
15 households in the rest of provinces. 
This sample was selected in 246 villages 
across the all districts in proportion to 
the size of the number of households in 
the village.  
Table	4:	Sample	size	per	provice.
Province Number	of	Districts Sample	Size Achieved	Sample		
Kigali City   3 600 600
Northern Province 5  600 600
Southern Province 8  960 960
Western Province 7 840 837
Eastern Province 7 840 840
Total  30  3,840 3,837
3.2.2. Qualitative methods
The qualitative research used purposive 
sampling to select key stakeholders/
expert informants and citizens who 
are the intended beneficiaries of 
the mechanisms for Dialogue and 
Consensus. We conducted in-depth 
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interviews and focus group discussions 
(FGDs) in 14 purposively sampled 
locations (Table 5). The locations were 
selected to ensure coverage of rural 
and semi-urban/urban locations in 
each Province. FGDs enabled us to 
bring together groups of citizens to 
discuss their views and understanding 
of the mechanisms and their impact on 
their lives. Key informants were able to 
provide a broader perspective of how 
the community use the mechanisms. 
In each location we conducted one male 
and one female FGD, alternating youth 
FGDs and FGDs with people 36 years 
and over between districts.  This was 
to ensure that we captured the views 
of older people as well as youth. We 
had single sex groups because Women 
tend to speak more freely and openly 
in single sex groups. For key informants 
we interviewed at every location a 
school teacher, a religious leader, the 
head of a cooperative association 
and a representative of a civil society 
organisation.  In total we carried out 26 
FGDs with each group comprising eight 
people and 52 key informant interviews.
Table 5: 	Locations	and	Samples	for	the	Qualitative	Research	
Province District Sector
FGDs Key	Informant	
Interviews	
East
Ngoma Kibungo 2 4
Gatsibo Rugarama 2 4
Rwamagana Rubona 2 4
West
Ngororero Hindiro 2 4
Rubavu Rugerero 2 4
Karongi Rubengera 2 4
South
Kamonyi Musambira 2 4
Nyanza Busasamana 2 4
Nyaruguru Kibeho 2 4
North 
Musanze Cyuve 2 4
Gakenke Nemba 2 4
Gicumbi Byumba 2 4
City of Kigali 
Kicurkiro Gahanga 2 4
Gasabo Gikomero 2 4
The research team prepared the agenda 
in advance and the focus groups were 
facilitated by a researcher(s) specifically 
trained to run the FGDs for this project. 
All interviews and FGDs were carried 
out Kinyarwanda. Notes were taken 
by trained note takers and the FGDs/
interviews transcribed into English and 
prepared for thematic analysis. 
3.2.3. Data Analysis
The survey data were entered using 
CSPro software and were transferred 
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into SPSS for statistical analysis. Data 
analysis includes frequencies, two-way 
tables and regression models. Unless 
indicated otherwise data form EICV3, 
FinScope 2012, the Women’s Economic 
Empowerment Survey 2011 and the 
African Values Surveys (2008 & 2012) 
were analysed specifically for this report 
and are the authors own calculations.
The qualitative data (FGDs and key 
informant interviews) were transcribed 
and analysed using Framework, 
a method specifically devised for 
analysing qualitative data for policy 
research. The analysis showed that we 
had reached theoretical saturation, 
in other words that the findings from 
the FGDs and key informant interviews 
were repeating the same information 
rather than new information emerging. 
There were differences across groups 
from different locations, but there 
was generally consistency between 
the findings from the FGDs and key 
informant interviews at one location. 
We can, therefore, be confident that the 
findings from the qualitative research 
are credible and representative of the 
different views of ordinary Rwandans. 
We indicate where the views expressed 
were the same across a large number of 
locations and were they were minority 
views suggesting differences between 
locations. 
3.2.4. Analytical Framework 
The main purpose of this report is to 
consider the extent to, and ways in, 
which communities work together 
to build consensus and how this 
contributes to the development of 
social cohesion and a way of life that 
people value. In other words, the extent 
to which Rwanda is building a society 
that is able to overcome the conflicts 
and divisions of the past and offers all 
citizens a stable society they can identify 
with and which offers them hope for 
the future. To do this it is necessary not 
just to look at the overall picture but to 
look at differences between groups in 
society that may have different interests 
and are differentially located in the 
opportunity structure. Our analytical 
framework includes: 
• Gender – male and female ;
• Age – in years ;
• Province  - City of Kigali, Southern, 
Western, Eastern, Northern;
• Location  -  urban, semi urban  and 
rural; 
• Marital status –  coded single, 
married/cohabiting, divorced/
widowed;
• Education measured on  an ordinal 
scale from no education to higher 
education; 
• Economic circumstances – 
Deprivation Scale, subjective 
evaluation of economic standing 
scale, Ubudehe Category; 
• Employment status – not 
employed, agricultural 
employment, non-farm 
employment 
• Disability/chronic ill-health (coded 
0 = disabled/chronic health 
problem, 1 = other).
The factors that influence our 
attitudes and behaviours identified 
in our analytical framework are often 
correlated, for example, poor people 
are more likely to live in rural areas 
than better off people, those with 
education are generally better off than 
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those without, and so on. In order to 
determine which factors are the most 
important in influencing we carry out 
multiple regressions. This enables us to 
identify what are the most important 
factors after controlling for all the 
factors that influence an outcome. 
3.2.5. Scales and Recorded  
 Variables 
Latent variables measure underlying 
phenomena that are not directly 
measurable and even out random 
variation in response to a number of 
questions aimed at measuring the 
underlying phenomena. For example, 
deprivation is multi-dimensional so we 
ask a number of questions and combine 
the answers to create a deprivation 
scale. We construct scales by first 
testing that our variables are measuring 
the same thing. To do this we use factor 
analysis with varimax rotation. This 
enables us to identify the variables that 
are measuring the same thing and how 
much of the variance they explain. To 
ensure that the variables are working 
together we test the reliability of the 
scale using Cronbach’s Alpha (CA). The 
minimum acceptable value is 0.75.
• High Community Engagement 
– often on 23a and/or 23b 
(see Appendix 2 for the 
Questionnaire);
• Deprivation Scale Qs 17a , c– 17 
f (reverse F M C L FL) explains 
53 percent of the variance CA 
0.77;5
5  We excluded cash income because of the seasonal 
nature of income in Rwanda and dropped ‘doing 
without water’ because the CA increased when it was 
removed from the scale.
• Deprivation Quintiles 
Deprivation Scale  dived into five 
equal parts;
• Trust Central Government – 
House of Representatives, 
Senate, Army, Courts of Law, 
Police. Explains 55.3 per cent of 
the variance, CA 0.78;
• Trust Local Politicians Scale 
Qs241e – 241k one factor 
explains 72.9 percent of Variance 
CA 0.95;
• Fear of Crime Scale Qs18a-18e 
- one factor 63.3 percent of 
variance CA 0.85;
• Trust Family Friends and 
Neighbours Qs 241s-241u – 
variance explained 77.9 CA 0.86;
• Active Member at Least One 
civil Society  Group Q22a/Q22b/
Q22c/Q22d/Q22e;
• Satisfaction with Ubudehe 
Poverty Categorises  Qs 222 & 
223 Variance 86 percent CA 0.84;
• Altruism Scale Qs243a-d 
Variance explained 57 percent 
CA0.75;
• Community Problem Solving Qs 
235 a b, d, e Variance explained 
63.6 percent CA 0.81;
• Community Collaboration Qs 
236 a-I Variance explained 74.8 
CA 0.91;
• Empowered to Participate Scale 
(subjective) 234 b &c variance 
explained 85.6 percent, CA 0.87;
• Satisfaction with Work of Village 
Advisory Council computed from 
answers to Qs 83a-h, Variance 
explained 84.5 percent, CA 0.98;
• Index of Density of Involvement 
in Civil Society Organisations 
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computed from Qs 22a-e - 
no involvement weighted 0, 
inactive membership 1 active 
membership 2 and leader 3; 
• Index of Density of Involvement 
in Government Mechanisms 
computed from Qs 23a, 23b, 
74,  113, 159,189,207, never 
weighted 0, sometimes/
occasionally 1, frequently/
regularly 3;
• Scale of Domain Satisfaction 
with Women’s National Council 
Qs 188a-188i variance explained 
91.9 percent, CA 0.99;
• Scale of Domain Satisfaction 
with National Youth Council Qs 
206a – 206h variance explained 
89.9 percent, CA 0.98;
• Confidence in Community Scale 
computed from Qs 242 c and d 
variance explained 89 per cent 
CA 0.9;
• Trust in Community Scale 
computed from Qs 242 a and b 
variance explained 80 per cent 
CA 0.7.5.
In this report we often present 
information using the normalised 
distribution for continuous variables. On 
the normalised distribution the sample 
mean is set to zero and values below 
zero are below the mean and positive 
values are above the sample mean. This 
enables us to see how the respondents 
are spread around the mean and see 
the variance in the population.
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3.2.6. Statistical significance 
We test all differences for statistical 
significance, that is, we analyse the data 
to determine if observed differences 
are due to chance or if we can be 
pretty certain that they represent real 
differences in the population. Small 
differences that are not of any real 
interest or large enough to suggest that 
there should be priorities for policy 
intervention can none the less be 
significant. 
Test of statistical significance 
determine if the observed differences 
are representative of those in the 
population. If the level of statistical 
significance is less than one per cent 
(p<0.01) we can be 99 per cent that the 
differences in our sample are not due 
to chance and if it is less than 0.1 per 
cent (p<0.001) we can be 99.9 per cent 
certain that the differences are not due 
to chance. In other words when we say 
that there are significant differences 
between groups in the sample then we 
are confident that they are likely to be 
replicated in the population at the given 
confidence level.
The tests of significance that we use 
are: the student t-test (t) to test the 
significance between a dichotomous 
variable and a continuous variable, 
Anova to test the difference between 
a categorical variable and a continuous 
variable, and Cramer’s V for testing the 
significance between two dichotomous 
categorical variables. We use correlation 
to establish association between 
continuous variables and ordinal 
variables. We use linear regression 
to determine the contribution of a 
number of variables to explaining the 
variation on a continuous variable. The 
regression enables us to identify the 
relative contribution that each of the 
significant variables makes to explaining 
differences in the population on the 
dependent variable controlling  for the 
contribution of the other variables. The 
R2 tells us the amount of the variance 
on the continuous variables that we can 
explain in total and the βs enable us to 
see the relative size of the contribution 
of each significant variable. Regression 
enables us to sort out what are the most 
important factors correlated with a 
given factor and thereby enable a firmer 
basis for prioritising interventions. 
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4. Location, Demographic and 
Socio-Economic Profile of the 
Sample 
4.1. 	Introduction	
In this section we describe the achieved 
sample and point out the differences 
between our sample frequencies and 
the EICV3 weighted sample frequencies 
for groups in the population and where 
EICV3 does not have comparable data, 
FinScope (2012) (Table 6; Appendix 2). 
Table	6:	Summary	of	Differences	between	the	Senate	Sample	and	EICV/FinScope	Weight-
ed Data 
Variable Difference Senate Sample and EICV3 and FinScope 2012  for 
Population  18 Years and Over
Location Senate sample over represents City of Kigali by 5% 
Marginally  over represents the urban population and 
underrepresents peri-urban
Gender Over represents men by about 9%
Age Underrepresents the under 25 by 16% and over represents  
the 36 to 50 age group by 9%
Education Underrepresents those with no education by 10% and over 
represents those with completed primary school by 6% and 
some secondary schooling by 3%
Marital Status Underrepresents the single by 16% and correspondingly over 
represents married couples
The purpose of this research, however, 
is not to generalise proportions to the 
population but to look at significant 
differences between groups in the 
sample. These significant differences 
can then be taken to represent 
significant differences between groups 
in the adult population. 
4.2. 	Location	
The sample was drawn from the four 
Provinces and the City of Kigali (Figure 
8). Compared with EICV3 the sample 
over represents the City of Kigali 
and Southern Province and under 
represents the other three Provinces. 
The difference for the City of Kigali is 4.6 
per cent but smaller for the Provinces.
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Figure	8:	Province	of	Residence	of	Respondents	to	Senate	2012	and	EICV3	18	Years	and	Over	(%)
(Source: Senate 2012)
Provinces to 91 per cent in Western 
Province. Those living in urban areas 
were significantly younger (t<0.001) 
and less deprived (t<0.001) than those 
living in semi- urban areas or rural 
areas. Those living in semi-urban areas 
were less deprived than those living in 
rural areas (t<0.01) but there were no 
significant difference by age.
A majority of the respondents live in 
rural areas, 74.4 per cent, with 16.1 per 
cent living in urban areas and 9.5 per 
cent semi-urban areas (Figure 9). 78 per 
cent of those resident in an urban area 
live in the City of Kigali and well over 80 
per cent of residents’ living out-of-Kigali 
resides in rural areas, varying from 84 
per cent in both Southern and Eastern 
Figure	9:	Location	of	Residence	of	Respondents	
(Source: Senate 2012)
4.3. 	Demographic	Structure	
The age of respondents varied from 18 
years to 96 with a mean of 40.5 years 
and a SD of 14.5. There was no sig-
nificant difference between male and 
female respondents.  A majority of the 
respondents re in early mid-life, that is 
between the ages of 26 years and 50 
years (Figure 10). 
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Figure	10:	Age	in	Categories	by	Gender	
(Source: Senate 2012)
A majority of the respondents are 
married, 73 per cent, with 13 per cent 
being widowed/divorced and 14 per 
cent single. Men are more likely than 
women to be single or married and 
women more likely than men to be 
divorced or widowed (Figure 11).
Figure	11:	Marital	Status	by	Gender	of	the	Sample
(Source: Senate 2012)
4.4. 	Education,	Employment	
and	Ownership	of	Land
4.4.1. education 
The vast majority of the respondents 
to the Senate Survey have completed 
primary school education or less, 83 
per cent, with just over 50 per cent 
not having completed primary school. 
By contrast only two per cent had 
any higher education. Women were 
more likely than men to have had no 
education (29.3% cf. 20.5%) and male 
respondents more likely than female 
to have had some primary education 
(31.5% cf. 27.5%) or completed primary 
education (31.5% cf. 26.7%).  The 
proportions of men and women having 
completed at least some secondary or 
higher education were not significantly 
different. Compared with EICV3, the 
Senate sample over represents those 
with no education or completed primary 
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and under represents those with some 
primary education. A slightly higher 
proportion of the Senate respondents 
compared to EICV3, have had some 
post primary education (Figure12)
Figure	12:	Highest	Level	of	Education	Respondents	to	Senate	Survey	and	in	EICV	3	
(Weighted	Data)
(Source: Senate Survey and EICV3 Data)
The levels of literacy and numeracy 
amongst the respondents are in line 
with the levels of education. Men 
report higher levels of literacy than 
women. Only half the male respondents 
and just over 40 per cent of female 
respondents say that they can read 
and write Kinyarwanda very well, and 
only just over 40 per cent of men and 
30 per cent of women say that they 
can do simple arithmetic very well. The 
ability to read and write Kinyarwanda 
and the ability to do simple arithmetic 
correlate very highly (0.8 p<0.01).  Just 
under 13 per cent of men can read and 
write French quite well or very well and 
nine per cent English. The comparable 
figures for women are 10 per cent and 
seven per cent. There is a large and 
significant correlation between the 
ability to read and write French and 
English (0.7 p<0.01).
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Figure	13:	Literacy	and	Numeracy	by	Gender	(%)
(Source: Senate Survey)
4.4.2. employment
Findings from the survey indicate that 
91 per cent of the respondents were 
economically active. Unemployment 
was just under five per cent (4.8%), 68.6 
per cent were employed in farming and 
17.3 per cent in non-farm employment. 
Only just over four per cent (4.4%) said 
they were too old or sick and disabled 
to work, although 30 per cent said 
that they have a long term disability or 
illness which limits their daily activities. 
Those in non-farm employment are on 
average less deprived than those in farm 
employment and rate their households’ 
economic situation as better, the 
mean on the deprivation scale, was 
for example, 22 for those employed in 
agricultural  and 24 for those employed 
in non-farm work (t-test df 372.3 p 
<0.001).
Figure	14:	Main	Activity	of	Respondents	
to	the	Survey
(Source: Senate 2012)
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further 1.7% own non-registered land. 
88 per cent are owner occupiers. In 
total only 6.9 per cent of respondents 
owned neither land nor a house (Figure 
15).
4.4.3. ownership of Land and 
housing 
A majority of respondents own 
registered land, 84.6 per cent and a 
Figure	15:	Ownership	of	Land	and/or	Property	by	the	Households	of	Respondents	to	the	
Survey
(Source: Senate 2012)
The importance of land ownership 
came across strongly in the qualitative 
research. In virtually every interview 
and FGD we were told that disputes 
over land were those that occurred 
most frequently. These disputes 
included those over the ownership of 
plots of land, boundary disputes and 
disputes over the inheritance of land. 
In some locations we were told that the 
Land Tenure Regularisation Process has 
reduced disputes over land. This means 
that there had been a decline in cases, 
but this was not always the case. The 
importance of land ownership was also 
evidenced by the fact that it was usually 
the Abunzi that had to resolve conflicts. 
While we were told in many FGDs that 
people now resolved conflicts amongst 
themselves, at Umuganda or with the 
support of the village leaders, land 
conflicts were still frequently referred 
to the Abunzi. There was general praise 
for the Abunzi, with the general view 
being that they were doing a good job 
with only a couple of exceptions where 
they were said to be incompetent and 
corrupt.
4.5.  Economic Security and 
Socio-economic Status
Economic security is essential for social 
cohesion, just as social cohesion provides 
a framework that facilitates equitable 
economic growth. Mechanisms for 
Dialogue and Consensus will only work 
to maximum benefit when people have 
economic security and at least view 
economic inequalities as equitable. 
Economic inequalities are generally 
one of the factors that underlay any 
conflict. Confidence in the future is also 
important.
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4.5.1. objective and Subjective 
Understandings of 
Poverty and Deprivation
In the survey we collected data to 
measure both respondents’ objective 
levels of deprivation and more 
subjective perceptions, both of the 
respondents themselves and of the 
communities in which they live. We can 
add value to the existing understanding 
of poverty by analysing subjective 
understands, community responses 
and perceptions of Ubudehe – the 
classification of households economic 
status by the community
The poor, as well as people living 
with disabilities and other vulnerable 
groups, can be excluded from 
participation in community and other 
activities because of negative attitudes 
and stereotypes of others, because 
they are too busy struggling to survive 
or because they think that they do not 
have the necessary capabilities and/
or resources to participate. We know 
from the findings of EICV3 and other 
research that poverty has declined 
significantly over the last ten years and 
now stands at 45 per cent live below 
the poverty line and 24 per cent below 
the extremely poor line. Poverty is 
much higher in rural compared to urban 
areas, and households at greatest 
risk of poverty include those that are 
dependent on agricultural wage labour 
for their livelihood, with children 
under fifteen years and those headed 
by a lone parent mother.  We also 
know that subjective poverty, people’s 
perception of their relative standing, 
can be important in influencing their 
satisfaction with their life and their 
participation in society. Perceptions of 
social standing can influence people’s 
behaviour including those who they 
interact with and are prepared to 
collaborate with. A feeling of relative 
deprivation can create a sense of 
injustice and result in conflict between 
groups based on socio-economic 
inequalities. Similarly, people’s 
perception of their future economic 
situation can influence the extent to 
which they feel loyalty to their society 
and are likely to respond positively to 
initiatives that expect them to invest 
time and effort working collaboratively 
with others on community projects. 
In the survey we measured deprivation 
using a number of questions to 
determine the extent to which 
respondents’ households are deprived 
(having to do without food, essential 
medicines/medical treatment, essential 
cloths, lighting after dark, fuel to cook 
with). Combining the variable creates a 
scale with a minimum values of 1 (never 
afford any item) and a maximum score 
of 22 (always afford all of the items). The 
mean for the scale is 18.9 (8.6 on a 10 
point scale) and the SD 3.1. 52 per cent 
of the respondents’ households scored 
19 or more on the scale suggesting that 
they are not deprived of essentials and 
this is in line with the data for poverty 
from EICV-3. 
The residents of the City of Kigali are, 
on average, less deprived than those 
living outside of the City, and those in 
Western Province the most deprived, 
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with a significant difference in social 
deprivation across the Provinces (Anova 
df 4,3745 <0.001). The post hoc test 
showed that Western Province had the 
lowest mean (18) and Kigali (20.4) the 
highest on the scale. Western Province 
had a significantly lower mean than 
the other Provinces and City of Kigali 
a higher one. The differences between 
the other provinces were not significant. 
The households of respondents living in 
rural areas had the lowest mean (18.6) 
and those in urban areas the highest 
(20.4). The differences between the 
three locations were significant (Anova 
df 2, 3747 <0.001). The households of 
male respondents were significantly 
less likely to be deprived than those 
of female, but the difference in means 
was small (19.1cf 28 df 3719 <0.05). 
The difference between rural and urban 
areas is what would be expected as is 
the very small difference between men 
and women. Also households in Kigali 
being less deprived than those living in 
other parts of the country. 
4.5.2. economic Situation 
of the Country and of 
Individuals 
The survey and qualitative data both 
indicate that a majority of Rwandans 
think that their economic circumstances 
have improved over the last five years 
and will continue to improve over the 
next five. In general the respondents 
rated the economic situation of the 
country as good or very good and 
thought things would be even better 
in five years’ time. 76 per cent of the 
respondents thought that the economic 
situation was fairly good or very good 
and 96 per cent were confident that 
it would be better or much better 
in five years’ time. However, some 
informants in the qualitative work did 
say that they thought that economic 
inequalities are widening with the rich 
getting richer. However, they generally 
thought that this was not a problem as 
the better off are now able to provide 
employment for the poor and in some 
cases the better of helped the poor by 
paying school fees and Mutual Health 
Insurance subscriptions.
However, respondents were somewhat 
less certain about the economic 
prospects for their own household; 
while 87 per cent thought that their 
household would be better off in five 
years’ time, only 21 per cent thought 
that they would be much better off. 
There was, not surprisingly, a positive 
correlation between confidence that 
the country’s economic situation 
would improve and that the economic 
circumstances of one’s own household 
would improve (0.48 p<0.01). The 
informants in the qualitative research 
were also generally of the view that 
things had improved over the last five 
years even when they thought that 
people in their community were poor 
and/or did not think that their own 
situation had changed much. 
However, 91 per cent of Rwandans 
think that their household’s income 
is insufficient to adequately support 
their household.  On a 10 point scale 
which asked respondents to place their 
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household from poorest to best off 
the mean is 5.5 and SD 2.5 (Figure 16). 
Only three per cent placed themselves 
on the bottom or top rungs and 50 per 
cent placed themselves on the 4th, 5th 
or 6th rungs; the middle of the income 
distribution.  Most people, therefore, 
see themselves as in the middle, neither 
amongst the poorest or the richest. 
There was also a modest correlation 
between the households’ deprivation 
scores and respondents ranking of their 
household (0.35 p >0.01)
Figure	16:	Respondents	Rating	of	their	Household’s	Economic	Standing	Compared	with	
Others	on	a	10	Point	Scale	
(Source: Senate 2012)
There are significant differences across 
the Provinces in ranking of household 
economic standing. Southern Province 
respondents gave their households 
the lowest average score (M 5.1) and 
Eastern Providence and City of Kigali 
the highest (M 5.9).Eastern Providence 
‘ranked  above Southern (M 5.4) with 
Northern Province (M 5.6) (Anover df 
4,3812 <0.001). Those living in rural 
or a in semi-urban areas rated their 
households as more deprived than 
those living in urban areas, but the 
differences were not large (M 5.5 cf 
5.9, Anova df 2,318 <0.001). Although 
gender and age differences were 
significant, with women and older 
people rating their household lower 
than male respondents and younger 
people, the differences were slight. 
Widows/divorced respondents (M 
5.1) rated their household significantly 
lower on the scale than married (M 5.6) 
or single respondents (M 5.7) (Anova 
df 2, 3814 <0.001). Respondents with 
a chronic illness/disability ranked their 
households lower, M 5.1 compared 
to 5.7 for those with no declared 
chronic illness (t-test df 2014 <0.001). 
Respondents who had secondary 
or higher education (M 6.4 ) were 
significantly more likely to rank their 
household as less deprived than those 
with other levels of education and 
those with no education to rank their 
households as more deprived (M 5.1). 
There was little difference between 
those with other levels of education, 
although the relationship is linear 
(Anova df 4, 3797 <0.001). 
45
The qualitative data suggests that 
people use four main indicators to 
assess their economic status compared 
with others. The most important is 
food security, with food security being 
able to have two meals a day; the very 
poorest go hungry. Other important 
indicators are; being able to afford 
to send children to school with the 
children of the very poorest having to 
work; being able to afford to purchase 
Mutual Health Insurance; and being 
able to save. It also supports the general 
picture of the extent of deprivation 
from the survey. Most of the informants 
told us that their communities had 
become food secure over the last five 
years and the availability of clean 
water was commented on positively 
by many. Mutual Health Insurance was 
seen as important and VUP was said to 
have helped the very poorest improve 
their standard of living. The increase in 
incomes combined with an increase in 
trust amongst neighbours was credited 
with more tontines being started 
enabling people to better cope with 
shocks and to invest in starting small 
businesses. In a few FGDs, SACCOSs 
was mentioned positively as providing 
credit for investment in businesses. 
There were exceptions in a few 
communities where food security was 
a concern. This was due to a number 
of different factors including poor 
harvests because of the weather as 
well low productivity and small plots. 
Crop specialisation was also seen as 
problematic by a small number as it 
increased risk of food insecurity. The 
yield was not sufficient to bring in an 
income to purchase an adequate diet. 
One concern that was raised in about 
half of the FGDs was the affordability 
of the Mutual Health Insurance. We 
were told that large families find it 
difficult if not impossible to pay for all 
members of the family to be covered. In 
one case we were told that the health 
centre refused to treat members of 
a family with insurance if the entire 
household were not enrolled. There 
was resentment that the cost of 
insurance had been increased without 
consultation. There was also concern 
that the Mutual Health Insurance only 
covers people in their own area leaving 
people without insurance cover if they 
are taken ill or have an accident when 
away from home.
In the survey we also asked some 
questions about the impact of 
Government policies designed to 
increase the productivity of farmers, 
improve food security and enable them 
to sell surplus crops on the market. 
69 per cent of respondents said that 
they were farmers. While around two-
thirds of farmers see benefits from 
Government policies, this leaves a 
significant minority who do not think 
the policies have had a positive impact 
on them (Figure 17). Just over two-thirds 
think they have benefited from land 
consolidation and crop specialisation, 
60 per cent from increased access to 
fertilizers and 56 per cent from terracing. 
Just over 60 per cent think that thy have 
adequate access to markets and 68 per 
cent that the infrastructure is good or 
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very good and 70 per cent have seen a 
positive impact on their ability to save. 
However, only just over a quarter think 
that they get an adequate return on 
their investment and just 28 per cent 
think that the price they get for the 
produce they sell is good or very good.  
Figure	17:	Perception	of	Farmers	of	Ben-
efits	from	Government	Policies	tin	Agricul-
ture
(Source: Senate 2012)
In the FGDS a number of policies 
and programmes were credited 
with bring about the improvements 
in farm productivity including land 
consolidation, terracing and the use of 
fertilizers which have enabled them to 
produce a surplus for sale. However, 
a small number of respondents were 
critical of crop specialisation arguing 
that it increased their risk of not being 
able to feed their households. Others 
argued that the crop they had been 
directed to grow was not a good one 
for their soil and others that they could 
not get surplus crops to a market to 
sell them. Some respondents said that 
they were too poor to buy fertilizer 
and therefore could not increase the 
productivity of their land and thereby 
increase their incomes. 
4.5.3. The communities 
evaluation of the 
economic circumstances 
of households 
A key element of Rwanda’s pro-poor 
policy is the Social Protection Policy 
(Ministry of Local Government 2011) 
and eligibility for benefits is based 
on a household’s poverty status 
which is agreed by the community 
using Dialogue and Consensus. The 
community agree the Ubudehe 
(participatory poverty) category of 
every household, and those who are 
placed in the bottom two categories, 
the destitute and the very poor are 
entitled to/eligible for social protection 
benefits including Community Health 
Insurance, the Vision 2020 Umurenge 
Programme (public works, cash 
benefits and loans) and help with 
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paying the costs of sending children 
to school. 27 per cent of respondents 
were in Ubudehe Categories 1 or 2, 
six per cent in Category 1 and 67.7 per 
cent in Category 3. In total, 27 per cent 
of respondents had benefited from 
VUP, 7.8 per cent from public works, 
3.3 per cent from the Ubudehe credit 
scheme, 11.3 per cent from direct 
support and 4.9 per cent from other 
benefits.  Although respondents in 
Ubudehe Categories 1 and 2 were more 
likely to have benefitted than those 
in other categories, the relationship 
was not very strong: 36 per cent of 
those in Category 1 and 34 per cent of 
those in Category 2 compared with 25 
per cent of those in higher categories. 
This suggests movement out of the 
bottom two categories possibly through 
participation in VUP.
Figure	18:	Respondents	Household’s	Ubudehe Category 
(Source: Senate 2012)
Respondents whose households are 
in Ubudehe Categories 1 and 2, not 
surprisingly, have a significantly lower 
mean score on the deprivation scale 
than those that do not (20.9 cf 22.9 
t-test df   1279 <0.001). Women were 
marginally more likely to be in Ubudehe 
Categories 1 and 2 than men, 26 per cent 
of women compared to 22 per cent of 
men, and widows/divorcees 39 per cent 
compared to 21 per cent of married and 
20 per cent of single respondents. The 
risk of being in Ubudehe Categories 1 
and 2 increases with age and decreases 
with educational attainment, with 34 
per cent of those with no education in 
Categories 1 and 2 compared to 19 per 
cent of those with completed primary 
education and 11 per cent of those 
with completed secondary or higher 
education (α2 <0.001). 
Satisfaction with Ubudehe category was 
measured on a 10 point scale from 0 
completely dissatisfied to 10 completely 
satisfied; the mean was 6.4 and the 
SD 2.8.  The normalised distribution 
went from -1.9 to + 1.3. There was 
a significant relationship between 
Ubudehe category and satisfaction 
with the category a respondents is in, 
although the differences were not large. 
Those in Category 1 were the most 
satisfied and those in Category 3 the 
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least satisfied, and the same was the 
case for satisfaction with the way the 
process is carried out. However, in the 
case, of satisfaction with the process 
there was no significant difference 
between those in Categories 1 and 2.
Figure	19:	Means	for	Satisfaction	with	Ubudehe Category and Process by Category
 (Source: Senate 2012)(Anova satisfaction with category df 2, 3577 p<0.001, satisfaction with process df 2, 3666 
p<0.001)
The qualitative work suggests that some 
of the dissatisfaction with placement in 
Ubudehe category relates to the cost 
of Mutual Health Insurance. We were 
told that households had been placed 
in Ubudehe category 3 but they could 
not afford to pay for Mutual Health 
Insurance. Another concern was that 
households were no longer considered 
eligible for Categories 1 or 2 once 
they had been given a cow. However, 
informants pointed out it take time 
for households to benefit from the 
milk and manure from the cow. It was 
also evident that there are very few 
communities where all the members 
are involved in deciding what category 
each household should be placed in. 
In a few focus groups the participants 
described how they all discussed and 
agreed which category each household 
should be placed in, but in the majority 
of cases the community leaders were 
said to make the decisions.
4.6. 	Disability	and	Vulnerability
Vulnerable groups include the 
extremely poor, people with chronic 
health problems and widows/divorcees. 
People in these groups are at risk of 
social exclusion and isolation. They 
may find it more difficult to engage 
in the mechanisms for Dialogue and 
Consensus.
Just under a third of respondents said 
that they have a disability or illness that 
limits their daily activities. Some people 
are more at risk of poor health/disability 
than others; older people, women and 
widows/divorcees are at greatest risk. 
People living with a disability or chronic 
illness are also at greater risk of poverty 
and are less likely to be economically 
active than those without. The risk of 
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disability increases with age, the mean 
age for those with disabilities/chronic 
ill health  is 47 years compared to 38 
years for those without (t-test df 3770 
<0.001). Women are at greater risk 
than men although the difference is 
not large, 32 per cent compared to 28 
per cent (Crammer’s V <0.01), widows/
divorcees (51.8 per cent) are at greater 
risk compared with 18 per cent of single 
people and 28 per cent of married ones 
(α2 <0.001). People living with a chronic 
illness or a disability are also at greater 
risk of poverty. 31 per cent of the 
chronically sick/disabled are in Ubudehe 
Categories 1 and 2 compared with 20 
per cent of those without a disability 
(Crammers’s V <0.001), and the mean 
on the normalised deprivation scale 
is -0.32 compared with 0.13 (t-test, 
df 3688 <0.001). People living with a 
disability are less satisfied with their life 
in general than those without (M4.6 cf 
5.3, t-test df 3790 <0.001), but there 
are no difference in the levels of trust 
or fear of crime or for personal safety. 
There is also little evidence that people 
with a chronicle illness/disability are 
limited in their ability to participate 
in the mechanisms for Dialogue and 
Consensus. They are as likely as other 
people to have participated frequently 
in a community project and community 
problem solving, and they are as likely to 
be an active member of a Government 
organised group and/or civil society 
group as other adults. They are, 
however, more likely to be economically 
inactive, 20 per cent compared to 13 
per cent (Crammer’s V<0.001), and less 
likely to have membership of a dense 
network of groups, but the differences 
are very small.
4.7.  Conclusions 
We have seen that there are five groups 
of adults who are at greater risk of 
poverty and social exclusion, older 
people, widows/divorcees, those in 
Ubudehe Categories 1 and 2, those 
in Social Deprivation Quintile 1 and 
people with chronic health problems/
disability. One important indicator of 
this is that they rate the quality of their 
life as significantly lower (t-test <0.001) 
although the differences are not large 
(Table 7).
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Table	7:	Vulnerable	and	non-Vulnerable	Groups	Mean	Scores	on	a	10	Point	Scale	Measuring	
Subjective	Quality	of	Life	
Variable	
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Age 65 Years and Over/ Other 4.6 5.1 t-test 367.5 ***
Widowed/Divorced/Other 4.5 5.2 t-test 666.5 ***
Chronic Health Problem/Other 4.6 5.3 t-test 3790 ***
Ubudehe 1 & 2/Other 4.5 5.3 t-test 1507.4 ***
Deprivation Quintile 1 3.8 5.4 t-test 3722 ***
(Source: Senate 2012)(***t<0.001)
of 0.37 (p<0.01), but the correlation 
with subjective poverty is higher, 0.58 
(p<0.01). In regression analysis the two 
variables combined with a variable for 
being /not being in the bottom two 
Ubudehe Categories explained 37 per 
cent of the variance, in life satisfaction 
with respondents’ estimation of their 
households’ relative economic situation 
explaining by far the largest amount 
as Table 8 shows. The larger the β the 
greater the contribution of the variable 
to the variance explained.
Subjective as well as objective measures 
of poverty are both important, with the 
former generally having more influence 
on people’s satisfaction with their lives 
than the latter, although both make an 
independent contribution to explaining 
life satisfaction. Poverty is also one of 
the main factors that can limit people’s 
ability to participate in community 
activities (Abbott et al 2012). There is 
a positive correlation between social 
deprivation and subjective quality 
of life measured on a 10 point scale 
Table	8:	Economic	Factors	Influence	on	Life	Satisfaction	
Variables b Beta SE
Constant 1.919 0.096
Deprivation 0.403 0.191*** 0.029
Rating of Household’s Economic Standing 0.536 0.509*** 0.015
Not in Ubudehe Categories 1 or 2 0.234 0.049*** 0.066
Adjusted R2    0.37
(Source: Senate 2012)(***p<0.001) 
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5. Knowledge of, engagement 
and satisfaction with 
mechanisms for consensus 
building at community and 
National levels
In this section we give an overview of 
the respondents’ knowledge of and 
engagement with the mechanisms 
for Dialogue and Consensus before 
considering in the next section if they 
are providing a basis for the building 
social capital and social cohesion. 
As we have pointed out these are 
Government sponsored and participation 
is compulsory or an expectation. 
Participating in Umuganda, for example, 
is compulsory, and attendance is 
enforced by the police; according to 
the informants in the FGDs, people are 
fined if they do not participate. All adult 
members of a village are expected to 
participate in the village council and 
certain disputes have to be taken to 
the Abunzi before they can be taken to 
courts of law. However, respondents 
also reported belonging to civil society 
groups, and these too can build social 
capital. Indeed as we have already 
pointed out, much of the literature on 
social capital has looked at the role of 
civil society organisations that people 
join on a voluntary basis. 
5.1. 	Introduction:	The	Basis	
for	Building	Social	Capital	
The mechanisms for Dialogue and 
Consensus are intended to enable 
people to work together to solve 
problems and have a stake in decision 
making. They are intended to build 
social capital mainly at community level, 
but they are linked into a framework 
of horizontal and vertical linkages 
through the decentralisation process 
and the National Women’s Council and 
the National Youth Council, etc. In this 
way the aim is for the mechanisms to 
be tools contributing to the building 
of a socially cohesive society through 
working cooperatively together to 
achieve outcomes that are agreed by 
the community. Working together in 
the community it is assumed will build 
trust amongst community members 
and  horizontal linkages trust across 
communities and vertical linkages trust 
in Government at local and national 
levels. 
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5.2.  Community Engagement 
Before we consider the knowledge of 
and engagement with the mechanisms 
for Dialogue and Consensus it is 
of interest to consider what the 
respondents said about their general 
involvement in community activities. 
The reported engagement with the 
community is relatively high (Figure 
20); nearly two-thirds of respondents 
frequently attend community meetings 
and just over half have often worked 
with other members of their community 
to develop programmes. There is, not 
surprisingly, a high correlation (0.69) 
between the two scales; people who 
frequently attend community meetings 
are also often involved in working with 
other members of the community to 
develop programmes. In total two-
thirds of the respondents say that they 
frequently attend community meetings 
and/or work with others on community 
development projects. This, however, 
leaves a third of respondents who 
do not frequently engage with other 
community members at meeting or in 
developing projects.
Figure	20:	Engagement	with	the	Community	in	the	12	Months	Prior	to	the	Survey
(Source: Senate 2012)
Combing the two variables together 
gives us a Scale of Community 
Engagement which goes from one, low 
engagement, to seven, high engagement. 
The mean on the scale is 5.8 (8.4 on a 10 
point scale) and the SD 1.7. Using this 
scale we carried out an analysis to see 
in more detail which groups are likely 
to participate more than others. Those 
who are more likely to have high levels 
of community engagement are men, 
live in semi-rural or rural areas, married, 
aged 26-50 years, have completed 
primary school education as their highest 
qualification and are in Social Deprivation 
Q 3 (Table 9). 
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Table	9:	Differences	in	Community	Engagement	by	Different	Groups	(%	respondents)
Variable	 Differences	 Ova	df	Test	
Province  Kigali (M 5.2) lowest and Southern Province 
highest  levels of participation  (M 5.9). There 
is no significant difference in participation 
between Western and Northern Provinces 
(M 5.5) but participation is lower  than in 
Eastern (M 5.8) and Southern Province with no 
significant difference between these.
Anova df 
4,370<0.001.  
Location Residents urban areas (M 5.1) are less likely to 
participate than those in semi-urban (M 5.7) or 
rural areas (M 5.8) but there is no significant 
difference between the latter
Anova df 2, 
3815<0.001.  
Age Lowest amongst 25 year olds and younger (M 
4.8), followed by 51 years and over (M 5.5). No 
significant difference between 26-35 (M 5.8)  & 
36-50  (M 6.0) year olds. 
Anova dfs 3,3814 
<0.001
Gender Women (M 5.3)  less likely to participate than 
men (M 5.9)
t-test df 3816 
<0.001
Marital 
Status 
Single (M 4.7)  significantly less likely to 
participate, followed by widowed/divorced  
(M 5.2) with married  (M 5.9) most likely to 
participate.
Anova df 2,3815 
<0.001
Education Least likely to participate completed 
secondary/HE (M 5.0). Most likely to 
participate completed primary (M 6.0).
Anova df  4,3798 
<0.001
Social 
Deprivation 
Q1 (M 5.3) least likely to participate, followed 
by Q2 (M 5.4). Q3 (M 5.9) most likely. No 
significant difference Qs 4 or 5 from Q3.
Anova df 4,3707
<0.001
Disability Disables/chronically sick (M 5.5), not (M 5.7). t-test df 3816 
<0.01
(Source: Senate 2012)
5.3. 	Civic	Engagement	
As we have already discussed, much 
of the literature on social capital 
argues that it is built through voluntary 
participation in civil society groups 
and networks. Social capital is said 
to be built through the existence of 
thick networks of social engagement, 
especially those that link people across 
communities and social divides. Some 
research in Rwanda has suggested that 
local community based groups and civil 
society organisations are crowded out 
by the Government sponsored ones, 
while other research has suggested that 
a lack of capacity for leadership is the 
main problem. 
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Active membership of at least one 
civil society group is moderate, with 
just under 40 per cent of respondents 
active in one or more community based 
groups. The most frequently mentioned 
was active membership of a religious 
group (25%), but only six per cent said 
that there were active members of a 
voluntary organisation.
Figure	21:	Active	Membership	of	Community	Based	Organisations
(Source: Senate 2012)
Density of membership and activity 
in civil society organisations is low; 
there is little multiple membership of 
organisations or active participation. 
The Index of Density of Participation 
in Civil Society Organization goes from 
zero, no engagement at all, to 13, high 
engagement and participation. The 
mean on the scale is 2.1 and the SD 
2.0. The normalised distribution of 
the Index goes from -1.1 to 5.3 but is 
crowded around the mean with a long 
thin tail to the more heavily engaged 
end (Figure 22).
Figure	22:	Normalised	Distribution	on	the	Index	of	Density	of	Participation	in	Civil	society	
Organisations
(Source: Senate 2012)
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There is a significant difference in dense 
engagement across the Provinces 
(Anova df4, 3832 <0.001) with the post 
hoc test showing that density of Civic 
Engagement is lowest in the City of 
Kigali (M 1.5) and highest in Western 
Province (M 2.5). There is no significant 
difference between Western Province, 
Northern Province and Eastern 
Province. Southern Province has a 
significantly lower average engagement 
than the other Provinces (M 2.0), but 
significantly higher than the City of 
Kigali. In terms of location, those living 
in urban areas are significantly less 
likely to have a density of engagement 
compared to semi-urban and rural 
areas (M 1.4 cf M 2.3, Anova df 2, 3834 
<0.001). 
Men are significantly more likely to have 
a dense engagement than women, but 
the difference in means is not large (M 
2.3 cf 2.0 t-test df 3835 <0.001).Those 
with no formal education (M 1.7) are 
least likely to have dense engagement 
and those with completed primary the 
highest (M 2.5). Those with completed 
secondary or higher (M 2.1) and less 
than completed primary (M 2.1) have 
a significantly higher engagement 
than those with no formal education 
and lower than those with completed 
primary education (Anova df 4, 3817 
<0.001). People who are married have 
the highest mean engagement in dense 
networks (M 2.3) and those who are 
single the lowest (M 1.5). The widowed 
and divorced are significantly different 
from the married and the single (M 1.8) 
(Anova df 2, 3834 <0.001), There are 
significant differences in engagement 
based on age, with the young being 
the least likely to participate in dense 
networks and those in midlife the most. 
The mean for the 18 to 25 year age 
group is 1.7 compared to a mean of 2.4 
for the 36-50 age group.  Those aged 51 
years and over are significantly more 
likely to participate in dense networks 
than the younger age group but less 
likely than those in mid-life (M 2.0). The 
26-35 years age group does not differ 
significantly from the 51 years and over 
age group or the 36 to 50 years age 
group (Anova df 3, 3833<0.001).
The extremely deprived are less likely to 
engage in dense networks than the non-
deprived. Those in Ubudehe Category 1 
(M 1.5) are the least likely to engage in 
dense networks and those in Category 
3 and higher the most likely (M 2.3), 
with those in Category 2 (M 1.9) being 
significantly different from Category 1 
and Category 3 and higher. (Anova df 2, 
3834 <0.001). There is also a significant 
difference in dense engagement across 
the deprivation quintiles with those in 
Q1 (M 1.9) the least likely to engage 
and those in Q4 the most likely (M 2.4). 
Those in Q2 (M 2.0) are significantly less 
likely to participate in dense networks 
than those in Q4 (Table 10).
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Table	10:	Homogeneous	Subgroups	for	Density	of	Membership	of	Civil	Society	Organisations	
by	Deprivation	Quintiles
Deprivation	Quintiles	 Subset 
1 2 3
Q1 1.9
Q2 2.0 2.0
Q3 2.2 2.2 2.2
Q5 2.3 2.3
Q4 2.4
 (Source: Senate 2012)(Anova df 4, 3724 <0.001)
There is a significant but low correlation 
(0.2 p<0.01) between density of 
engagement in civil society networks 
and density of engagement with 
the mechanisms for Dialogue and 
Consensus. There are also low but 
significant correlations with altruism 
(0.07 p<0.01), trust in other people in 
general (0.11 p<0.01) and satisfaction 
with life (0.123 p<0.01).
5.4. 	Knowledge	of	the	
Mechanisms	for	Dialogue	
and Consensus 
5.4.1. Awareness of the 
Mechanisms
An initial question is the extent to which 
people have heard of the mechanisms 
put in place by the Government for 
Dialogue and Consensus. As Figure 
23 shows, there is a high level of 
awareness of most of the mechanisms, 
with virtually all respondents having 
heard about Umuganda, participation 
in which is compulsory, but a low level 
of awareness of the Forum of Political 
Parties. There is generally greater 
awareness of mechanisms that operate 
at the local level and less awareness 
of those that operate at district and 
national levels. Only just over a quarter 
of respondents had heard of the Forum 
of Political Parties and only just over 
half the National Dialogue Summit. 
There is also comparatively low level of 
awareness of Community Juries (57%) 
and the Community Development 
Committee (45%) which do operate at a 
local level. Awareness is not the same as 
being empowered to participate.  While, 
for example, 97 per cent of respondents 
had heard about Gacaca, only 67 per 
cent said that they knew how to take 
part. We discuss participation in more 
detail later in this section.
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Figure	23:	%	of	Respondents	heard	of	the	Mechanisms	for	Dialogue	and	Consensus.
(Source: Senate 2012)
about. The mean on the Index was 11.1 
and the SD 3.1. No respondent had 
heard of none of the mechanisms, 11 
per cent had heard of all of them and 
over half (54.4%) had heard of 80 per 
cent of them. 
Clearly many of the respondents had 
heard of more than one mechanism. 
We computed an Index of Awareness of 
Mechanisms which goes from 0, never 
heard of any of them, to 15, heard of all 
the mechanisms we asked respondents 
Figure	24:	Number	of	Mechanisms	 for	Dialogue	and	Consensus	 that	Respondent	Knew	
About
(Source: Senate 2012)
Regression analysis showed that 
gender, education, social deprivation, 
marital status, location and age all 
make an independent contribution to 
predicting who is likely to identify more 
mechanisms (Table 11). Deprivation 
explains the highest amount of the 
variance, with knowledge increasing 
as you move up the deprivation scale 
and the same applies to education. 
Those living in urban areas are less 
likely to know a large number of the 
mechanisms than those living in semi-
urban or rural areas and those who are 
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married are more likely to know about 
more. In other words the people most 
likely to be aware of more mechanisms 
are non-deprived married men over 25 
years with secondary school or higher 
education and not living in an urban 
area.
Table	11:	Factors	Predicting	Awareness	of	Mechanisms	for	Dialogue	and	Consensus
Variables b Beta SE
Constant 10.431 0.355
Age 0.013 0.063*** 0.004
Gender -0.0931 -0.151*** 0.097
Education 0.427 0.16*** 0.046
Married 0.978 0.139*** 0.111
Urban Location -1.428 -0.168*** 0.2
Deprivation 0.617 0.199*** 0.051
Rural ns ns ns
Disability /Chronic Illness ns ns ns
Adjusted R2    0.14
(Source: Senate 2012)(***p<0.001)
When we consider differences in 
awareness of the mechanisms the 
most notable difference is between 
awareness of those that operate at 
local level and those that operate at 
a national level (Table 12). Southern 
Province stands out with respondents 
having a higher level of awareness for all 
mechanisms than the other Provinces. 
Respondents in the City of Kigali had 
a lower level of awareness of all the 
mechanisms except for the Forum of 
Political Parties, the National Dialogue 
Summit and Itorero, where residents 
of the Kigali City are significantly more 
likely to have heard of them. The 
same pattern holds for the differences 
between urban and other locations. 
Those with higher levels of education 
are more likely to have heard of the 
National Dialogue Summit, the Forum 
of Political Parties and Itorero, but 
there is no clear pattern for the other 
mechanisms. Women are significantly 
less likely than men to be aware of 
virtually all the mechanisms.  Differences 
are slight for the main mechanisms that 
operate at a local level, Umuganda, 
Gacaca, Abunzi, Ubudehe and Women’s 
National Council, but range from 7.4 
per cent fewer women than men 
having heard of the Village Advisory 
Council to 20 per cent having heard 
of the Forum of Political Parties. With 
the notable exception of the National 
Youth Council and Itorero, where young 
people aged 18-25 years were no less 
likely to have heard about them than 
those over 25 years, young people were 
significantly less likely to have heard of 
the mechanisms than those in older 
age groups (Crammer’s V<0.001). There 
were no significant differences between 
other age groups.
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5.4.2. Sources of information 
about the Mechanisms
People are likely to find out about 
mechanisms that operate in the 
community from village leaders and by 
word of mouth, but this may not be the 
case for those that function nationally. 
In virtually every FGD the participants 
told us that the leaders tell them about 
policies and initiatives in the meetings 
after Umuganda. This seems to be 
the main way in which Rwandans get 
information. In a few cases informants 
told us they get information on what 
the House of Representatives and 
Senate are doing from the radio. In 
the survey we asked respondents to 
tell us how they find out about three 
mechanisms, Gacaca, the Abunzi and 
the National Dialogue Summit. As a 
further indication of awareness we 
asked respondents to tell us how often 
they discussed Gacaca and the Abunzi 
with friends and relatives. The main 
sources of information are meetings, 
especially for getting information 
frequently. In the case of Gacaca, for 
example, nearly half of the respondents 
said that they got information at least 
weekly from meetings (Figure 25) and 
only eight per cent that they never get 
information.  Friends and the radio 
were also sources of information with 
around two-thirds of respondents 
saying they got information from at 
least one of these. By contrast only 
around 15 per cent of respondents ever 
got any information from television or 
newspapers.
Figure	25:	Sources	of	Information	Gacaca
(Source: Senate 2012)
Gacaca is also frequently discussed 
with family, friends, neighbours and 
other members of the community. Only 
around 11 per cent of respondents did 
not discuss Gacaca ever with any one of 
these groups, although only just over a 
61
third discuss Gacaca often or very often 
(Figure 26). There is little difference in 
who Gacaca is discussed with, although 
marginally more respondents discuss 
Gacaca frequently with other members 
of their family than neighbours, friends 
or other members of the community. 
Figure	26:	Discussion	about	Gacaca	with	Family,	Friends	and	Members	of	the	Community	
%	of	Respondents	
(Source: Senate 2012)
The same pattern of information 
sources holds for the Abunzi as for 
Gacaca, but respondents were less 
likely to get information as frequently. 
Nevertheless just over 40 per cent 
of respondents said that they got 
information at least monthly through 
meetings and only 13 per cent that 
they never get information at meetings 
(Figure 27). The significantly lower 
proportion getting information on the 
Abunzi from the radio, television and 
newspapers compared to information 
about Gacaca suggests that the service 
does not get the same level of media 
exposure.
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Figure	27:	Sources	of	Information	Abunzi	%	of	Respondents	
(Source: Senate 2012)
Respondents were slightly more likely 
to discuss the Abunzi with friends, 
neighbours and other members of the 
community than with family, but the 
differences were small (Figure 28). 
However, 40 per cent of the respondents 
rarely or never discuss the service with 
anyone, and only just under a fifth 
discuss the service frequently with 
other people.
Figure	28:	Discussion	about	Abunzi	with	Family,	Friends	and	Members	of	the	Community	
%	of	Respondents		
(Source: Senate Data)
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Figure 29 shows the main sources 
for information about the National 
Dialogue Summit. Only 54 per cent of 
respondents had heard of the Summit, 
and of these the vast majority had 
got information from the radio. This 
contrasts strongly with sources of 
information about Gacaca and the 
Abunzi, where meetings and friends 
were nominated as the main sources 
of information, although the radio 
was also seen as important. According 
to EICV 3(NISR 2012) 60.2 per cent of 
households have at least one radio and 
45.4 per cent a mobile phone, while 
only 6.4 per cent have a television and 
3.7 per cent accesses to the internet at 
home.
Figure	29:	Sources	of	Information	National	Dialogue	Summit	%	of	Respondents	
(Source: Senate 2012)
5.4.3. Knowledge of the 
Mechanisms
In addition to awareness of the 
programmes, it is important for people 
to know what they are intended for 
and how to participate. Only just over 
two-thirds (67.4%) of respondents said 
that they knew how to take part in 
activities related to Gacaca. A majority, 
two-thirds of the respondents, thought 
that Gacaca was intended for the whole 
community, a quarter that it was for the 
perpetuators of the Genocide against 
the Tutsi, 12 per cent that it was for 
perpetuators and survivors and five per 
cent for survivors. Only two per cent 
said that they did not know.
Most of the respondents did not think 
that they had adequate knowledge 
about the Abunzi. Only 14 per cent 
thought that they had adequate 
knowledge while 64 per cent of 
respondents said that they have no 
or very little knowledge. Although the 
differences between groups was not 
large, respondents living in the City 
of Kigali (76%), living in urban areas 
(73.4%), women (72.8%) , under 26 
years (73%) and single (74.8%) were 
more likely to say they had little or no 
knowledge of the service than other 
respondents.
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5.5. Engagement	 with	 the	
mechanisms	for	Dialogue	
and Consensus 
5.5.1. Attending/Using the 
Mechanisms
However, it is important not just to 
consider if people have heard of the 
mechanisms but if they are engaging 
with them. Dialogue and consensus 
means participating in the process 
on a regular basis. As Figure 30 
shows, engagement with any given 
mechanism is relatively low with the 
notable exception of Umuganda. 
Even with Umuganda, 28 per cent of 
respondents do not attend regularly. 
While 44.3 per cent of respondents said 
that they engaged with the National 
Dialogue Summit, in practice this is 
overwhelmingly passive, watching 
television or listening to the radio. 
Less than two per cent of respondents 
participated by calling, sending an SMS, 
using the internet or participating in 
person. 
In the case of some of the mechanisms, 
not all members of the community 
would be expected to have engaged 
with them, for example, only those 
involved in a dispute within the remit of 
the Abunzi will have used the service. 
However, the building of social capital 
and social cohesion from Dialogue and 
Consensus are likely to be greatest when 
there are high levels of engagement.  
Figure	30:	%	of	Respondents	Engagement	with	Mechanisms	for	Dialogue	and	Consensus1
(1 Umuganda engagement is attending every month, for Village Advisory Committee 12 or more times a year, for 
NWC and NYC attending regularly.  For NWC % of women and for NYC % 35 years and under)
Nevertheless 95 per cent of respondents 
have engagement with at least one 
mechanism, albeit infrequent. An index 
of density of engagement computed 
by adding together frequency of 
involvement with the mechanisms 
for Dialogue and Consensus ranged 
from 0, no engagement, to 16, high 
engagement, the mean on the 16 point 
index was 7.9  (4.9 converted to a 10 
point scale) and the SD 3.1.  
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Figure	31:	Index	of	Density	of	Engagement	with	the	Mechanisms	for	Dialogue	and	
Consensus
(Source: Senate 2012)
dicating that there are far fewer people 
with a very high level of engagement 
than there are with a low level of en-
gagement. 
The normalised scale ranges from -2.5 
to +2.26 with crowding just above the 
mean but a more dense tail to the 
negative end than the positive end in-
	Figure	32:	Normalised	Distribution	on	the	Index	of	Density	of	Engagement	with	the	
Mechanisms	for	Dialogue	and	Consensus
(Source: Senate 2012)
There is a significant difference in the 
average density of engagement with 
the mechanisms across the Provinces 
but the differences are not large. It is 
densest in the Southern Province (M 
+0.2) and least dense in the City of Kigali 
(M -0.27). The post hoc test shows that 
there are three subsets with the City of 
Kigali and the Western Province having 
the least engagement and the Southern 
and Eastern the most. The Northern lies 
between these two groups (Anova df 4, 
3821 <0.001. There is also a significant 
difference by location with density 
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of engagement being significantly 
lower in urban areas (M -0.37) than 
rural and semi-urban areas (M +0.11) 
(Anova df2, 3823 <0.001).  Men, on 
average, have a denser engagement 
with the mechanisms than women 
but the differences are not large (M 
+0.1, M -0.1, t-test df 3824 <0.001) 
and the same is the case for people 
living with a chronic illness (M-0.17, M 
+0.07, t-test df 3785 <0.001). Married 
people are significantly more likely to 
engage in dense networks than single 
or divorced/widowed people (+ M 
0.14, -0.43 Anova df 2, 2, 2823 <0.001). 
Younger people and older people 
are less likely to participate in dense 
networks than adults in mid-life. The 
lowest mean is for the 18-25 years age 
group (M  -0.34) and the highest for 26 
to 35 year olds (M +0.29). There is no 
significant difference in the means for 
18-25 year olds and 51 years and over 
with 36 to 50 and 26-35 year olds being 
significantly different from these two 
groups (Anova df 3, 3822 <0.001). 
The most deprived are significantly 
less likely to engage in dense networks 
with those in quintile 1 having a 
significantly  lower mean but with no 
difference between the other quintiles 
(M -0.26), M +0.12 , Anova df 4,3714 
>0.001).  Similarly those in Ubudehe 
Category 1 have a significantly lower 
mean than those in the other two 
categories (M -0.31, M +0.02, Anova df 
2, 3823 <0.001). The lowest mean for 
education is for completed secondary 
or higher (M -0.23) and the highest 
for completed primary (0.25). There 
is no significant difference between 
completed secondary and no formal 
education (Anova df 4,3807 <0.001).
The linear regression enables us to see 
(Table 13) that  married, able bodied 
men living outside of  urban areas  with 
completed primary school education, 
aged 26 to 50 years and not in the 
bottom social deprivation category are 
those most likely to engage in a number 
of mechanisms. 
Table	13:	Factors	Predicting	Engagement	with	Mechanisms	for	Dialogue	and	Consensus
Variables b Beta SE
Constant 5.445 0.324
Age  - Midlife 1.221 191*** 0.103
Gender -0.289 -0.046** 0.096
Senior Secondary or Higher Education ns ns ns
Primary Education 0.529 0.077*** 0.108
Married 1.009 0.142*** 0.115
Urban Location -1.288 -0.151 0.137
Not Deprivation Q1 0.864 0.109*** 0.123
No Disability /Chronic Illness 0.417 0.061*** 0.107
Adjusted R2    0.15
(Source: Senate 2012)***p<0.001)
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Differences in engagement by different 
groups in the individual mechanisms are 
not generally very large and there is no 
easily discernible pattern. The residents 
of the City of Kigali are less likely to 
engage with the mechanisms apart for 
Umuganda and the National Dialogue 
Summit where they are more likely to 
engage. Generally engagement is lower 
in urban areas, with the exception of 
the National Dialogue Summit where 
it is higher. With the obvious exception 
of the Women’s National Council and 
Gacaca, women are much less likely 
than men to engage frequently with 
the mechanisms. There is no clear 
relationship between engagement 
with the mechanisms and education, 
although those with completed primary 
education tend to engage more than 
other groups and those with completed 
senior secondary or higher education 
with the National Dialogue Summit. 
With the exception of the National 
Youth Council, participation tends to 
be highest amongst adults in mid-life 
(25-50 years) and lowest amongst the 
18-25 year olds. Those over 50 years 
are marginally more likely to have 
engaged with Gacaca and Ubudehe 
but the differences are relatively small. 
With the exception of the Abunzi and 
Ubudehe where engagement increases 
with increasing deprivation, there is a 
tendency for engagement to increase 
as the level of social deprivation 
decreases. 
The FGDs and key informant interviews 
suggest a rather different picture 
of community engagement and 
differences across the country. As the 
survey suggests the highest levels 
of engagement are with Umuganda, 
with some communities having very 
high levels of participation and others 
lower levels. High participation in some 
cases is said to be because people 
want to participate, but in other 
cases at least part of the explanations 
for high attendance is fear of being 
fined. In urban and semi-urban areas 
those with non-farm jobs were said 
to participate less frequently than 
those working in agriculture. Some 
informants suggested that male youth 
attended more than older people and 
women. Apart from this there was 
little evidence of engagement with the 
formal mechanisms.  
However, what did come across in the 
FGDs was significant involvement in 
dispute resolution at a local level. In a 
large number of the FGDs participants 
told us that they had learnt how to 
resolve disputes themselves and if 
they could not then neighbours in the 
village discussed the issues and made 
recommendations. Disputes were less 
frequently being referred to village 
leaders and especially to the cell and 
Abunzi than in the past. Also in a high 
proportion of FGDs and key informant 
interviews reference was made to 
the involvement of members of the 
community in tontines. This was seen 
to be very important as the groups 
were seen to provide a sort of insurance 
saving for members to cope with 
shocks as well for investment in income 
generating activities. Also reference 
was frequently made to attending the 
funerals and weddings of members 
of the community providing another 
forum for interaction.
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Table	14:	Proportion	of	Respondents	that	have	Frequently	Engaged	with	Mechanisms	by	
Various	Characteristics
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C of K 80.8 38.4 12.7 32.0 11.5 7.9   5.3 67.0
Southern 73.8 39.5 21.4 34.4 20.2 14.2 18.6 43.9
Western 69.7 44.4 24.0 30.6 26.6 17.8 10.4 24.6
Northern 70.8 44.8 22.0 50.0 37.0 28.7   6.8 46.2
Eastern 68.1 30.4 25.5 52.1 32.6 25.1 12.3 51.3
Urban 74.8 40.7 12.8 28.6 9.5 6.7 5.7 61.4
Semi-urban 77.3 34.2 21.2 49.3 31.1 21.1 11.8 50.7
Rural 71.1 39.6 23.5 40.6 28.5 21.0 12.7 41.1
Male 78.2 34.1 23.9 44.6 0 25.5 14.3 53.0
Female 66.3 44.4 19.6 34.4 32.9 10.7 8.7 37.4
No Education 57.2 41.2 21.3 37.2 23.5 14.7 9.4 32.0
Incomplete  Primary 73.3 40.1 23.2 41.5 24.0 20.5 11.1 40.9
Completed Primary 82.4 35.0 21.2 43.3 29.9 17.8 14.9 48.5
Incomplete Secondary 73.4 43.1 23.4 34.4 22.9 14.6 8.9 56.6
Senior Secondary Higher 77.5 41.8 16.7 29.4 23.7 18.8 10.3 78.6
18-25 Years 69.1 55.7 15.5 23.4 15.3 33.2 5.6 48.2
26-35 Years 86.7 47.0 20.0 43.4 26.1 27.7 12.5 47.9
36-50 Years 81.4 33.2 23.3 43.2 33.3 ------ 13.0 44.7
51 Years and Over 45.3 28.1 25.3 40.0 20.1 ------ 12.0 41.1
Q1 60.6 43.6 24.7 33.6 22.3 26.0 11.9 29.8
Q2 72.3 37.6 23.3 42.2 24.7 27.1 10.6 37.9
Q3 74.9 41.4 19.8 39.5 25.3 31.3 12.4 45.9
Q4 75.6 38.1 21.8 43.0 26.8 30.8   9.5  54.9
Q5 78.5 35.9 19.3 40.2 26.8 31.1 13.1 57.6
Total 72.3 39.2 39.5 25.3 18.0 11.5 45.2
(Source: Senate 2012)
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5.5.2  Participation in the 
mechanisms for Dialogue 
and Consensus
A majority of respondents said that in 
general they welcome participating in 
the mechanisms and the opportunity 
they afford for debate. Only 6.8 per 
cent said that they did not welcome 
the opportunity, 19.3 per cent that 
they worry about not being able to 
express themselves freely and 25.3 
per cent that they take up too much 
time. Those who lack confidence in 
their ability to contribute are also much 
more likely to say that they worry that 
the mechanisms take up too much 
of their time (Spearman 0.8 p<0.01). 
Interestingly there is little relationship 
between welcoming the opportunity to 
participate and density of participation, 
the correlation although significant was 
negligible (Spearman 0.09 p <0.01). 
The proportion not welcoming the 
opportunity is too small for detailed 
analysis.
Those most likely to lack confidence in 
their ability to participate are widows, 
the chronically sick/disabled, those 
with little if any formal education and 
those in the bottom social deprivation 
category. However, there were no 
large differences between groups: 
women compared to men, (21% cf 
17%), the chronically sick and disabled 
(21.4% cf 17.7%) and widows/divorced 
compared to single and married people 
(27% cf 18%) were all less confident 
(Crammer’s V 0.001). Those with no 
education were less confident than 
those with education; the relationship 
is linear varying from 25.4 per cent of 
those with no education to 15.6 per 
cent of those with senior secondary 
or higher education. The relationship 
between social deprivation and lack of 
confidence was more complex. Those 
in the bottom quintile were significantly 
more likely to lack confidence (27.5%) 
and those in Q3 the least likely (14.3%), 
followed by Q4 (17.7%), Q2 (20%) and 
Q5 (21.1%) (α2 <0.001).There were no 
differences by age. In terms of concern 
about time to participate those that 
were concerned about sufficient time 
were widows/divorced (30% cf 25%), 
Crammer’s V 0.001), with no formal 
education (30.2% cf 25% ) and in the 
bottom social deprivation category 
(33% cf 20.3% for Q3, 23.8% Q5 & 
24.8% Q2) (α2 <0.001).
For Gacaca we asked respondents 
which activities they had participated 
in and Figure 33 shows activities 
respondents had undertaken. The most 
frequently mentioned role of those who 
had participated was as an observer 
with just over a quarter of respondents 
saying that they had done this. 14 per 
cent had gathered information and nine 
per cent acted as a judge, while only four 
per cent had given witness testimony 
and two per cent been defendants or 
were survivors. The numbers are too 
small for detailed analysis.
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Figure	33:	Activities	Related	to	Gacaca	Respondents	Participated	In
frequently, 51.3 per cent compared 
to 39 per cent (Cramer’s V <0.001). 
Men are more likely to have raised an 
issue than women, (54.8% cf 34.0%, 
Cramer’s V <0.001), married/single 
people than widows/divorced (45.6 cf 
38.9, Cramer’s V<0.01), and there is a 
linear relationship between education 
and raising an issue varying from 50.5 
per cent of those in Q5 to 39.6 per cent 
of those in Q1.
44 per cent of respondents had heard 
of the National Dialogue Summit but 
only 45.3 per cent had participated. All 
of those who said that they participate 
said they felt free to express their 
opinions during the Summit but the 
majority only participated passively by 
listening to the radio and/or watching 
the television. Only two per cent of 
respondents took part actively by 
phoning in and/or using SMS and/or 
attending in person (Figure 34). 
The vast majority of those who attend 
village council meetings feel able 
to express their opinions (96.8%). 
Just under half of those who attend 
meetings have had an issue discussed 
during a meeting (44.8%, 36.6% of 
all respondents) and for 93 per cent 
of these their issue was discussed at 
a meeting. There was a high level of 
satisfaction with how the issue was 
dealt with, 92.6 per cent were satisfied 
with the amount of time devoted to 
their issue and 88.6 per cent with the 
resolution agreed. However, while only 
47.6 per cent thought that all decisions 
made at meeting are implemented, only 
just over one per cent (1.3%) thought 
that none of the decisions agreed at 
meetings were implemented.
Those who attend village council 
meetings regularly are, perhaps not 
surprisingly, more likely to have raised 
an issue than those who attend less 
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Figure	34:	%	of	Respondents	that	Participate	in	the	National	Dialogue	Summit
respondents how they rated the 
attendance of the members of their 
community. Nearly three-quarters 
thought attendance was high or very 
high and only 2.8 per cent though it was 
low or very low. There was no significant 
relationship between rating of the 
level of attendance and participation. 
There were some differences between 
respondents rating of attendance and 
their reports of their attendance by 
District and location. While Kigali had 
the highest level of regular attendance 
by respondents (80.8%) only 68 per 
cent of respondents rated attendance 
as high by the community, and while 
only 70.8 per cent of respondents from 
the Northern Province reported regular 
attendance  themselves 83.8 per cent 
reported high levels of community 
attendance. Similarly, while 74.8 per 
cent of respondents living in urban 
areas said that they attend regularly, only 
63.8 per cent thought that community 
attendance was high.
In total 57 per cent of women have 
some engagement with the Women’s 
National Council and of these the 
overwhelming majority (98.2%) feel 
able to express their views during 
meetings and 97 per cent think that 
they have sufficient opportunity during 
meetings to make their views known 
on local issues. Ninety-one per cent 
have voted in elections for committee 
membership.
5.5.3. motivation for Attending 
meetings of mechanisms 
for Dialogue and 
Consensus
It is important to understand what 
motivates people’s attendance. For a 
number of the mechanisms we asked 
respondents the most important 
reason for their attendance, and we 
also asked them what they thought was 
the most important reason for other 
people attending.  For Umuganda, 
which is compulsory, we also asked 
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For those who attended meetings 
the main reason given was that the 
programme was important and they 
wanted to participate. Other reasons 
such as participation being compulsory 
or because of the expectation of 
monetary reward were given by a tiny 
minority. However, 13 per cent, over 1 
in 10 said that they attended Gacaca 
out of curiosity. 
Table	15:	Most	Import	Reason	for	Participation/Attending	Meeting	%	of	those	that	
Attend.
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Reason for Attending 
Expectation Financial Incentives   0 0 0 0.3 0.8 2.8
Negative Sanctions /Compulsion   7.4 7.4  3.9 2.8 2.9 1.9
Voluntary/Programme Important 69.8 89.1 91.1 90 90.4 77.2
Curiosity 13.1 0 0 2.6 2.0 2.6
Other /Don’t know   8.8 3.5 5.0 4.2 3.8 5.7
(Source: Senate 2012)
In the FGDs, respondents talked at 
length about the reasons for attending 
Umuganda. While there certainly was 
an element of wanting to avoid paying 
fines, the overwhelming impression was 
that people attend because they want 
to. In many communities there seems 
to be a strong collective commitment 
to Umuganda and what it achieves for 
the community. The main motivation 
for participating in community work 
was commitment to improving 
their community. In some cases the 
community work undertaken during 
Umuganda was seen as benefitting the 
whole community and in other cases 
the vulnerable and very deprived. The 
main motivation for participating in 
the meetings held after Umuganda 
was to get information on Government 
programmes, to keep abreast of what is 
going on. 
The motivations for attendance 
attributed by respondents to other 
people were much the same as for self-
motivation. However, the proportion 
of other people who were said to 
attend because they saw attendance as 
important was somewhat lower. 
Over 1 in 10 in the case of Umuganda 
and 1 in 10 for village advisory council 
meetings thought that people attended 
because of fear of negative sanctions 
if they did not attend. In FGDs, as well 
as fines for non-attendance community 
disapproval was also mentioned as a 
sanction.
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Table	16	Most	Important	Reason	Why	Other	People	Attend	Meetings	%	of	Reponses
Mechanism Gacaca Village 
Advisory 
Council 
Meetings 
After 
Umuganda
Women’s 
National 
council
National 
Youth 
Council 
Reason for 
Attending 
Expectation 
Financial 
Incentives
0.1 0 0.8 0.9 0.7
Negative 
Sanctions /
Compulsion
13.7 10.0 6.2 3.1 2.9
Voluntary/
Programme 
Important 
73.8 82.1 87.4 86.2 85.7
Curiosity 8.0 0 1.9 1.8 2.2
Other /Don’t 
know
4.3 7.9 3.7 7.0
(Source: Senate 2012)
the Women’s National Council and 
National Youth Council meetings were 
because of lack of knowledge, but 
only a tenth thought this was the case 
for Gacaca and the Village Advisory 
Council. Interestingly a third thought 
that people did not participate in the 
Village Advisory Council because they 
were not encouraged to do so, while 
none thought this was the case for the 
other mechanisms. 
Overall, the two main reasons given 
for people not attending meetings 
were lack of time and not being aware 
of the mechanism. Just over a third 
said that people lacked time to attend 
meetings after Umuganda, and a 
fifth to attend meetings of the Village 
Advisory Council, Women’s National 
Council or the Youth Council.  Around 
a third said that non-attendance at 
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Table	17:	Main	Reasons	Why	People	Do	Not	Attend	Meetings	%	of	Responses
Mechanism Gacaca Village 
Advisory 
Council 
Meetings 
After 
Umuganda
Women’s 
National 
council
National 
Youth 
Council 
Reason for  Not 
Attending 
Not Aware of 
Mechanism
11.3 11.5 17.8 33.0 34.3
Not Encouraged 
to Attend 
   4.3   5.9    6.0   9.2 11.4
No Benefit from 
Attending 
11.4   5.5   7.0   6.3   9.4
Not Willing to 
Participate 
  0.0 32.3   0.0   0.0   0.0
Do Not Have 
Time
15.1 20.4 35.3 23.7 19.6
Other/Don’t 
Know
62.0 23.4 32.3 27.7 25.3
(Source: Senate 2012)
5.6. Perceptions	 of	 Individual	
and	Community	Benefitting	
from	 the	 Mechanisms	 for	
Dialogue and Consensus
Figure 35 shows the proportion of 
respondents who thought that their 
community had benefitted from the 
mechanisms. This ranges from 98 per 
cent who think that their community 
has benefitted from Umuganda, 
to 43 per cent who think that their 
community has benefitted from the 
Community Development Committee. 
In general, not surprisingly, mechanisms 
that are more widely known about are 
more likely to be seen as benefitting the 
community and these are also the ones 
where people are more likely to see the 
direct benefit to their community. 
The proportion saying that people 
only attend meetings because they are 
compulsory was relatively low. Only 18 
per cent, for example, of those that were 
aware of Community Juries thought 
that attendance should be voluntary, 
while 80.8 per cent gave answers that 
suggested they agreed that it should be 
compulsory. Furthermore there was no 
suggestion in the FGDs that there was 
any problem with fining people for non-
attendance at Umuganda. 
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Figure	35:	%	of	Respondents	that	think	that	they/their	Community	has	Benefitted	a	lot	
or	a	Fair	Amount	from	the	Mechanism	for	Dialogue	and	Consensus
(Source: Senate 2012)
and problems affecting women in their 
community and 74.9 per cent that it 
promotes Dialogue and Consensus 
around women’s issues in their 
community.  In total, 62.8 per cent of 
women think that it has achieved its 
objective.
Much the same picture emerges when 
we consider the evaluation of youth of 
the National Youth Council, although 
only 52 per cent think that it has been 
successful. Seventy-four per cent think 
that they and the community benefit 
from the Council and 74 per cent that 
it represents the interests of youth. 
Seventy-three per cent strongly agree 
or agree that it promotes Dialogue and 
Consensus around youth issues, 69 per 
cent that it plays a key role in solving 
conflict and problems affecting youth in 
the community and 66 per cent that it 
contributes to the process of Dialogue 
and Consensus.
Seventy-five per cent of respondents 
thought that the Women’s National 
Council represents the interests of 
ordinary Rwandan women, and 72 per 
cent that it plays a key role in solving 
conflicts and problems affecting women 
in the community. 71 per cent think that 
the National Youth council represents 
the interests of youth in Rwanda, and 
67 per cent that it plays a role in solving 
conflict and problems affecting youth.
Around three-quarters of the female 
respondents think that the Women’s 
National Council plays an important role 
in resolving conflict and issues involving 
women, with 76 per cent thinking that 
they and their community benefit a 
lot or a fair amount from it. The same 
proportion thinks that it represents the 
interests of ordinary Rwandan women. 
Seventy-three per cent think that it 
plays a key role in resolving conflict 
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However, in the FGDs and key informant 
interviews the three mechanisms 
that were seen to bring the greatest 
benefit were Umuganda, the Abunzi 
and Girinka. Umuganda was seen 
to bring benefits to the community 
through the building of infrastructure 
including schools and roads as well as 
building houses for the extremely poor 
and the elderly. The Abunzi were seen 
by a majority of informants to be very 
effective at resolving disputes especially 
those involving land. In addition, in 
a number of FGDs, the participants 
told us that the community had learnt 
from the Abunzi how disputes can be 
resolved and now most disputes are 
dealt with at the village level. Girinka 
was seen as successful for two reasons: 
firstly, it improved recipients’ economic 
wellbeing; and secondly, it increased 
altruism because those with cows often 
gave milk to those without and the 
recipient of a cow had in turn to give a 
cow to another household.
5.7. Satisfaction	 with	 the	
Mechanisms	 for	Dialogue	
and Consensus 
5.7.1. Satisfaction with the 
Mechanisms Generally 
Respondent’s levels of satisfaction 
with the mechanisms will reflect the 
extent to which they are delivering. 
However, it is not a measure of how 
satisfied they are with it as a way of 
permitting Dialogue and Consensus. 
Dialogue and consensus is the way 
in which decisions that influence the 
outcomes are expected to be made, 
but as the qualitative research shows 
this is not invariably the case. The 
extent to which the informants felt 
they contributed to outcomes varied by 
mechanism and location, but generally 
was not considered to be high except 
for dispute resolution in the meetings 
after Umuganda. Also the mechanism 
that the informants seemed to be 
most satisfied with was the Abunzi, 
where few had actively participated. 
Nevertheless, it is conceivable that 
levels of satisfaction with Dialogue 
and Consensus may influence overall 
satisfaction, at least for some of the 
mechanisms. We first look at the levels 
of satisfaction with the mechanisms 
based on the proportion of respondents 
who had used the mechanisms. We 
then look in more detail at three of 
the mechanisms that respondents 
participate in at village level and where 
Dialogue and Consensus is likely to 
be central to the functioning of the 
mechanism. 
Levels of high satisfaction with the 
mechanisms (8/10 and above) vary 
from 82 per cent for   Umuganda to 
51 per cent for the National Dialogue 
Summit, based on the respondents 
who rated the mechanisms. Levels of 
high satisfaction are somewhat lower 
than the proportion of respondents 
who think that their community has 
benefitted from a mechanism, for 
example, 98 per cent of respondents 
said that their community had 
benefitted from Umuganda but only 
83  per cent gave a score of eight out 
of 10 or over to Umuganda for level of 
satisfaction.
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Figure	36:	Satisfaction	with	Mechanisms	for	Dialogue	and	Consensus	%	of	Sample	Giving	
a	Rating	of	at	Least	8	out	of	10,	%	of	Respondents	Giving	a	Rating	
(Source: Senate 2012)
with a SD of 2.5. Those who have used 
the service are significantly less likely 
to be satisfied than those who have 
not although the difference is not large 
(85% cf 91% Crammers’ V 0.001). 
90 per cent of respondents thought that 
the service was successful. However, 
only just over a fifth (21%) had used 
the service, and on a 10 point scale the 
mean level of satisfaction was only 7.4, 
Figure	37:	Levels	of	Satisfaction	on	a	Ten	Point	Scale	by	Those	Who	Have	Used	the	Service	
(Source: Senate 2012)
There was no significant difference 
between those that had not and those 
that had used the service in terms of 
attribution for successful outcomes.
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5.8.2. Satisfaction with the 
Village Advisory Council
We also ask a number of questions 
asking about satisfaction with specific 
elements of the Council, eight per cent 
said that they did not know or did not 
give a rating. The mean rating for overall 
satisfaction and on the various aspects 
varied from 7.4 to 7.7 (Table 18). The 
variance explained by the various 
aspects on factor analysis was 84.5 per 
cent and the CA 0.97 indicating that 
satisfaction with one aspect correlates 
highly with satisfaction on all the other 
aspects. The correlation between 
overall satisfaction and satisfaction 
on a scale computed from satisfaction 
with the various aspects was large and 
significant (0.8 p<0.01).
Table	18:	Mean	Satisfaction	with	Various	aspects	of	the	Work	of	the	Village	Advisory	
Council	%	Respondents	Gave	a	Rating	
Activities of Village Advisory Council Mean 
Satisfaction 
SD 80% + 
Overall Rating 7.6 1.8 56.8
Identifying Problems of Community 7.5 1.8 55.2
Initiating community dialogue  around Issues 7.5 1.7 53.8
Encouraging Inclusive Participation 7.7 1.7 58
Ensuring that there is a Clear Understanding of 
Community’s perceptions of  Issues
7.5 1.8 54.7
Ensuring Inclusion of more Disadvantaged 
Members of the Community 
7.4 1.8 53.6
Implementing the Agreed Action Plan 7.5 1.9 54.2
Mobilising Resources to Address Problems that are 
identified 
7.5 1.8 54.4
Ensuring that All Members of the Community 
Participate in Implementation 
7.5 1.8 53.5
Securing Equity of Benefit from Community 
Initiative
7.4 1.9 53.7
The normalised distribution for 
satisfaction with the Village Advisor 
Council (Figure 38) goes from -3.7 to 
+1.3 indicating a long tail of people 
who are less satisfied with the work of 
the Council, but with the majority of 
respondents being crowded around the 
mean and with a noticeable proportion 
who are totally satisfied with the work 
of the Council, and indeed 30 per cent 
of respondents gave the Council a score 
of nine or 10 out of 10. 
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Figure	 38:	 Normalised	 Distribution	 for	 Satisfaction	 with	 the	Work	 of	 Village	 Advisory	
Council 
(Source: Senate 2012)
18 to 25 years (M 7.3)  are significantly 
less satisfied than all other age groups 
with no significant differences between 
the other age groups  (M 51 years and 
over 7.7) (Anova df 3.3559 <0.001). The 
single (M 7.2) are less satisfied than 
the married and widowed/divorced 
but there is no significant difference 
between the latter (M Married 7.6) 
(Anova df 2, 3560 <0.001).
5.8.3. Women’s Satisfaction 
with the Work of the 
Women’s National 
Council
Two-thirds of women who rated the 
work of the council give it a satisfaction 
score of 8 out of 10 or higher (Figure 
39). On the 10 point scale the mean for 
overall satisfaction is 7.9 with a SD of 1.8. 
Nevertheless there are some women 
who are dissatisfied with the work of the 
Council and 1 in 10 gave it a satisfaction 
score of five out of 10 or less.
Differences between groups in terms of 
satisfaction with the work of the Village 
Advisory Council were small even when 
significant. There were no significant 
differences between men and women, 
those with a disability/chronic illness 
and those without, by education, by 
deprivation or Ubudehe Category. There 
were differences across the Provinces, 
with those in the City of Kigali being the 
least satisfied (M 7.2) and those living in 
Northern Province the most satisfied (M 
8.0). Eastern Province residents (M 7.7) 
are less satisfied than Northern Province 
and more satisfied than City of Kigali 
(Anova df 4, 3558 >0.001). The means 
for Western Province and Southern 
Province do not differ significantly 
from those of City of Kigali residents or 
those of Eastern Province. Those living 
in urban areas (M 7.3) are significantly 
less satisfied than those living in rural 
areas (M  7.6) but there is no significant 
difference between urban and semi-
urban (M 7.5) or rural and semi-urban 
(Anova df 2, 3560 >0.001). Those aged 
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Figure	39:	Score	out	of	10	for	Overall	Satisfaction	with	the	Work	of	the	Women’s	National	
Council	%	of	Women	Aware	of	its	Work
(Source: Senate 2012)
the council’s work tend to be satisfied 
with the other aspects and those who 
are dissatisfied with one aspect with 
the other aspects as well.  The domain 
scores are highly inter-correlated and a 
scale computed from them correlates 
highly with the overall satisfaction 
score, Pearson 0.8 (p<0.01). 
In addition to asking about overall 
satisfaction we asked about satisfaction 
with various elements of the work of 
the Council and the satisfaction scores 
were much the same for all the domains 
as the overall score (Table 19). Women 
that are satisfied with one aspect of 
Table	19:	Satisfaction	with	Activates	of	Women’s	National	Council	%	of	Women	Giving	a	
Rating	
Activities of Women’s  National Council Mean 
Satisfaction 
SD 80% +
Overall Rating 7.9 1.8 67.5
Identifying Problems of Women in the 
Community 
7.7 1.9 62.0
Initiating community dialogue  around 
Issues amongst Women
7.6 1.9 60.0
Encouraging Inclusive Participation  of 
Women in Community Development 
7.7 1.9 61.7
Ensuring that Women have a Clear 
Understanding of Issues
7.7 1.9 61.0
Ensuring Inclusion of more Disadvantaged 
Women in the Community 
7.7 1.9 61.5
Implementing the Agreed Action Plan 7.6 1.9 60.2
Enabling Women to Get their Voice Hard 
on local Issues 
7.7 1.9 62.3
Enabling Women to Get their Voice Hard 
on National Issues 
7.7 2.0 63.2
Initiating Dialogue on Issues between Men 
and Women
7.7 1.9 61.8
(Source: Senate 2012)
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Figure 40 shows the normalised 
distribution for the scores on the Scale 
satisfaction with the various aspects 
of the work of the National Women’s 
Council around the mean score of 7.7. 
The scale goes from -3.7 to +1.3 with 
crowding around and above the mean 
but with a long tail again showing a 
relatively high level of satisfaction by 
women with the work of the Council 
but with a long tail of women who are 
less satisfied.
Figure	40:	Domain	Satisfaction	for	National	Women’s	Council	%		of	Women	that	Rated	
the	Work	of	the	Council	
(Source: Senate 2012)
There were no significant differences in 
levels of satisfaction between women 
based on age, marital status, education, 
social deprivation or living with a chronic 
illness/disability. There are significant 
differences across provinces and by 
location, but they are not large. The 
Provinces fall into three distinct groups, 
women are least satisfied with the 
Women’s National Council in Southern 
Province (-0.26) and the City of Kigali 
and most satisfied in Northern Province 
(+0, 42), with Western and Eastern 
Province laying in-between (Anova df 
4, 1402 <0.001). Women living in urban 
areas (-0.26) are less satisfied than 
those living in other locations (+0.06) 
(Anova df 2, 1404).
5.8.4. youth Satisfaction with 
the Work of the National 
youth council
Youth are also relatively satisfied with 
the work of the National Youth Council 
although marginally less satisfied than 
women are with the National Women’s 
Council. The 76 per cent of youth who 
are aware of the work of the Council 
on average give it a score of 7.3 out of 
10, with 52.7 per cent giving it a score 
of 8 out of 10 or higher. However, just 
under one in five (17.2% of youth)  give 
it a score of five or less on the 10 point 
scale although nearly a quarter give it a 
score of 10 out of 10.
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Figure	41:	Score	out	of	10	for	Overall	Satisfaction	with	the	Work	of	the	National	Youth	
Council	%	of	Women	Aware	of	its	Work
(Source: Senate 2012)
with various aspects of the Council’s work 
was very high (0.8 p<0.01). This indicates 
that youth’s level of satisfaction with the 
Council tends to be much the same across 
the various aspects of its work. 
Youth that were satisfied with one 
aspect of the Councils’ work tended 
to be satisfied with other aspects. 
The correlation between the overall 
satisfaction scale and a scale computed 
from the scales measuring satisfaction 
Table	20:	Satisfaction	with	Activates	of	National	Youth	Council	%	of	Youth	that	Gave	a	
Rating	
Activities of Women’s  National Council Mean 
Satisfaction 
SD 80%
+
Overall Rating 7.3 2.0 52.7
Identifying problems of youth in the community 6.9 2.0 41.8
Initiating community dialogue  around issues 
affecting youth
6.8 2.0 40.6
Encouraging inclusive participation  of youth in 
community development 
7.0  2.0 42.8
Ensuring that youth have a clear understanding of 
issues
6.8 2.1 40.9
Ensuring inclusion of more disadvantaged youth in 
the community 
6.8 2.1 41.1
Implementing the agreed action plan 6.9 2.1 40.6
Enabling youth to get their voice hard on local issues 6.9 2.1 42.6
Enabling youth to get their voice hard on national 
issues 
6.9 2.1 44.2
(Source: Senate 2012)
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Figure 42 shows the normalised 
distribution for the Domain Satisfaction 
Scale. It shows the variance around the 
mean for the scale of 6.9. It goes from 
-3.1 to +1.6, showing a moderate level of 
variance.  There is crowding around the 
mean with a noticeable peak at the top 
end but also a long tail suggesting that 
most youth are relatively satisfied with 
the work of the Council but that there 
is a noticeable minority that are less 
satisfied and in some cases dissatisfied 
with the work of the Council.
Figure	42:	Domain	Satisfaction	National	Youth	Council	%	of	Youth	that	are	Aware	of	the	
Work	of	the	Council
(Source: Senate 2012)
There were no significant differences 
in levels of satisfaction between youth 
based on age, gender, marital status, 
education, social deprivation or living 
with a chronic illness/disability. There 
are significant differences across 
provinces and by location, but they are 
not large. Youth are least satisfied in the 
City of Kigali (-0.21) and most satisfied 
in Northern Province (+ 0.21) with no 
significant differences for the other 
Provinces (Anova df 4, 1194<0.001). 
Youth living in urban areas (-0.21) are 
significantly less satisfied than those 
living in rural areas (+0.07) but there 
is no difference with semi-urban areas 
(Anova df 2, 1196 <0.001).
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6. Consensus Building in the 
Community 
6.1. 	Introduction
of the mechanisms, don’t know/did 
not give a response varied from 55 per 
cent for the Community Development 
Committee to 2. 2 per cent for Girinka. 
Interestingly, those mechanisms that 
are the most likely to involve members 
of the community directly in Dialogue 
and Consensus, at least in theory, 
are not the ones that are most highly 
rated. The findings from the qualitative 
research provide some clues as to why 
this may be the case. Firstly, with the 
notable exception of dispute resolution 
between neighbours, there was little 
evidence that most people take part 
in Dialogue and Consensus. In other 
words, members of the community 
were not meeting and discussing issues 
and agreeing how to resolve them. 
In a few cases we were told that the 
community discusses the placement 
of households in Ubudehe Categories 
and that the whole community (village) 
discusses how a dispute can be 
resolved. Generally, however, we were 
told that leaders make the decisions and 
the community implement them. On 
several occasions the participants in the 
FGDs said that they would like training 
in Dialogue and Consensus, although it 
is clear that informants in some groups 
did understand the principles as they 
described for us how the community 
work together to resolve disputes. 
A major objective of the mechanisms 
of Dialogue and Consensus is that they 
will bring Rwandans together across 
divides at local and national levels. The 
assumption is that by working together 
to solve common problems, people will 
develop recognition of sharing common 
problems, a sense of belonging and a 
shared identity. Performance, working 
together will result in bonding, trust, 
a concern with further the interests 
of the community rather than self or 
group interests and trust in others in 
general. Important questions then 
are the extent to which people are 
resolving differences and conflict 
using the mechanism of Dialogue and 
Consensus and the extent to which 
people see the community as a whole as 
having responsibility for the successful 
operation of the mechanisms. In other 
words, to what extent are ordinary 
Rwandans performing Dialogue and 
Consensus and taking ownership of the 
mechanism.
Figure 43   shows the extent to which 
the respondents to the survey thought 
that the mechanisms contribute to 
Dialogue and Consensus. A number of 
interesting points can be gleaned from 
this Figure. Firstly the high proportion 
of respondents who said they did not 
know or did not give a view for a number 
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However, the mechanisms that are seen 
as having made the largest contribution 
to Dialogue and Consensus are valued 
because they are seen as a way of bring 
the community together, integrating 
or at least enabling the community 
to live together. In the FGDs it was 
not so much Gacaca itself that was 
valued, but the outcome. What was 
valued was that the processes generally 
enabled perpetrators and survivors 
to be reconciled through the asking 
for and the giving of forgiveness. This 
enabled them to live in harmony in 
many communities, although there 
were exceptions, with a number of FGD 
participants telling us that there was not 
full reconciliation because perpetrators 
had not made the required payments. 
Ingando and Itorero are valued 
because they provide opportunities 
for education in Rwandan history and 
values and providing an understanding 
of all belonging to one country. So, the 
mechanisms that are most valued are 
ones that are thought to bring/or are 
likely to bring the greatest harmony to 
communities, but they are not the ones 
where consensus is most obviously 
achieved or intended to be achieved 
through dialogue.
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6.2. Using Dialogue and 
Consensus	to	resolve	
issues 
A short term objective (outcome) of 
the mechanisms for Dialogue and 
Consensus is that they result in to the 
performance of resolving differences 
through Dialogue and Consensus at 
local and national levels. Longer term 
outcomes, building community identity 
and cohesion, a community that works 
together to solve common problems 
and where there are high levels of 
interpersonal trust are dependent on 
this. We asked respondents to the 
questionnaire a number of questions 
which enable us to get some feel for 
how important they think that dialogue 
is and are therefore indicative of 
the extent to which it is used during 
participation in the mechanisms. We 
also talked to the informants in the 
FGDs and the key informants about their 
and the members of the community in 
which they live engagement in Dialogue 
and Consensus. 
Dialogue and Consensus, as we have 
discussed, requires the participants’ 
discussing an issue or problem and 
agreeing an outcome that is acceptable 
to all. The research on what works 
in building trust and social cohesion 
suggests that people by coming 
together to agree a solution to a 
common problem or concern and 
then working together to solve it can 
develop a shared understanding of 
the problems they face. It enables 
them to recognise that they of have 
a common interest in solving the 
problems and that by working together 
they can solve them. The process 
builds trust between participants and 
supports the development of social 
cohesion. Working together to solve 
common problems builds an ethic of 
collaboration so that Dialogue and 
Consensus becomes embedded in 
everyday life and taken for granted, just 
accepted as the way things are done. 
Everyone in a community where there 
are thick networks of civic organisations 
working together benefits from the 
increase in trust and social cohesion 
and it provides the basis for stronger 
economic development and growth.
If Dialogue and Consensus are to be 
used effectively, it is essential that 
leaders have skills in managing group 
discussions and bring the group to a 
consensus. Seventy-four per cent of 
respondents thought that these skills 
were important for leaders of Village 
Councils suggesting that Village Council 
meetings involve discussion. However, 
only 16 per cent thought this was an 
important attribute for a Gacaca official 
and seven per cent for an Abunzi, even 
though Dialogue and Consensus would 
seem to be central to the work of these 
two mechanisms.
What was most noticeable in the FGDs 
was that Dialogue and Consensus 
seemed rarely to be used to discuss 
and come to a decision about how to 
solve shared community issues and 
problems. It was much more a practice 
used for reaching a decision about the 
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advice to be given to individuals as to 
how to solve interpersonal disputes. It 
is perhaps not surprising then that the 
skill to manage Dialogue and Consensus 
were rarely attributed to leaders. 
Leaders were much more frequently 
presented as people who make 
decisions. However, there was repeated 
reference to the Abunzi as having 
shown people how decisions could be 
reached by Dialogue and Consensus; 
a practice now adopted, according 
to our informants, by villagers for 
dispute resolution, making the Abunzi 
increasingly redundant.  Accepting a 
solution to an interpersonal problem or 
dispute recommended by those who are 
not party to the dispute also generally 
means compromising and agreeing to 
a solution all parties can live with.  It 
potentially builds the capacity to take 
on the position of the other, recognise 
the importance of compromise and, 
to the extent that the agreed solution 
works, builds trust in the community.   
However, a very high proportion of 
respondents, 88 per cent, thought that 
the meetings after Umuganda were 
very important in initiating community 
dialogue around issues, while just over 
two-thirds thought it was important 
in strengthening common community 
aspirations. It was said to provide 
opportunities for participants to identify 
community issues and reach consensus 
on how to resolve them as a community 
(Figure 44). Around three quarters of 
respondents thought that meetings 
after Umuganda were successful 
in identifying common problems, 
initiating community dialogue, agreeing 
on how to resolve the issue and how 
the community would work together 
to implement the resolution. However, 
the informants in the qualitative 
research suggested that it was more 
disputes between individuals that 
were resolved through Dialogue and 
Consensus at the meetings rather than 
dialogue about development issues 
or even what projects the community 
would work on during Umuganda. 
They painted a picture of Umuganda 
as a very top down process, with the 
village leaders setting the agenda 
and determining what happens. The 
meetings after Umuganda were valued 
for the opportunity for members of the 
community to be given information by 
community leaders about Government 
initiatives and programmes. However, 
it was also evident that community 
members do work together on the 
projects that they see as benefitting 
the community including ones targeted 
at supporting the poorest and most 
vulnerable members. 
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Figure	44:	Perception	of	Effectiveness	of	Meetings	after	Umuganda	in	Dealing	with	Com-
munity Issues 
(Source: Senate 2012)
and 47 per cent of women thought that 
it facilitated dialogue between men and 
women, while 41 per cent of youth and 
42 per cent of older age groups thought 
the NYC facilitated dialogue between 
youth and non-youth. 
The mechanisms more directly focused 
on dispute resolution were more 
frequently seen to involve Dialogue 
and Consensus. However, they are 
concerned with resolving disputes 
between individuals, although the 
discussion involves agreeing a common 
recommendation/decision. Nearly 
half of the respondents (91% of those 
that answered the question) said that 
leaders at Community Juries allow 
dialogue until a consensus decision 
is reached. Similarly, the informants 
in the qualitative research said that 
Abunzi discuss issues until a consensus 
is reached. The same was said to 
happen when neighbours try to resolve 
The same picture is painted if we 
consider the Women’s National Council 
and the National Youth Council. The 
Women’s National Council was seen by 
just under three-quarters of men (70.1%) 
and women (73.1%) as playing a key-
role in solving problems and conflicts 
affecting women in the community, but 
the National Youth Council was viewed 
less positively with only 64 per cent 
of youth and 65 per cent of older age 
groups seeing it as resolving conflicts 
between youth.  While 41 per cent of 
men and 45 per cent of women give 
the NWC a score of eight out of 10 or 
higher for facilitating dialogue between 
women, only 29 per cent of youth and 
non-youth give this score to the NYC 
for initiating dialogue between youth. 
However, there was less difference in 
the proportions who gave a high score 
to the Councils for facilitating dialogue 
between the groups they represent and 
other members of the community. In 
the case of the NWC, 41 per cent of men 
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disputes between members of a family 
or other individuals in the community. 
This was also reported to be generally 
the case when a dispute was reported 
to village leaders for resolution, but 
some informants told us that the 
leaders make a decision without wider 
community involvement. Interestingly, 
protagonists were said to generally 
abide by decisions because they had 
publically made a commitment to do 
so. Some informants did explain to 
us how the community agrees which 
Ubudehe category each household 
should be placed in, but in most cases 
the decision seems to be made by 
leaders. We were also told that in some 
cases the lists provided by the village 
are changed at higher levels, reducing 
confidence in leaders and making the 
process of agreeing categories seem a 
waste of time and effort.   
A rather different way of trying to 
understand the extent to which 
Dialogue and Consensus has become 
embedded in the community is to 
consider how ordinary Rwandans think 
that disputes and problems should be 
resolved. In the qualitative research, 
participants in FGDs and key informants 
told us that Dialogue and Consensus 
has become the accepted way of trying 
to resolve disputes between individuals 
within the family and the community. 
However, it was evident from comments 
made about leaders that when there 
was disagreement between them and 
the community the preferred option 
was to replace the leaders but this was 
not always seen as possible. 
However, a significant proportion of 
respondents do see Dialogue and 
Consensus as a way of resolving conflict 
between leaders and members of 
the community. Nearly two-thirds of 
respondents think that differences 
between village leaders and members 
of the community should be resolved 
through Dialogue and Consensus at the 
village council. However, 30 per cent 
think that disputes should be referred 
to a higher authority. Only 14 per cent’s 
preferred option is replacing leaders 
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Figure	45:	Resolving	Problems,	Village	Advisory	Council
(Source: Senate 2012)
through discussion. However, only 43 
per cent see this as the way of resolving 
problems (Figure 46). The next most 
preferred option, given by 22 per cent, 
was to refer the matter to a Government 
official. 
Similarly in the case of Gacaca Courts, 
only 18 per cent said that the officials 
should be replaced, with the most 
frequent response being that issues 
with the leaders should be resolved 
Figure	46:	Resolving	Problems	Relating	to	Gacaca	Courts	at	Cell	Level
(Source: Senate 2012)
In the case of the Abunzi, just of half 
of those that have used the service as 
well as those who have not thought 
that issues with mediators should be 
resolved through discussion, although 
over a quarter think that they should 
be replaced. Less than a fifth think 
that the issue should be referred to a 
Government official (Figure 47).
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Figure	47:	Resolving	Problems	%Abunzi	Users	and	Non-Users	of	the	Service	
(Source: Senate 2012)
not generally see the community as 
a whole being responsible and that 
there is a significant proportion that 
see leaders as responsible, suggesting 
a lack of a strong sense of community 
responsibility and ownership.
In the case of Gacaca courts, success was 
most frequently attributed to leaders/
officials, although at 46 per cent this 
was less than half of the respondents. 
However, only just over a quarter 
thought that the community as a whole 
should be credited with the success of 
the courts. Responsibility for failure 
(where responsibility was attributed) 
was attributed to defendants or their 
family and friends (Figure 48). 
6.3. Responsibility	for	the	
Successful	Operation	of	
the	Mechanisms	
Another way of trying to understand 
how ordinary Rwandans understand 
their role in the mechanisms is to 
consider who is seen as responsible 
for the success and failure of them. 
We asked respondents that thought 
a mechanism was successful who 
was responsible for the success, and 
similarly we asked respondents who 
thought a mechanism was unsuccessful, 
who was responsible for its failure. 
We also asked those who thought a 
mechanism was a failure, who should 
be responsible for solving the problems. 
It is clear that the respondents do 
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Figure	48:	Responsibility	for	the	Success	and	Failure	of	Gacaca	Courts
(Source: Senate 2012)
problems with a clear majority of those 
that made a nomination or selecting a 
leader (Figure 49).
Only 15 per cent of respondents 
thought that the entire community 
should take responsibility for solving 
Figure	49:	Responsibility	for	Solving	Problems	Related	to	Gacaca
(Source: Senate 2012)
The picture is much the same for the 
Abunzi, with responsibility for the 
success of the mediation service most 
frequently attributed to the Abunzi, 
but with  a quarter of respondents 
attributing it to community leaders and 
a quarter to the community as a whole 
(Figure 50).
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Figure	50:	Attribution	for	Responsibility	of	Success	of	Abunzi	Service,	%	that	Agreed	
Successful
(Source: Senate 2012)
Those who saw the service as a failure 
were most likely to blame the Abunzi, 
the more so for those that  had used 
the service, two-thirds, than those that 
had not, 48 per cent (Figure 51). Only 
around 10 per cent thought that the 
community as a whole was to blame.
Figure	51:	Attribution	of	Responsibility	for	Failure	of	Abunzi	Service	Users	and	Non-Users	
(Source: Senate 2012)(α2<0.05)
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When we consider the three councils, 
Village Advisory Council, Women’s 
National Council and the National Youth 
Council, it is evident that leaders are 
seen as having greater responsibility for 
success and failure than the community 
as a whole (Figures 52-55). In the 
case of the Village Advisory Council, 
only just over a third thought that the 
community as a whole was responsible 
for its success. The majority of those 
who thought it had failed to meet 
its objectives said they did not know 
who was to blame, but even so the 
proportion nominating the community 
as responsible was very small, five per 
cent (Figure 52). Not surprisingly, nearly 
two-thirds of those who thought the 
Village Council was not doing its work 
thought that village leaders should 
take responsibility for resolving the 
problems, with only 15 per cent think 
that the community as a whole should 
be responsible.  
Figure	52:	Attribution	of	Credit	and	Blame	for	Success	and	Failures	of	Village	Council	%	of	
Respondents	Giving	Positive	and	Negative	Responses	
(Source: Senate 2012)
Figure	53:	Responsibility	for	Resolving	the	Problems	to	Make	Village	Executive	Commit-
tee	More	Successful	%	of	Respondents	
(Source: Senate 2012)
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The lack of a strong sense of community 
ownership is also evident in the case of 
the NWC and the NYC. In the case of 
the NWC only a third of respondents 
think that women in the community 
can be credited with responsibility for 
successful outcomes and just over a 
fifth for failure (Figure 54). Only a tiny 
minority think that any credit or blame 
can be attributed to the community 
more generally. In the case of the NYC, 
only a fifth of respondents think that 
youth in the community can be credited 
with responsibility for its success and 
15 per cent think that they are to 
blame for failure, with only a very small 
number attributing responsibility to 
the community more generally. In both 
cases leaders are most frequently seen 
as responsible. In the case of the NWC, 
a quarter gives the credit for success 
to local leaders and a fifth to national 
ones, while responsibility for failure is 
attributed to local leaders by 20 per cent 
of respondents  and to national leaders 
by 17 per cent, with just over 10 per 
cent making reference to ‘outsiders’. In 
the case of the NYC, the major credit 
for success and responsibility for failure 
is attributed to community leaders, 47 
per cent for success and 55 per cent for 
failure. Thirteen per cent credit national 
leaders with responsibility for success 
and eight per cent the community as a 
whole 
Figure	54:	Attribution	of	Credit	and	Blame	for	Success	and	Failure	of	Women’s	National	
Council	at	Village	Level%	of	Women	Giving	Positive	and	Negative	Responses	
(Source: Senate 2012)
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Figure	55:	Attribution	of	Credit	and	Blame	for	Success	and	Failure	of	National	Youth	
Council,	
(Source: Senate Data)
by the participants, only 11 per cent 
credit them with successful outcomes 
and 17 per cent the community more 
broadly, although 17 per cent attribute 
problems to participants and 23 per 
cent to the community more generally. 
The group most frequently mentioned 
as responsible for failure are local 
leaders, 36 per cent nominating them 
although only 15 per cent credit them 
with success. 
Umuganda suggests a rather different 
picture, with credit for success being 
most frequently attributed to the 
Government (Figure 56). 40 per cent 
credit the Government with the 
success of community work but only 
eight per cent see the Government as 
responsible for its failure.  Surprisingly 
given that the success of community 
work dependents on the work done 
Figure	56:	Attribution	for	Responsibility	for	Success	and	Failure	of	Umuganda	%	agreeing	
Success	and	%	seeing	it	as	a	Failure
(Source: Senate 2012)
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Perhaps not surprisingly few 
respondents thought that those 
who participate in Umuganda or the 
community as a whole are responsible 
for resolving the problems to make 
Umuganda more successful. This 
responsibility is assigned to leaders 
by 85 per cent of respondents, the 
Government by 30 per cent, local 
leaders/organisers of Umuganda by 
45 per cent and to local and national 
leaders jointly by 10 per cent. 
Figure	57:	Responsibility	for	Resolving	the	Problems	to	Make	Umuganda	More	Successful	
%	of	Respondents	
(Source: Senate 2012)
There is more evidence of a sense of 
community ownership and therefore 
of responsibility for success and failure 
when we look at the respondents’ 
views about credit for the success of 
the meetings held after Umuganda. 
The main credit was thought to be 
due to the community (Figure 58). 
Fifty-eight per cent of respondents 
credited the whole community (43.1%) 
or participants/some members of the 
community (14.9%) with responsibility 
for success.  None mentioned the 
national Government, although 38 
per cent gave credit to local leaders. 
Responsibility for failure was laid at the 
door of the community by just under 
50 per cent of respondents, but with 
half of these blaming some members 
of the community (20%) or those that 
participate (5.6%) as frequently as the 
community as a whole (23.1)
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Figure	58:	Attribution	for	Responsibility	for	Success	and	Failure	of	Meetings	after	
Umuganda,	%	Agreeing	Success	and	%	Seeing	it	as	a	Failure
(Source: Senate 2012)
However, only around 20 per cent 
thought that the community were 
responsible for solving problems 
related to Umuganda, while just over 
half thought that the responsibility lay 
with local leaders.
Figure	59:	Responsibility	for	Resolving	the	Problems	to	Make	Meetings	After	Umuganda	
More	Successful	%	of	Respondents	
(Source: Senate Data)
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7. Community Identity and 
Collaboration
7.1. Introduction	
they feel that they belong to the 
community in which they live. Only 12 
per cent of respondents said that they 
feel left out of society. Participants in 
the FGDs told us that when they talk 
about their community they mean the 
people that live in their village. 
However, only 70 per cent would 
definitely not prefer to live in another 
community and 20 per cent would like 
to move out of their village as soon as 
possible. In other words nearly 3 in 10 
do not feel a strong affinity with the 
community in which they live, and 1 
in 5 want to move away as quickly as 
possible. Although 76 per cent think that 
everyone is striving for the same goals, 
only 39 per cent think that members of 
their community are prepared to put 
the interest of the community before 
their own goals.
There is no strong evidence that those 
who identify with their community 
are more likely to engage with 
the mechanisms for Dialogue and 
Consensus. There was a positive 
correlation between community 
identity and the density of engagement 
with the mechanisms, but it was only 
0.2 (p<0.01) for a sense of belonging to 
the community and thinking everyone 
in the community is striving for the 
same goals and 0.1(<0.01) for preferring 
In this section we consider the extent 
to which the respondents identify 
with their community and the 
extent to which high identification 
with community correlated with 
participation in the mechanisms for 
Dialogue and Consensus. We consider 
the extent to which ordinary Rwandans 
feel they can collaborate and work with 
other members of their community. 
We also consider the extent to which 
respondents are altruistic; they say 
that they are selflessly prepared to put 
the interests of their community and 
others before their own. In the absence 
of longitudinal data it is not possible 
to demonstrate that engagement in 
the mechanisms is responsible for 
engendering an ethic of community 
collaboration and/or altruism. However, 
given the breakdown in community 
integration following the Genocide, 
a strong relationship between high 
community identity and integration and 
high engagement in the mechanisms 
would make it reasonable to conclude 
that they have made a contribution. 
7.2. 	Community	Identity	
The vast majority of respondents said 
that they were proud of their Rwandan 
citizenship and 93 per cent said that 
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to live in this community more than any 
other. Although those who want to leave 
the community are significantly less 
likely to attend meetings of the Village 
Advisory Council and Umuganda, the 
differences are very small.
Those who want to move are more 
likely to live in urban areas (32% cf 14% 
semi-urban, 18% rural) and live in the 
City of Kigali (30% cf 19% Southern, 
21% Western, 23 5 Eastern) with those 
least likely to want to move living in 
Northern Province (6%).  Men, the 
more educated and youth were also 
significantly (α2 <0.01) more likely to 
want to move than women, the less 
educated and older people, but the 
differences are very small. 
There was a relatively low level of trust 
in other members of the community 
to be able to take on responsibility for 
projects and tasks unsupervised, but 
moderate confidence none the less that 
they could rely on each other (Figure 
60). In the FGDs and key informant 
interviews we were frequently told that 
while community members provided 
support to families when a member 
dies and that neighbours could be 
relied on to look after children, there 
was less certainty that other members 
of the community or even neighbours 
and friends could be relied on to 
repay money loaned to them. Alcohol 
and drug use was said to make some 
members of the community unreliable 
and in some, but not all communities, 
theft and witchcraft were seen as 
problematic.
Figure	60:	Perceptions	of	Reliability	of	and	Confidence	in	Members	of	the	Community	
(Source: Senate 2012)
The two variables on feeling comfortable 
with other people taking responsibility 
without personal supervision for 
projects and tasks form a scale which 
measures perception of reliability of 
other members of the community. On a 
nine point scale the mean is four which 
converts to five on a 10 point scale. 
The two variables on ability to rely on 
other members of the community form 
a scale which we can use to measure 
confidence in other members of the 
community. The mean on the nine 
point scale is 5.8 which converts to 
6.4 on a 10 point scale. The two scales 
correlate but the correlation is only 
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moderate, 0.32 (p<0.01), suggesting 
that there is a tendency for those who 
trust other members of the community 
to take responsibility for projects and 
tasks unsupervised by them, also have 
confidence in other members of the 
community. 
Perceptions of the reliability of other 
people and confidence in members 
of the community has little impact 
on whether or not people want to 
move, although the means on both 
scales for those who want to move are 
significantly lower than for those who 
wish to stay, the differences are very 
small.  
The analysis suggests that the main 
motivation for wanting to move is 
the desire to move away from Kigali 
or another urban area rather than 
lack of trust in other members of the 
community.
7.3. 	Community	Collaboration	
There are some contradictions in 
answers to questions on ability of 
the community to use Dialogue and 
Consensus to resolve disputes and 
agree on how to tackle shared issues 
and problems. On the one hand, 
a majority of respondents to the 
questionnaire thought that people in 
the their community can work together 
but they were a lot less confident that 
they could do so without conflict and 
that they could actually work together 
to solve problems. 
Figure 61 shows the answers to a serious 
of questions relating to the ability of 
the community to work together. The 
proportion of respondents giving a 
positive answer varied from 73 per cent 
who thought that their community had 
members with the skills, knowledge and 
ability to implement a community action 
plan, to 88 per cent who think that their 
community as a group can influence 
decisions that affect them. There was 
also a high level of confidence that they 
could work together cooperatively, 
deal with difficult issues and mobilise 
the necessary resources to tackle 
community problems.
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Figure	61:	Community	Collaboration%	of	Respondents
(Source: Senate 2012)
25.5) were significantly more likely to 
say that community problem solving 
was high than in the other Provinces 
(Anova df 4.3614 <0.001). Young people 
aged 18-25 years were less likely to 
agree that there was good community 
collaboration but the differences were 
relatively small; where significant the 
mean for 18-25 year olds being 23.6 
compared with 24.4 for 26-35 year olds 
(Anova df 3,3615 <0.001). Single people 
were less likely to think community 
collaboration is high compared to 
the married and widowed, with no 
significant difference between the 
latter (Anova df 2, 3616).There is a 
linear relationship with wealth, with 
the mean for the bottom quintile being 
23.1 and that for the top 24.9 (Anova df 
4,3523<0.001). 
The answers to the nine questions 
were used to construct a 32 point 
scale going from one (low community 
collaboration) to 32 (high community 
collaboration). The mean on the scale 
was 24.2 and the SD 4.9. The mean 
converted to a 10 point scale is 7.3. 
The distribution on the normalised 
scale goes from a minimum -4.9 to 
a maximum of +1.6 (Figure 62) and 
shows a peak at the mean and at the 
maximum of the scale with a long, thin 
tail to the negative end. This indicates 
that there is relatively good agreement 
amongst respondents that there is 
good community collaboration but with 
a small number who do not agree with 
this. There was no significant difference 
by gender, education or location and 
other difference were not large. People 
living in the Northern Province (M 
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Figure	62:	Normalised	Distribution	for	Community	Collaboration	
(Source: Senate 2012)
Respondents generally thought that 
members of their community can work 
together and support members of the 
community solving their problems 
(Figure 63).  However, only around half 
were confident that they could actually 
solve problems and a similar proportion 
thought that the community could not 
work together without conflict. 
Figure	63:	Perceptions	of	Community	Willingness	and	Ability	to	Solve	Problems	
(Source: Senate 2012)
105
We constructed a scale for Community 
Problem Solving from the items in 
Figure 63.  The Scale goes from 0 to 
16 with a means of 12.3 and SD of 2.6. 
The mean converts to 7.2 on a 10 point 
scale. Figure 69 shows the normalised 
distribution for the Scale which ranges 
from a minimum of -4.8 to a maximum 
of +1.8. There is a noticeable peak just 
below the mean and another at the 
top of the scale with a long tail to the 
negative indicating a long tail of people 
that do not think their community has 
the necessary skills to tackle problem 
solving. The picture was much the 
same as for community collaboration; 
differences between groups even 
where significant are not large. There 
is no significant difference by gender, 
education or deprivation. 
Younger people significantly rate 
the ability of their community to 
work together to solve problems as 
significantly lower than older age 
groups with no significant differences 
between the latter. The mean for 18-25 
year olds is 11.8 compared to 12.6 for 
those aged 51 years and older (Anova 
df 3,3717 <0.001).The single (M 11.8) 
rated community problem solving 
significantly lower than the married 
(M 12.4) or widows/divorced (M 12.4) 
(Anova df 2,3716). Residence of the 
City of Kigali rated community problem 
solving the lowest (M 11.8) and the 
Northern Province the highest (M 13) 
with no significant difference between 
the other three Provinces (Anova df 
4,3716<0.001). 
Figure	64:	Normalised	Distribution	for	Community	Problem	Solving
(Source: Senate 2012)
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The qualitative research indicated 
that people do collaborate and work 
together as a community, although 
not everyone participates. The general 
impression was that participation was 
higher in rural areas than urban ones. 
Communities reportedly do work 
together to solve problems, but this was 
generally using Dialogue and Consensus 
to help individuals resolve interpersonal 
disputes. There was little evidence 
of communities using Dialogue and 
Consensus to agree collective working 
together to overcome community 
problems. They did collaborate on 
projects to solve social problems such 
as helping the very poorest or improving 
communications, but it was generally 
leaders that dictated what work was to 
be done. The same is the case for land 
consolidation and crop specialisation - 
farmers affected clearly worked together 
but the ‘solution’ to low productivity had 
been identified by the Government and 
the farmers were doing what they had 
been instructed to do.
We also asked respondent to the 
survey specifically if they are confident 
that their community has the skills, 
knowledge and abilities to tackle issues 
of divisionism and genocide. Only 59 
per cent said that they were. There is 
no significant relationship between the 
scale on community problem solving and 
this variable suggesting that different 
factors are at play in influencing a 
general confidence in the ability of the 
community to work together to solve 
problems and a specific confidence that 
the community can tackle divisionism 
and genocide ideology. Nevertheless 
78 per cent of respondents were 
confident that their community was 
better able to deal with issues related 
to divisionism and genocide ideology 
today than five years ago and only two 
per cent thought that their community 
was less able to do so. There is no 
significant difference on the variable 
on tackling divisionism by gender, age, 
social deprivation, marital status or 
education but there is by Province. Just 
over two-thirds of respondents living 
in Western and Eastern Provinces are 
confident that their community have 
the necessary resourced to tackle 
divisionism compared with only 45 per 
cent in Northern Province. City of Kigali 
and Southern Province lay between 
these (Figure 65).
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Figure	65:	%	of	Respondents	Confident	that	their	Community	can	Tackle	Divisionism	by	
Province
(Source: Senate 2012)
There was little evidence of altruism. 
In general people were said to be 
motivated more by a fear of the 
consequences of not fulfilling their 
obligations than any concern for the 
wellbeing of others (Figure 66). Nearly 
60 per cent of respondents think 
that people are motivated by a fear 
of punishment and 70 per cent by a 
concern that if they fail to fulfil their 
obligations then others will not fulfil 
their obligations to them. 
One of the aims of Dialogue and 
Consensus is that people will come 
to recognise that they share common 
problems and that they can work 
together to solve them. In other 
words, that people will come to a 
shared understanding of the goals of 
their community and commit to work 
towards achieving them.  Although 70 
per cent of respondents thought that 
people do fulfil their obligations to 
others and that they have confidence in 
their community. 
Figure	66:	Motivation	for	Fulfilling	Obligations	to	Others	
(Source: Senate 2012)
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We combined the four variables to create 
a 17 point Altruism Scale, going from 0 
(low altruism) to 16 (high altruism). The 
mean for the scale is 7.3, converting to 
4.3 on a 10 point scale, with a SD of 3.4, 
confirming that altruism is low. On the 
normalised distribution (Figure 67) the 
range goes from  -2.1 to + 2.6. There is 
crowding around the mean and a tail 
of very low altruism. However, there 
are a relatively small proportion of 
people with high scores. There were no 
significant differences by gender, age or 
marital status. Residents in the City of 
Kigali had the lowest scores for altruism 
(M 6.4) and Northern Providence the 
highest (M 8.6), with Eastern Province 
scoring significantly lower than 
Northern Province (M 8.0) but higher 
than Southern  (M 6.5) and Western 
(M 6.8) Provinces between whom there 
was no significant difference (Anova df 
4,3810 <0.001). People living in urban 
areas (M 6.4)  scored significantly lower 
on the Scale than those living in other 
areas (M rural 7.3, semi-urban 7.5) 
with no difference between the latter 
(Anova df 2,3812<0.001). Difference by 
social deprivation were not large or for 
the most part significant but those in 
Q5 (M 7.0)  were significantly less likely 
to be altruistic than those in Q3 (M 7.5) 
(Anova df 4,3702 <0.001). 
Figure	67:	Normalised	Distribution	for	Altruism	Scale	
(Source: Senate 2012)
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8. Trust and Social Cohesion  
8.1. Introduction 
tasks and 30 per cent who do not think 
they can rely on other members of their 
community (see Figure 60 above).
8.1.1 Fear of crime and concern  
 for Personal Safety 
Feeling safe in one’s home and 
community is a measure of people’s 
confidence in the forces of law and 
order as well as trust in other people. 
Fear of crime disrupts people’s everyday 
activities and reduces levels of trust in 
the forces of law and order and other 
people in general. In general there was 
relatively low fear of crime although a 
quarter of respondents were concerned 
about something being stolen from 
their home. Conversely only around 
six per cent are worried about going 
out alone during the day, although 
just over one in ten are worried about 
being physically attacked in their 
neighbourhood and one in five have at 
least some concerns about their safety 
in their own neighbourhood (Figure 
68). There was little difference between 
men and women in terms of concern 
about crime. Women were more likely 
to be afraid of crime and concerned for 
their personal safety but even where 
the differences were significant they 
were trivial
Generalised trust in other people as 
well as trust in Government and other 
institutions provides the basis for social 
cohesion; it is what enables everyday 
interactions to take place on a normal 
basis. However, following the Genocide 
against the Tutsi, trust in Rwanda was 
destroyed, citizens did not trust the 
Government, they did not trust civil 
society organisations and they did not 
trust each other, or rather they did not 
know who they could trust. This made 
everyday life extremely problematic. 
As we have discussed there is strong 
and consistent evidence that trust 
in Government at least at a national 
level has been rebuilt. Citizens trust 
the President, the army, the forces of 
law and order, the Government and 
Parliament. There are also relatively 
high levels of trust in family and friends, 
but lower levels of trust in other people 
in general. Indeed the African Values 
Survey suggests that generalised trust 
may even have declined between 2008 
and 2012, but this is based on cross 
sectional survey data not longitudinal. 
We have also shown that less than 
half of the respondents to the Senate 
survey think that people can be relied 
on to take responsibility for projects 
without supervision, over a third for 
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Figure	68:	Fear	of	Crime	%	of	Respondents
scale is 12.9 (converting to 7.1 on a 10 
point scale, SD 3.4) indicating , as the nor-
malised distribution shows (Figure 69), 
that generally there is a low level of con-
cern about crime but that a small minor-
ity are very concerned about crime (range 
-3.7 to +2.3).
Combining the five variables creates a 
16 point Fear of Crime Scale going from 
0 (high fear of crime) to 15 (no fear of 
crime).  Just over half (52.4%) of the re-
spondents said that they have no fear 
of crime or for their personal safety in 
their neighbourhood. The mean on the 
Figure	69:	Normalise	Distribution	Fear	of	Crime	Scale
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8.1.2 Trust in Government, 
Institutions of Law and 
order and civil   
Society Institutions
Trust in the organs of Government and 
law and order was generally very high. 
There seemed to be a general confidence 
amongst the survey respondents 
and the informants in the qualitative 
research that the Government was 
delivering. The President was said to 
be universally trusted by the survey 
respondents as was the Chamber of 
Deputies and The Senate (Figure 70). 
However, in the FGDs it was evident 
that people generally do not completely 
trust the members of either Chamber 
of Parliament. Informants frequently 
did not voice an opinion as to whether 
they trusted them or not but said 
that they had never met them; that 
they do not come to their community. 
In a noticeable number of FGDs the 
informants said that they did not trust 
them because they had not met them.
Figure	70:	High	Trust	in	National	Political	Institutions	
There was also high trust amongst 
survey respondents in the police, the 
army and the law courts. However, in 
the FGDs although the level of trust in 
the army was said to be high, the level 
of confidence in the police was much 
lower. It was evident that the informants 
in a noticeable number of FGDs had 
little confidence that the police would 
deal with those the community thought 
had committed crimes. 
Trust in elected local politicians was 
high amongst survey respondents 
although not as high, in general, as for 
national ones (Figure 71). In the FGDs 
informants generally said they trusted 
local leaders but in a small number of 
cases said that they did not do so.  On a 
scale going from 0 (no trust) to 24 (high 
trust) the mean 22.5 (9 converted to a 
10 point scale) and the SD 3.1.
113112
Figure	71:	High	Trust	in	Local	Politicians	
trust in local politicians with a long thin 
tail of people that are less trusting.
The normal distribution goes from -4.7 
to 0.5 and as Figure 72 shows, the ma-
jority of people have very high levels of 
Figure	72:	Normalised	Distribution	for	Trust	Local	Officials	
Trust in the media and religious 
institutions was relatively high but 
somewhat lower than for political 
leaders and the forces of law and order. 
Seventy-six per cent of respondents say 
that they trust the media and 71 per 
cent religious institutions, with 69.5 
per cent saying that they trust both. 
However, 17.5 per cent said that they 
trusted neither, meaning that they do 
not trust the main  independent sources 
of information in the country.
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8.1.3 Trust in Family, Friends 
and neighbours 
Trust in family, friends and neighbours 
is relatively high. Trust is highest in 
family and lowest in neighbours (Figure 
73). Nevertheless 15 per cent of 
respondents to the survey do not fully 
trust their family, 21 per cent friends 
and 26 per cent neighbours. 
Figure	73:	High	Trust	in	Family,	Friends	and	Neighbours	
On a 10 point scale going  from 0 (no 
trust) to nine (complete trust) the  mean 
is 8.3 and the SD 1.2. The normalised 
distribution goes from -4.3 to 0.5 and 
as Figure 74 shows there is high crowd-
ing above the mean and a relatively long 
tail indicating that a small minority are 
very distrusting of relatives and friends. 
Figure	74:	Normalise	Distribution	for	Trust	Family,	Friends	and	Neighbours	Scale
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8.1.4 Generalised Trust 
The levels of generalised trust in other 
people reported by our respondents 
is much higher than has been found 
in other surveys including the African 
Values Survey which was carried out 
in the same year. However, we asked 
a different question: whereas the AVS 
asked people to say if they trusted 
people or if you could not be too careful 
we asked respondents to rate their level 
of trust on a 10 point scale. Fourty per 
cent of respondents gave a score of 
eight out of 10 or higher on the trust 
scale. The mean was 7.1 and the SD 1.8. 
However, 10 per cent of respondents 
refused to answer the question. If they 
are assumed to have a low level of trust 
the mean falls to 6.4. 
The range on the normalised distribution 
(excluding the non-responses) went 
from -3.3 to +1.5, indicating a skew to 
the negative end (Figure 75). However, 
most respondents are clustered 
around the mean with a long negative 
tail, indicating a small proportion 
of respondents with very low levels 
of trust but most with moderate to 
relatively high levels of trust in other 
people in general. There is a positive 
correlation between general trust and 
trust in family and friends and trust in 
local officials, but the correlations are 
not large (0.31 and 0.25 p<0.01).
Figure	75:	Normalised	Distribution	for	Trust	Other	People	in	General
In the qualitative research informants 
were generally though that levels 
of trust in other people had been 
increasing but that people still do not 
fully trust others, including their own 
families. It was also evident that when 
people say that they trust other people 
they are referring to people they 
know and interact with on a frequent 
basis, not other people in general. It is 
family, friends and neighbours that are 
trusted. There seemed to be two tests 
of trust: would you trust someone to 
look after your children; and would you 
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trust someone to pay you back if you 
lend them money. Informants in FGDs 
most frequently indicated that people 
in their communities generally trust 
family, friends and neighbours to look 
after their children but there was much 
less certainty that you could trust even 
those you know well to pay you back if 
you lend them money. However, there 
was said to be an increase in tontines 
in virtually every community we visited, 
and that this is the case across Rwanda 
is supported by the findings from 
FinScope 2012 (authors own analysis of 
the data).
There is a significant difference in 
generalised trust across the Provinces 
but the Anova post hoc test shows 
that the only significant difference 
is between the City of Kigali and the 
four Provinces. The mean for the City 
of Kigali is 6.3 compared with 7.1 for 
both the Southern and the Western 
Provinces, 7.3 for the Northern Province 
and 7.4 for the Eastern Province  (Anova 
df 4, 3417 p<0.001). Similarly there is a 
significant difference by location with 
urban areas having a significantly lower 
mean (6.4) than semi-urban and rural 
areas which both have a mean of 7.2 
(Anova df 2, 3419 p<0.001). 
As we have already discussed, research 
suggest that active participation in 
civil society groups and community 
activities increases generalised trust 
which in turn increases social cohesion. 
As we have demonstrated there is 
relatively high participation in a range 
of community activities although active 
participation in voluntary organisations 
is much lower. Analysis of participation 
in community activities (Figure 76) 
shows that the mean score on the 
trust variable is significantly higher for 
those who actively engage in these 
activities compared with those who do 
not, although there was no difference 
between those who have and have not 
used the mediator service or between 
those who do and do not participate in 
Umuganda. There is also a significant 
correlation between engaging in 
community problem solving (0.23 
p<0.01) and trust and community 
collaboration (0.21 p<0.01).
However, factors other than 
engagement in community groups and 
networks have been shown to influence 
or at least are correlated with trust, 
including gender, with women generally 
being more trusting than men, trust 
generally increases with age, with 
wealth and educational attainment. 
There is no significant difference in trust 
by economic status, as measured by 
the social deprivation scale or Ubudehe 
categories or by gender in the Senate 
data. However, there is a significant 
correlation between trust and age, with 
trust increasing with age in a linear 
relationship although the differences 
by age are not large. The mean for the 
18 to 25 year  age group being  6.6 
and  increasing to 7.3 for the over 50 
years age group (Anova df 3, 3418 
p<0.001). However, trust decreases 
with educational attainment, the 
higher the level of education the lower 
the level of trust, the mean for those 
with completed secondary or higher 
education is 6.6 compared to 7.3 for 
those with no formal education (Anova 
df 4,3404 p<0.001). Single people have 
less generalised trust than the ever 
married, the mean for single people is 
6.5 compared to 7.1 for those who are 
married/cohabiting or formerly married 
(Anova df 2, 3419 p<0.001
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In order to know which factors explain 
the variation in trust taking account of all 
the significant participation variables as 
well as education and age, we carried out 
a linear regression. We first controlled for 
age and education and then added the 
participation variables to our regression 
model. When we entered age and 
education on their own they both made 
a significant contribution to explaining 
the variance but the amount of variance 
explained was trivial (0.009) and when 
we added the participation variables they 
no longer made a significant contribution. 
The variables measuring participation 
together only explained 7.5 per cent of 
the variance (p<0.001). This indicates 
that participation in community activities 
increases generalised trust but that most 
of the factors that explain differences in 
trust are not in our model (Table 21).
Table	21:	The	influence	of	Participation	in	Community	Activities	on	Trust
Variables b Beta SE
Constant 4.74 0.49
Age 0.01 0.04 0.00
Education -0.02 -0.02 0.03
Active Participation in Gacaca 0.07 0.02 0.02
High Community Engagement 0.70 0.19** 0.3
Frequently Worked on Community Projects 0.35 0.09** 0.10
Frequently Attended a Community Meeting 0.77 0.20** 0.27
Active Member Civil Society Group 0.08 0.02 0.07
Participation in Village Advisory Committee 0.28 0.05** 0.07
Participation in Ubudehe 0.21 0.05** -.078
Participated in Meetings After Umuganda 0.28 0.03 0.22
Community Collaboration 0.03 0.09*** 0.01
Community Problem Solving 0.09 0.13*** 0.02
Adjusted R2    0.075
(Source: Senate Data) ***p<0.001 **p<0.01
It is evident that actively engaging in 
the community correlates with trust. 
We cannot demonstrate if it is more 
trusting who participate more actively 
in the first place or if participation builds 
trust but there is likely to be an element 
of both. The failure to explain more of 
the variance in trust by differences in 
active community participation may be 
due to spill over effect. As we discussed 
in the literature review the extensive 
research on social capital suggests that 
in a society rich in social networks the 
whole society benefits, not just those 
who participate. 
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9. Social	Quality:		   
Making Life Good 
10. Satisfaction	with	Life
If a society is to remain stable and enjoy 
inclusive economic growth then citizens 
need to feel they have a stake in society 
and to feel relatively satisfied with their 
lives. As the contributors to Hutton and 
Redmond (eds. 2000) point out, social 
cohesion, or at least relative social 
stability, achieved because of economic 
growth is fragile. An economic downturn 
can result in old cleaves resurfacing and 
conflict among different groups. 
As we have seen, the improvement 
in their economic circumstances that 
ordinary Rwandans have witnessed in 
recent years is the main reason that 
people are optimistic about the future. 
Undoubtedly, one of the main reasons 
for trusting politicians is that they are 
delivering; people see their lives as 
getting better and have confidence 
that this will continue. In FGDs those 
that were discontent generally had not 
experienced the same improvement 
in their economic circumstances that 
they perceived other to have had. 
People generally know what they want 
and those that live in households that 
cannot provide these feel resentful 
of those that can. The main causes of 
resentment were the increases in the 
premium for Mutual Health Insurance 
and the placement into Ubudehe 
Categories. In FGDs informants told 
us that many households could not 
afford to insure all their members. The 
increased premiums had exacerbated 
the problem. They also said that many 
very poor households ended up in 
Ubudehe Category 3 but were no better 
off than those in Categories 1 and 2. 
There was also evidence of tensions 
between groups that have historically 
been in conflict. The failure of some of 
those convicted of Genocide crimes to 
make restitution as mandated by the 
courts is a cause of resentment in some 
communities. 
The respondents to the survey generally 
thought that things had gotten better 
over the last five years (92%) and the 
vast majority were confident that things 
would improve for them and their 
households over the next five years 
(87%). In the FGDs and key informant 
interviews informants, except at a very 
small number of locations, agreed that 
things had gotten better over the last 
five years and that the quality of their 
life was improving. However, a majority 
were dissatisfied with their lives. 
The improvement in their economic 
circumstances was clearly one reason 
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for this, with a general perception that 
incomes had improved for most people. 
However, it was also clear that what 
people value goes beyond economic 
security, although some of the things 
they value are seen as important for 
improving their economic situation. 
People value good health, education 
for their children and economic security 
for the poorest and most vulnerable 
members of their community. They also 
value having decent housing, access to 
water, improved sanitation and good 
roads. They also want security, low 
levels of crime, to be able to trust the 
members of their community and live 
in harmony with them. They want to 
be confident that leaders will deliver on 
their promises and improve their lives, 
as well as wanting to have a say over 
the decisions that impact on their daily 
lives. They want politicians to show that 
they take an interest in their welfare.
However, they do not, in general, think 
that life is good. On a 10 point scale 
the mean for general satisfaction with 
life is 5.1 with SD 21 (Figure77). The 
distribution on the scale shows that 
a majority of people are neither fully 
satisfied nor totally dissatisfied but is 
skewed towards dissatisfied. 
Figure	77:	General	Satisfaction	with	Life	on	a	10	Point	Scale	
There is no significant difference 
by gender, but young people are 
significantly less satisfied than older 
people although the difference is 
small (Pearson -0.01**). People living 
in urban areas are significantly less 
satisfied than those living in semi-urban 
areas (t <0.01) or in rural areas (t <0.01) 
but there is no significant difference 
between semi-urban and Rural areas. 
People living with a disability or chronic 
illness are less satisfied than those not 
doing so (t <0.001), single people  
(t <0.001) and married people   
(t <0.001) are significantly more satisfied 
than widows and divorcees but there is 
no significant difference between single 
and married people. There is a positive 
and significant correlation between 
rating of economic circumstances 
compared with that of others (0.59**), 
deprivation scale (0.39**), education 
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(0.21**) and those who think their 
monthly income is enough to live on 
are significantly more satisfied than 
those who do not (t <0.001). There is 
also a positive correlation between 
trust in other people in general and 
satisfaction with life (Pearson 0.13**) 
but no difference for trusting national 
and local politicians and family friends 
and neighbours. Those who feel left out 
of society are significantly less satisfied 
than those who do not (t <0.001).
10.1. 	Social	Quality	
The Social Quality Model provides 
a heuristic device to enable us to 
understand the factors that make 
ordinary Rwandans more or less 
satisfied with their lot based on building 
a society that delivers for its citizens and 
integrates them into a society where the 
different interest groups are able to live 
work together to achieve common ends 
and that meets peoples basic needs. 
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs (1943, 
1954), has been questioned in terms 
of the extent to which the needs are 
hierarchical and the extent to which self-
actualisation,  reflects Western values 
rather than more collectivised values 
of  non-western societies; nevertheless, 
it  does provide a framework of what is 
necessary to enable people to grow and 
flourish  (Figure 78). Whilst the needs 
may not form a hierarchy in that needs 
at the bottom of the pyramid need to 
be met before those higher up, it does 
alert us to the importance of survival 
and having sufficient to live on. In 
research on life satisfaction economic 
security and health have been found 
to be the most important factor for 
explaining variation in life satisfaction 
between individuals and groups with 
trust, social capital and human capital 
all making a contribution (see e.g. 
Abbott and Wallace 2012a, 2012b)
Figure	78:	Maslow’s	Hierarchy	of	Needs
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Subjective life satisfaction is the 
cognitive evaluation by people of their 
current situation. It tells us what life is 
like for them, the extent to which they 
are living a life that they value. So it is 
important to understand what makes 
some people and groups more satisfied 
with their lives than others in order to 
improve people’s lives. 
Table 22 shows the extent to which 
variables that measure economic 
security influence life satisfaction. 
The model explains 38 per cent of 
the variance which is a reasonable 
amount. The variable that makes the 
largest contribution is respondents’ 
own evaluation of their economic 
circumstances; but not being deprived 
makes a significant contribution as does 
confidence in the households economic 
circumstances improving over the 
next five years, as well as not being in 
Ubudehe categories 1 or 2. The fact 
that not being in Ubudehe category 1 
or 2 makes a contribution, controlling 
for other economic factors, suggests 
that there may be an element of social 
stigma attached to being placed in the 
bottom two categories. However, in the 
qualitative research more concern was 
expressed about not being in one of the 
two bottom categories and therefore 
not being exempt from paying premiums 
for Mutual Health Insurance.  Perhaps, 
not surprisingly, we can conclude that 
those that are not deprived and, even 
more importantly, those who think 
that they are relatively better off than 
others are more satisfied with their 
lives than those that are deprived and 
think that they are relatively worse off 
than others. 
Table 22: Economic Security
Variables b Beta SE
Constant 0.68 0.25
Social Deprivation 0.36 0.17*** 0.03
Ubudehe Category 0.16 0.05*** 0.05
Rating of Household’s Economic Standing 0.51 0.49*** 0.02
Economic Situation of Household in Five Years’ 
Time 
0.20 0.07*** 0.05
Economic Situation of Country in Five Years’ Time 0.70 0.02 0.05
Adjusted R2     0.378
(Source: Senate Data) ***p<0.001 
Table 23 shows that variables and scales 
measuring social inclusion explain very 
little of the variance in life satisfaction. 
The only variable that make a significant 
contribution to the variance explained 
are participation in civil society 
organisations.  
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Table 23: Social Inclusion 
Variables b Beta SE
Constant 4.41 0.16
Density of Government Sponsored Mechanisms -0.01 -0.01 0.01
Frequent Participation in Government Mechanisms 0.26 0.03 0.17
Density Participation Civil Society Organisations  0.11 0.10*** 0.02
Frequency of Participation in Civil Society Organisa-
tions 
0.26 0.06*** 0.08
Employed 0.04 0.01 0.10
Married 0.07 0.01 0.08
Adjusted R2    0.02
(Source: Senate Data) ***p<0.001 **p<0.01)
The only trust variable for which there 
was a significant correlation with life 
satisfaction was generalised trust; 
however, as Table 24 shows trust in the 
generalised other only explains a very 
small amount of the variance.
Table	24:	Social	Cohesion	
Variables b Beta SE
Constant 4.00 0.14
Trust in others 0.149 0.130*** 0.02
Adjusted R2    0.02
(Source: Senate Data) ***p<0.001 **p<0.01
Empowerment is the extent to which 
people have the basic capabilities 
to take control over their lives. The 
empowerment variables explain seven 
per cent of the variance with the main 
contribution being education followed 
by health with feeling empowered 
to participate and not feeling left out 
making more modest contributions 
(Table 25). 
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Table	25:	Empowerment	
Variables b Beta SE
Constant 3.75 0.31
Empowered to Participate 0.17 0.08*** 0.04
Empowered through Community Collabo-
ration 
0.01 0.03 0.01
Empowered Through Community Problem 
Solving 
0.03 0.03 0.02
Education 0.32 0.17*** 0.03
Disability/Illness 0.54 0.12*** 0.08
Feel Left Out 0.56 0.09*** 0.11
Adjusted R2    0.07
(Source: Senate Data) ***p<0.001 
Table 26 shows the influence of 
the factors that were significant for 
economic security, social cohesion, 
social inclusion and empowerment 
influence on subjective life satisfaction. 
In combination they explain 40 per cent 
of the variance, which is marginally 
more than the economic security 
variables did alone. 
The economic variables make the 
greatest contribution, but trust in 
others, education and not feeling left 
out all make a contribution at the 99.9 
per cent level. Ubudehe only makes 
a contribution at the 99 per cent 
level and participation in civic society 
organisations at the 95 per cent level. 
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Table	26:	Social	Quality	
Variables b Beta SE
Constant 1.14 0.37
Social Deprivation 0.32 0.15*** 0.04
Ubudehe Category 0.14 0.04** 0.05
Rating of Household’s Economic Standing 0.51 0.48*** 0.02
Economic Situation of Household in Five 
Years’ Time 
0.22 0.08*** 0.05
Density Participation Civil Society Organ-
isations  
0.04 0.04* 0.02
Frequency of Participation in Civil Society 
Organisations 
0.16 0.04* 0.07
Trust in Others 0.10 0.09*** 0.02
Empowered to Participate 0.06 0.03 0.03
Education 0.12 0.06*** 0.03
Disability/Illness 0.08 0.02 0.07
Feel Left Out 0.43 0.07*** 0.10
Adjusted R2    0.40
(Source: Senate Data) ***p<0.001 **p<0.01 *p<0.05
As has been found in other research 
where poverty levels are high economic 
factors tend to explain most of the 
observed variance in subjective 
life satisfaction. This is perhaps not 
surprising. People that are struggling 
to survive are unlikely to be very 
satisfied, especially when they see 
others who do not have to struggle to 
survive. However, even controlling for 
economic circumstances the model 
suggests that trusting others (social 
cohesion), participating in civic society 
organisations and being empowered 
are associated with higher levels of 
life satisfaction.  Moreover, as we 
have argued throughout this report, 
for a Government to deliver economic 
security for all requires that people 
are empowered and a basic condition 
for sustainable inclusive economic 
growth is social cohesion. Furthermore 
social cohesion is built through social 
participation which creates social 
capital.
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11. Conclusions and 
Recommendations 
11.1. Conclusions 
However, the contribution of the 
mechanisms cannot be untangled 
from the contribution of other 
policies and developments that 
have improved people’s lives and 
their sense that things will continue 
to get better.
• A majority of Rwandans think that 
life has improved over the last five 
years and are confident that it will 
improve over the next five years. 
What ordinary Rwandan’s want 
is economic security, personal 
security and to be able to live in 
peace and harmony with family 
and neighbours. They want to 
have enough to eat; employment 
especially for youth; to be able to 
save to mitigate shocks and invest 
in income generating activates; 
accessible markets to sell surplus 
produce in; accessible quality 
education for their children; 
affordable mutual health insurance; 
roads, electricity, clean water 
and hygienic sanitation; decent 
housing; affordable access to 
fertilizers; a responsive police force; 
local leaders that are not corrupt 
and include the community in 
decision making; effective means of 
resolving conflicts; and socially and 
economically inclusive communities 
with social protection for the 
poorest and most vulnerable. 
• Ordinary Rwandans do recognise 
social cleavages that are seen 
From the analysis of both quantitative 
and qualitative data it can be 
concluded that:  
• Rwanda is becoming a more 
cohesive society and people are 
living together in relative harmony 
in most local communities. There 
is a very strong sense of identity 
with Rwanda, of pride in being a 
Rwandan citizen and people feel 
part of their local community. 
There is, however, less evidence of 
people having links outside their 
local community whether with 
other communities or by being 
linked into hierarchal social and 
administrative layers. Given the 
high levels of economic inequalities 
and the urban-rural divide this 
could lead to new divisions and 
conflicts based on socio-economic 
inequalities.
• Government is experienced as top 
down and there is little sense that 
ordinary Rwanda’s feel that they 
have say in decision making even at 
a very local level. 
• Nonetheless the mechanisms for 
Dialogue and Consensus have 
undoubtedly played a role in 
rebuilding the social fabric and 
trust thus enabling people to live 
together in harmony and to work 
together to build a shared future. 
By building social cohesion they 
provide a context which is essential 
for the rebuilding of the economy. 
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as having the potential to cause 
disharmony and conflict most 
notably the division between 
the poor and the better of and 
between genocide survivors and 
perpetrators. The most frequent 
causes of conflict and disputes 
were said to be family conflict 
and disputes over land. In some 
communities such conflicts were 
said to be declining but this was 
certainly not universally the case 
and the frequency with which the 
community was said to meet to 
resolve conflicts suggests that they 
are rife.  Gender based violence was 
also seen as a significant problem 
in most communities generally 
attributed to the consumption of 
alcohol or male infidelity. Theft, 
alcoholism and drug abuse were 
seen as problematic in some 
communities and witchcraft was 
also raised as a concern in several. 
• Rwandans do want to live and work 
in harmony as one people. This is 
fragile and depends on ensuring 
that everyone feels that they have a 
stake in society; that their interests 
are being addressed and their 
needs meet. Also, central to this 
are continued economic growth 
and social cohesion with the latter 
requiring the building of trust in 
other people and confidence in 
Government, forces of law and 
order and civil society. 
• There are very high levels of 
confidence in Government at all 
levels and the forces of law and 
order, but marginally less in the 
media and religious institutions. 
There are also high levels of trust 
in family and neighbours. The 
qualitative work suggests that 
confidence in Government and the 
forces of law and order may not 
be as high as the survey suggests 
with a number of communities 
rising concerns about unresponsive 
police. In a majority of communities 
the informants either said that 
they had little trust in members 
of Senate and the Chamber of 
Deputies because they had never 
met them or that they did not 
know if they trusted them because 
they had never met them. Where 
informants said that they trusted 
them this was generally said to 
be because they had visited the 
community. 
• Levels of trust in other people 
are marginally lower but still 
comparatively higher and much 
higher than other recent surveys 
including the Women’s Economic 
Empowerment Survey carried out 
in 2011 and the African Values 
survey in 2010. The informants in 
the qualitative work were quite 
clear what they meant when they 
said that they trusted other people; 
they trust people they know and 
interact with on a regular basis. 
They trust people they would be 
prepared to leave their children 
with and people they would lend 
money to. Even then trust is 
contingent and has to be earned. 
There is little evidence of trusting 
other people in general. 
• The policies for rebuilding the 
political and social fabric of the 
country are clearly influenced by 
those that have been shown to 
enable the rebuilding of cohesive 
societies in post conflict situations. 
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Rwanda has forged a unique 
path based on creating a single 
national identity and Government 
sponsored mechanisms for creating 
social capital through Dialogue and 
Consensus.  Participation is often 
compulsory or highly encouraged 
and little capacity building has 
been provided for working in such 
groups. 
• People are working together in 
communities to resolve issues 
and disputes but it is much 
more difficult to demonstrate a 
causal link between this and the 
building of trust and greater social 
cohesion. Other polices are also 
likely to influence a change in levels 
of trust, greater confidence in 
political, legal and civil institutions 
and people’s sense of wellbeing 
and confidence in a better future. 
Disentangling the contribution of 
the mechanisms for Dialogue and 
Consensus is not possible in the 
absence of longitudinal data. The 
best that can be said is that as 
things are improving then, unless 
there is evidence to the contrary, 
the mechanisms are making a 
contribution. 
• It is evident from the qualitative 
work that for some of the 
mechanisms there is a very strong 
feeling of top down control 
especially for Umuganda. The 
degree of control questions 
the quality of and experience 
of participation in some of the 
mechanisms reviewed. 
• Where ordinary Rwandans did 
seem to engage in Dialogue 
and Consensus was in solving 
disputes between members of 
the community, most frequently 
between members of families. The 
community, or more frequently, 
the immediate neighbours of the 
people in dispute would discuss 
possible ways of resolving the 
problem and make an agreed 
recommendation. 
• In trying to understand the extent 
to which the mechanisms are 
contributing to the building social 
cohesion we can look at the logical 
connection or chain of connection 
from knowledge of the mechanisms, 
to active participation, to levels of 
trust and hence to social cohesion. 
Given the total breakdown of trust 
following the Genocide against 
Tutsi, in the absence of evidence 
to the contrary, it should be 
safe to assume that, if there is a 
difference in levels of general trust 
between those who do and do not 
participate, the mechanisms have 
contributed to the difference. 
• There is a relatively high level 
of community engagement with 
84 per cent of respondents to 
the survey having participated in 
community activities in the year 
preceding the survey and 76 per 
cent having worked with others to 
develop a programme. This high 
level of engagement was confirmed 
by those who participated in FGDs.
• The level of engagement in civil 
society organisations is much lower 
with little evidence of multiple 
memberships. In total 37 per cent 
of respondents are members of one 
or more but with the vast majority 
belonging just to one. Typical 
members are again married men 
in midlife with completed primary 
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school education and not living in 
urban areas.
• There is a high level of knowledge 
of the mechanisms that operate 
at a local level, especially Gacaca 
(96.6%) and Umuganda (99.7%), 
but a much lower level of 
knowledge about national level 
mechanisms.  Only 11 per cent of 
respondents had heard of all the 
mechanisms but just over half had 
heard of 80 per cent of them. 
• The most important source of 
information about most of the 
mechanisms is local leaders, 
followed by friends. The radio is 
also a relatively important source 
of information but very few 
people get information from TV or 
newspapers. However, in the case 
of the National dialogue Summit 
the main source of information is 
the radio.
• 95 per cent of respondents had 
some engagement with at least one 
mechanism and had participated 
because they thought the activity 
was important. However, frequent 
and multiple engagements with 
mechanisms is much lower. 
• Taking into account the responses 
to the survey and what informants 
told us in the FGDs the most valued 
mechanisms are Umuganda, the 
Abunzi and Girinka. Umuganda 
was valued most for providing an 
opportunity to get information 
on Government projects and 
programmes although that 
infrastructure improvements are 
the outcome from community work 
were also appreciated.   
 The Abunzi are credited with having 
contributed to the significant 
decline in interpersonal disputes 
both directly by adjudicating 
on disputes but also because 
community members have learnt 
from their example how to resolve 
disputes without recourse to them. 
Gacaca is also very highly valued 
and the outcomes from the process 
are credited with enabling survivors 
and perpetrators to live in relative 
harmony in the community and get 
on with their lives. However, we 
were told in a noticeable number 
of communities that the failure 
of some perpetrators to pay the 
agreed compensation was causing 
ongoing tensions. 
• There is little evidence that 
the mechanisms are enabling 
ordinary Rwandans to engage in 
dialogue and reach consensus 
to agree development initiatives 
and community projects that 
enables the building of social 
cohesion by the development of 
an understanding of the collective 
interests of the community.  There 
is, however, evidence that in many 
communities neighbours and even 
the whole village discuss and agree 
recommendations for individuals 
resolving interpersonal disputes. 
• One potential negative outcome 
of the resolution of interpersonal 
disputes through Dialogue and 
Consensus is that much anti-social 
behaviour and crime does not get 
officially recorded and perpetrators 
and victims may not get the 
professional support and advice 
they need. This is especially the 
case with gender based violence 
and violence against children
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• Ninety-two per cent of respondents 
to the survey said they feel that 
they belong to the community in 
which they live. However, only 70 
per cent would definitely prefer 
not to live elsewhere and 20 per 
cent would like to move away as 
soon as possible. Although 76 per 
cent think that everyone in their 
community is striving to achieve 
the same goals, only 39 per cent 
think that community members 
are prepared to put the interests 
of the community above their own 
interests. There is no evidence 
that strength of identity with the 
local community is related to 
participation in the mechanisms for 
Dialogue and Consensus. 
• There is confidence in the ability of 
members of a community to work 
together on community projects 
(87%) but less confidence in their 
ability to do so without conflict 
(51%) or that they can actually 
work together to solve a problem 
(51%). There is little evidence of 
altruism.  Most people are said 
to be motivated by self-interest 
(73%) although 70 per cent of 
respondents thought that people 
could be relied on to fulfil their 
obligations. 
• Only 59 per cent of respondents 
to the survey thought that 
their community has the skills, 
knowledge and abilities to tackle 
issues of division and genocide 
- although 78 per cent thought 
that their community was better 
prepared to tackle these issues 
than five years ago. 
• Fear of crime is one measure of 
community cohesion. Cohesive 
communities can work together 
to take action to reduce crime 
and having good connections 
with neighbours can act as a 
buffer. High fear of crime can 
reduce confidence in the police 
and Government.   Levels of fear 
of crime are comparatively low 
but not negligible as measured by 
responses to the survey. However, 
in the FGDs frequent reference was 
made to domestic violence being 
a major concern and in a majority 
theft was also talked about. 
• Trust is significantly higher 
amongst those who participate 
in community activities and civil 
society organisations but in the 
absence of longitudinal data it is 
not possible to say if this is because 
participation increases trust or 
more trusting people are more likely 
to participate. Regression analysis 
shows that the main influences 
on trust are frequently attending 
community meetings, high 
community engagement and being 
involved in community problem 
solving. There are no difference 
between men and women, by age 
or by level of education.
• It is clear that people think that 
life is getting better but there are 
nevertheless people dissatisfied 
with their lives. We were constantly 
told in the FGDs and the key 
informant interviews that things 
are getting better but that most 
people felt that things needed to 
improve a lot more before they 
would feel satisfied with their lives. 
On a 10 point scale the mean for 
general satisfaction with life was 
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5.1 suggesting that people are 
relatively dissatisfied. 
• Building social cohesion requires 
more than putting in place 
mechanisms to specifically build 
trust. It requires that citizens 
feel that they have a stake in the 
existing social arrangements and 
are valued members of society. This 
means ensuring that peoples’ basic 
needs are met as well as fighting 
social exclusion, making politicians 
and other leaders accountable to 
the electorate and more generally 
building social inclusion, trust 
and social cohesion. The Social 
Quality Model enables us to see 
how policies for economic security, 
social integration, social inclusion 
and empowerment interact and 
mutually support each other in 
deliver a way of life that people 
value. 
• Regression analysis shows that the 
main influence on life satisfaction 
is economic circumstances and 
especially people’s perception 
of their household’s economic 
situation relative to others.
• It is evident that improving the 
economic circumstances of 
ordinary Rwandans and ensuring 
economic security makes the 
strongest contribution to people’s 
sense of wellbeing and there is a 
strong influence on increased trust 
and increased social cohesion. 
Mechanisms for Dialogue and 
Consensus make a direct and 
indirect contribution to the increase 
in social cohesion. They make a 
direct contribution by building trust 
through participation in solving 
community problems thereby 
building a common understanding 
of what is in the interest of the 
community.  Indirectly the increase 
in social capital itself provides an 
important context for economic 
activities which enable individuals 
to improve their economic situation 
and contribute more generally to 
economic growth.  
11.2. Recommendations
Policy Recommendations
• The Government of Rwanda 
should continue to combine 
policies for economic growth and 
transformation with pro-poor 
policies and to promote good 
governance in order to ensure an 
increase in inclusive community 
and civil society engagement 
amongst different segments of the 
population;
• The Government of Rwanda should 
continue to sensitize Rwandans to 
use Dialogue and Consensus as a 
way of overcoming their problems;
• The Government of Rwanda should 
explore ways of ensuring that 
genocide perpetrators that have 
failed to do so  make the payments 
to survivors agreed by the Gacaca 
Courts as not doing so may prove to 
be a setback to reconciliation ; 
• The Government of Rwanda should 
explore ways of publicising all 
mechanisms for dialogue operating 
at the  national level, namely the 
National dialogue Summit and the 
Forum of Political Parties, so that 
all Rwandans are aware of their 
existence and their purpose.
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• The Government of Rwanda should 
explore ways of increasing frequent 
and multiple engagements with 
mechanisms for Dialogue and 
Consensus especially in urban 
areas. This can be done by the 
ongoing capacity building of local 
leaders, especially at the village 
level, on how to better engage the 
community with mechanisms for 
Dialogue and Consensus; 
• The Government of Rwanda should 
find appropriate ways to improve 
the service delivery of local 
Government in order to increase the 
trust of citizens in local Government 
and among themselves;
• The Government of Rwanda should 
encourage greater participation 
by youth in the National Youth 
Council at a local level through 
concrete actions. There is a need 
for engaging youth in decision 
making and debate because  youth 
are future leaders and  a potential 
force for social transformation;
• The Government of Rwanda should 
strengthen linkages between 
councils at village level to encourage 
cross community bridges and 
vertical linkages and give more 
voice to youth and women;
• The Government of Rwanda should 
ensure that ordinary Rwandans 
feel that they are able to make a 
contribution  to the development 
of their community and the country 
more generally and  ensure that 
a sense of ownership policies  is 
increased and decision making is 
not perceived as top down;
• The Government of Rwanda 
should continue to explore ways 
of increasing the capabilities of 
communities to tackle issues such 
as divisionism and promoting a 
sense of solidarity and altruism. 
• The Government of Rwanda should 
ensure that community policing is 
responsive to local communities 
and that the police explain laws 
and legal procedures. A particular 
emphasize should be put on 
explaining that detention is an 
exception and that correction is 
different from judicial punishment ;
• Members of Senate together 
with members of the House of 
Representatives should consider 
ways of increasing interaction 
with citizens by putting in place 
strategies for improving their 
visibility in local communities. 
Especially appreciated are members 
of parliament participating in 
Umuganda with members of a 
community;
• Civil society organizations, 
political parties and faith based 
organizations should engage in 
the process of promoting and 
reinforcing Dialogue and Consensus 
in local communities.
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Appendix	2:	
Comparison	of	the	Senate	Sample	with	EICV-3	and	FinScope	2012	
Weighted	Data
Compared with the findings from the 2012 Census our sample over represents the 
City of Kigali by about five per cent and under represents the Eastern Province by 
four per cent and Western Provinces by just under two per cent. Compared with 
FinScope 2012 which used the 2012 classification of urban and rural our sample 
slightly over represents the urban population and correspondingly underestimated 
the semi-urban. We had 50/50 per cent men and women in our sample which 
indicates an under representation of women aged 18 years and over by about nine 
per cent compared to EICV3. The mean age of our sample was higher than that 
for EICV 3 40.5 years compared with 36.7 years. Our sample significantly under 
represents the under 25 year olds (15% compared with 31%) and over represents 
the 36-50 year olds (32% compared to 23%) and marginally over represents other 
age groups. Not surprisingly given the under sampling of the youngest age group 
our sample under represents single people (13% compared with 30.5%) and over 
represents married couples.  Our sample under represents those with no educational 
qualifications (54.4% compared to 64.2%) and over represents those with a primary 
school leaving certificate by six per cent and some secondary schooling by three per 
cent. The sample has a slightly smaller proportion of non-workers (14% compared 
to 18%) but the proportions doing farm and non-farm work as their main activity 
are much the same. Compared to FinScope 2012 our sample under represents the 
proportion of households in Ubudehe Categories 2 (21.4% compared to 25.5 %) 
and 4 (4.7% compared to 8.4%) and over represents those in Category 3 (67.7% 
compared to 50.3%). However, there is little difference if we dichotomise between 
Categories 1 and 2 and other (27% compared with 30% in the bottom 2 categories). 
30 per cent of our sample said that they have a disability or illness that limits their 
daily life while 37 per cent of the respondents to FinScope 2012 said that they had 
poor health. This compares to the eight per cent that are reported as having a 
severe disability in EICV3.
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